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THE HANDBOOK SERIES

SERIES II VOLUME 5

SELECTED ARTICLES ON

INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA

Compiled by
LAMAR T. BEMAN, A. M., LL. B.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Cleveland, Ohio

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

There have been few public questions in this country which have received more attention in the past few years than the policy of intervening in the affairs of the Latin-American countries. No governmental policy in the past decade or two has been more generally or more bitterly attacked, and none has been more consistently or more persistently followed by both political parties. Professor John H. Latané, in testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 12, 1927, said that the number of cases of intervention by the United States in the affairs of some other country probably runs up to a hundred. Particularly in the smaller countries of the Caribbean has the United States often intervened, controlling the affairs of the country by the force of American arms, sometimes continuing such control for a considerable number of years.

There is scarcely another great public question on which the people of this country have formed their opinions and reached their conclusions on the basis of so little definite information, on which so large a part of our own people are so ill-informed. On the right and the wrong of the policy of intervention, on its benefits and its harm to this country and to Latin America, on the question of whether it insures or endangers the peace of the world, on the present status and the future scope of the Monroe Doctrine, on the operations and business transactions of American bankers, oil magnates, and concession hunters in the less advanced Latin-American nations of the tropics, on the ability of some of the smaller nations of the tropics to govern themselves, the possibility of democratic institutions modeled on those of the United States forming the basis of a permanent and satisfactory government

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in the smaller countries of the tropics that have so large a percentage of illiteracy and so small a percentage of Caucasian people, there is urgent need of more general knowledge in this country, of educating the American people to the facts and eliminating the harmful effects of insidious and selfish propaganda.

LAMAR T. BEMAN.

March 1, 1928.

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BRIEFS

RESOLVED: *That the United States should continue its present policy of intervening when necessary in the Latin American republics.*

INTRODUCTION

I. The meaning of the question
   A. Intervention is the forcible interference by one country in the affairs of another.
      1. Force, actual or potential, is necessary to make it a case of intervention.
   B. The Latin American republics are the independent nations to the south of the United States.
      1. They do not include the colonies or dependencies of any European nation.
      2. They do include the islands of Cuba and Haiti.

II. The importance of the question
   A. Intervention, when necessary to protect the lives or property of American citizens, particularly in the smaller and more backward countries of the Caribbean, has become the established policy of the United States.
      1. The United States has intervened in the affairs of some other country on more than a hundred different occasions.
      2. At the present time (1928) the United States is maintaining such interventions by force of arms in Haiti and Nicaragua.
      3. Some of these interventions have lasted for quite a number of years, the pres-

ent intervention in Haiti having been begun in 1915.

4. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have instituted and have conducted interventions, so that this question is not a party issue.

B. In Latin America this policy has been made the ground of an extensive and hostile propaganda against the United States.

1. Much of this propaganda emanates from European nations, most of whom have themselves often intervened in the affairs of other countries, frequently using intervention to secure a sphere of influence or to reduce an independent nation to a dependency or a colony ruled permanently by themselves, and most of whom have sanctioned intervention by the United States by notifying the United States, when revolutions broke out in the Latin American countries, that they looked to this country to protect their interests.

a. Some of the Latin nations of Europe, especially France and Spain, have used this hostile propaganda in an effort to regain their own prestige in Latin America.

b. Great Britain and Germany have used it to advance their own commercial and financial interests.

c. Some of this hostility is Soviet propaganda that emanates from

Russia and is spread through Latin America from Mexico.

2. Bitter opposition to American intervention and a hostile attitude toward the United States is frequently expressed in Latin America.
   a. It is more and more frequently uttered by scholars, public men and the press, often in the most extravagant language.
   b. Commercial boycotts against the United States have occasionally been discussed or tried.

C. Vigorous opposition to this phase of the American foreign policy is often expressed by scholars, statesmen and the press in this country.
   1. In several of his campaign speeches as a candidate for President, Mr. Harding criticised and attacked the intervention policy of the Wilson administration, but as President, Mr. Harding continued the policy, showing less moderation and consideration than Mr. Wilson had.
   2. Many speeches have been made in Congress sharply criticising this policy.
   3. Many of the newspapers of this country often publish vicious criticisms of interventions.

AFFIRMATIVE

I. Conditions in some of the Latin American countries make necessary occasional intervention by the United States.
   A. The twelve countries between the United States and the equator are backward peoples.

1. This region is not a white man's land.
   a. In only two of these countries, Cuba and Costa Rica, is a majority of the people Caucasian.
   b. In most of these countries the great majority of the people is Indian or Mestizo, with some Negroes.
   c. In Mexico the white population is variously estimated at from five to twenty per cent.
   d. In Haiti and Santo Domingo the people are almost all Negroes or of some Negro blood.
2. In most of these countries the large part of the people is very poor and ignorant.
   a. In most of them there is a high percentage of illiteracy, often over fifty per cent.
   b. In some of these countries no census is taken.
   c. Agriculture is the chief occupation, and it is often conducted by primitive methods.
3. Practically all of the other countries in the world, that are situated in the tropics and are occupied by non-Caucasion people, are the colonies or dependencies of some European power.
   a. Their incapacity for self government is obvious and is generally acknowledged.
   b. Only the Monroe Doctrine of the United States has saved these twelve countries from a similar fate.

B. In these twelve countries the government is often unstable, inadequate and unsatisfactory.
   1. The government is frequently very corrupt.
      a. Elections are often corruptly conducted, some countries having scarcely ever held an honest election.
      b. Bribery of officials occurs in practically all of these countries, it being the regular method of obtaining concessions or getting anything done in several of them.
   2. The governments are everywhere very backward and inefficient.
      a. Public health and sanitation have been neglected so that yellow fever, tuberculosis, smallpox, hookworm, typhoid fever, leprosy and the tropical fevers are so prevalent as to be a menace to this and other countries.
      b. Roads, railroads, bridges and other means of transportation and communication have not been built or maintained.
      c. Natural resources have not been developed or utilized.
      d. Education has everywhere been sadly neglected and mismanaged.
   3. Revolutions and internal disorders have been of very frequent occurrence.
      a. In several of these countries revolution is a regular institution, the only method of getting rid of a

dictator or of making a change in the administration because of the corruption in all elections.

b. President Roosevelt said that from May, 1850 to July, 1902 there had been fifty-three revolutions or attempted revolutions in Panama. (*Message to Congress.* December 7, 1903. p. 32.)

c. In some of these countries very few presidents serve their full term and many of them are murdered or driven into exile, while occasionally one will make himself a military dictator and serve in this capacity for many years, as Díaz did in Mexico.

d. There have been many cases of prolonged disorder and internal dissension, guerilla warfare by groups of bandits, endangering the lives and property of natives and foreigners.

e. Industry has often been interrupted, cutting off the exportation of raw materials and thus interrupting the industries of other countries.

4. Government finances are often woefully mismanged.

a. Most of these twelve countries are deeply in debt and are continually borrowing more.

b. Several of them have borrowed money to pay the interest on their bonded debts.

c. All of them have at one time or another defaulted in the payment of their national debts.
d. Some of them are now practically bankrupt.
e. In one case at least no adequate records have been kept of their national debts, even of their outoutstanding bonds.

5. The governments have often failed to safeguard the interests of their own people.
a. Concessions have been given to foreign capitalists, disposing of oil, mineral or timber lands worth billions of dollars in the aggregate with practically no compensation.
b. Loans have been made from foreign bankers with exorbitant interest rates.

C. All of the Latin American countries are and must continue to be in close contact with the leading nations of the world.
1. They are all debtor nations, owing money to the leading powers of Europe.
a. European nations have over seven billion dollars invested in Latin America. (*Literary Digest.* 96:60. January 28, 1928.)
b. This is two billion more than the United States has invested there.
2. They must all continue to borrow more money in the future.
a. They have vast natural resources which must be developed.

3. The world needs their products.
    a. There is a great world demand for crude rubber, coffee, sugar, tobacco, tropical fruits, etc.
    b. A steady flow of raw materials and foods is necessary to the industrial world.
4. To obtain the loans they need to develop their resources their credit must be made secure.

D. The interests and safety of the United States demand that the European powers shall not intervene in Latin America.
1. History shows that European intervention usually has an ulterior motive, or at least a result highly undesirable in this hemisphere.
    a. It has very often been made a pretext to gain a sphere of influence, a naval base, a coaling station or some other concession.
    b. It has often resulted in robbing the country of its independence, making it a colony or a dependency.
2. Further European intervention in the Latin American countries would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.
    a. It would violate the Monroe Doctrine, at least the Rooveselt interpretation of it.
    b. It would endanger the Panama Canal.
        (1) In 1880 President Hayes said: "An interoceanic canal across the Ameri-

can isthmus would be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United States."

c. Any further European intervention or interference in the countries of the Caribbean would be intolerable.

(1) More than four billions of American capital are now invested in these countries and this amount is rapidly increasing.

(2) It would endanger the Panama Canal, or menace its approaches.

E. The European powers will intervene in the Latin American countries if the United States does not do so when the occasion demands it.

1. They have adequate grounds and provocation to do so.

a. The lives of their citizens are often endangered by the frequent revolutions and uprisings.

b. The property of their citizens is often threatened with destruction either by the disorders or by confiscation or defalcation.

2. They have often intervened in the past.

a. During the civil war France intervened in Mexico and actually set up a monarchy there.

b. In 1915 France landed marines in Haiti, and so forced the United States to take the situation in hand.

c. England, France and Germany have often intervened in Latin American countries in the past.

3. In cases of revolution or disorder in the Latin American countries, the European powers have often notified the United States that they will look to this country to protect their interests.

F. The United States must protect its citizens wherever they are and must protect their property wherever it is.

1. This is according to international law, as recognized by all the leading nations of the world.

2. We have billions invested in Latin America.

a. Our total investments there aggregate over five billion dollars.

b. In each Cuba and Mexico we have more than a billion dollars invested.

c. American capital is invested in every one of the Latin American countries.

II. To intervene when necessary is a wise and desirable policy.

A. It is a remedy, and the only possible remedy, for the existing evils.

1. It has restored order out of chaos.

2. It has protected life and property, not only of our own citizens, but of Europeans and natives as well.

3. It has established stable government.
4. It has systematized government finances.
5. It has advanced sanitation, public health, education, road building, railroad construction and commerce.
6. It will lead to the development of the resources of the country.

B. It will make these nations feel their responsibility before the world.
   1. When the intervention is withdrawn they will realize that they cannot enjoy independence unless they maintain in government, society, finance and industry the minimum standards of civilization.

C. It will be of lasting benefit to these countries.
   1. Foreign capital will feel safe in going there for investment.
      a. The more foreign capital goes to a Latin American country, the lower will be the interest rate there.
      b. Foreign capital leads to the development of the natural resources and therefore to the enrichment of the country.
   2. During the period of intervention we have built roads, railroads, hospitals, improved sanitation and public health, systematized finances, bettered education, and improved the condition of the working classes.
   3. Intervention has been the means of keeping the peace in the western hemisphere.

4. Intervention has set the country a great moral example that will be of lasting benefit.
    a. It has taught by example the great benefit of a strong, honest, efficient government.
    b. It has demonstrated the benefits of peace and order to the development and prosperity of the country, to the progress and advancement of commerce, industry, agriculture, education, public health, sanitation, and society in general.
    c. It has shown the loss and harm of continual revolutions, factionalism, intrigue, and banditry, of so often murdering or exiling the leading men.
5. The United States alone among the powers of the world withdraws entirely when the conditions that made intervention necessary have quieted down.

III. Intervention is a practicable remedy.
  A. It is sanctioned by international law.
    1. According to international law intervention is justified under several conditions.
      a. For the self-preservation of the intervening state.
      b. To compel a state to live up to its treaty obligations.
      c. To protect the persons and property of the citizens of the intervening state.
      d. For the sake of humanity.

B. It has worked well in the past.
   1. It has prevented European powers from intervening in this hemisphere.
   2. It has been unnecessary in the more advanced Latin American countries.
   3. It has preserved civilized standards in the government and society of the less advanced countries.

C. It is the only effective remedy.
   1. The policy of non-intervention has never been tried.
   2. President Wilson adhered to non-intervention in theory, but he found he was forced to intervene on several occasions.

D. It has been followed by all our recent Presidents.
   1. Roosevelt used intervention on several occasions.
   2. Taft followed the Roosevelt policy.
   3. Wilson opposed intervention in theory, but followed it, though reluctantly, in practice.
   4. Harding denounced intervention in his campaign speeches, but followed it consistently while in office.
   5. Coolidge has continued the policy.

NEGATIVE

I. There is no necessity for the intervention of the United States in the Latin American countries.

A. All just and proper results can be secured by peaceful methods.
   1. In the first instance resort should be had to the courts of the country.
      a. The American oil interests won their case in the courts of Mex-

ico and perfected their title to the oil lands that had been the chief point of difference between this country and Mexico for several years.

2. Many difficulties can be adjusted by diplomatic negotiations between the two countries.
3. In case diplomatic negotiations fail, then resort should be had to arbitration.
4. If arbitration fails, differences should be referred to the world court for final adjudication.

B. No harm would be done this country by the complete discontinuance of the policy of intervention.

1. It would not endanger American lives.
   a. American lives have nowhere been menaced to a great extent.
   b. No American life has ever been lost in Haiti, except in the case of marines.
2. It would not endanger legitimate property rights.
   a. Legitimate American property has seldom been destroyed, confiscated or endangered.
   b. Many concessions have been obtained by unconscionable methods and ought not to be defended or even countenanced by our government.
      (1) The same oil magnates, who have not used ethical or even legal methods in this country

to get possession of oil lands, have been operating in Mexico and other Latin American republics and claim large holdings there.

(2) Certainly American oil magnates will not use more ethical or better methods when dealing with illiterate Indians in Mexico than when dealing with the American government, including Congressional committees and the courts.

c. Many loans have been made to Latin American countries on conditions that are no better than grand larceny.

(1) Interest rates as high as thirty per cent have been charged.

(2) Commissions or premiums have been charged or other deductions have been made so that only a part of the loan actually reached the treasury of the borrowing nation.

3. It would not prevent further legitimate loans and investments.

a. There is a surplus of capital in this country seeking foreign investment.

4. It is not necessary to protect the Panama Canal or the Nicaraguan canal option.
    a. This is merely a false pretense, an excuse for the policy of dollar diplomacy which began in the Taft administration, a smoke screen to cover up the protection of ill-gotten concessions or unfair loans.
    b. The Panama Canal is practically neutralized by treaty.
    c. Nobody, no nation and no individual, is threatening or endangering our Nicaraguan canal option.

C. The Monroe Doctrine does not require it.
1. The Monroe Doctrine deals only with the acquisition of additional territory in this hemisphere by European powers.
    a. President Monroe declared that the extension of their political systems to any portion of this continent by the European powers would endanger our peace and safety.
    b. In 1866 Secretary Seward said the United States could not, under the Monroe Doctrine, prevent war being made on an American state by a European country, when it was not the object of the latter to extend its territory or its political system in this continent.
    c. In 1901 President Roosevelt said,

"We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by a non-American power."

2. Policing the western hemisphere is not the Monroe Doctrine.
   a. It had its roots in the brazen and impertinent words of Secretary Olney, who wrote Great Britain in 1895 that "Today the United States is practically the sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."
   b. It is the Roosevelt doctrine, as announced in his message to Congress of December 6, 1904, which showed his boldness after his re-election by a large majority; a very different doctrine from that he uttered in 1901.
3. There have been many European interventions in the affairs of Latin American countries without any harm to the peace or interests of the United States.
   a. These nations have not permanently seized any territory.
   b. They have not jeopardized our peace or security.
   c. They have not endangered the Panama Canal.

D. The policy of intervention is never used on one of the larger nations.

1. Nobody has ever suggested intervention to collect the debt France owes us and refuses to pay or refund.
2. The United States hesitates in the case of Mexico but intervenes with less provocation in Nicaragua and Haiti.
3. This shows that the policy is unnecessary.

E. If it is ever necessary as a last resort for outside intervention, then it should be by a group of nations, and not by any one power.

1. In the western hemisphere, it should be by the A.B.C. group acting with the United States.
   a. President Wilson found this method practical and very successful in dealing with Mexico.

II. Intervention in the Latin American nations is an unwise and undesirable policy for the United States.

A. It is a violation of international law.

1. It is an infringement of the sovereignty of independent nations.
   a. It denies them the right of self-government.
   b. The United States, by military power, has made and unmade governments in several independent countries.
   c. In some cases Americans have fomented revolutions to bring about intervention, and were influenced in doing so by selfish financial reasons.
2. No state is bound to give foreigners greater protection than it gives to its own citizens.

a. This is the established rule of international law.
b. Some of the Latin American countries, Haiti for example, have given Americans greater protection than their own citizens, and still this country has intervened.

3. No state is bound by international law to give the property of foreigners greater protection than it gives to the property of its own citizens.

B. It is a violation of our traditions and sometimes of our own laws.

1. It is often a declaration of war by the President.
a. This was certainly true in the case of Roosevelt's intervention in Panama.
b. It is the present condition in Nicaragua.
c. Congress alone has the constitutional and legal power to declare war.

2. It is a violation of our customs and traditions for the hundred years prior to the administration of Roosevelt.
a. In the case of Underhill versus Hernandez the Supreme Court of the United States said, "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state." (168 U.S. 250.)
b. In the Antelope case (10 Wheat 66) the Supreme Court held in a decision written by Chief Jus-

tice Marshall, "No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. It results from this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another."

3. It is a moral violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
   a. When the United States commands European nations not to seize American republics, we are in honor bound not to do it ourselves.

C. It is unfair and unjust to the country attacked.
1. Unpopular governments have been forced upon Latin American republics by American soldiers.
2. Treaties have been forced upon them by military pressure.
3. American exploiters have fostered and financed revolutions to force intervention.
4. Personal and civil liberties have been denied the citizens of Latin American republics.
   a. They have been denied the right of peaceful assembly.
   b. They have been forced to work on roads.
   c. Homes and vehicles have been searched for arms.
   d. Newspapers have been censored and even suppressed.
   e. Civil courts have been extinguished and military tribunals established by our soldiers.

5. Many of their citizens have been killed by our soldiers.
    a. Thousands have been killed in Haiti and Nicaragua.

D. The policy of intervention has been a great and unjust burden to the people of this country.
    1. It has cost the lives of many of our marines.
    2. The money cost has run into hundreds of millions of dollars in the period of less than twenty-five years since Roosevelt announced his policing-the-western-hemisphere doctrine.
        a. The taxpayers' money should be spent only for the general good.
        b. American intervention, costly in blood and money, is primarily for the financial benefit of a few American millionaires, some of whom are now under indictment here.
    3. Intervention is a burden to the people of this country in that it has encouraged the further exportation of capital from this country.
        a. It has increased the interest rates charged in this country, which is a burden upon all our people.
            (1) It acts to increase prices and rents.
        b. It is an especial hardship to small industries that are struggling to get a start, and to all people who own a home or a farm that is mortgaged.

E. It is an unreasonable and unnatural policy for a country to follow.

1. Our government constitutes itself policeman, prosecutor, judge, jury and hangman to decide upon and take over and manage the business of our neighboring nations.

III. Intervention in the affairs of the Latin American nations is an impracticable policy.

A. It endangers the peace of the world.

1. Grave international complications might arise from almost any one of these interferences by the United States in the affairs of other countries which might precipitate another world war.

a. All of the great powers of Europe have financial and commercial interests in every Latin American country.

b. Portugal with Brazil, France with Haiti, and Spain with the other Latin American countries have ties of blood, language and institutions that the United States does not have.

2. Sooner or later in pursuing this policy of intervention the United States will run into a combination of nations with disastrous results for us.

a. Many of the nations of the world are jealous and hateful of the United States.

b. In England, Germany, France, Russia, Spain, Austria and Japan, and in all the Latin American nations, especially in Mexico and Colombia, this feeling is pronounced.

B. It is doing this country a permanent harm.

1. It creates and develops suspicion, jealousy and hatred against this country.
   a. This is particularly true in the Latin American nations that ought to be our friends, because most of them owe their independence to the Monroe Doctrine.
   b. It is growing more and more true of the Latin nations of Europe.
2. It will mean a loss of markets to us in Latin America.
   a. In the keen competition for the markets of the world that will grow sharper as Europe recovers from the dislocation caused by the World war, the United States cannot afford to take any chances of losing the commanding position it has gained.
   b. Any loss in world markets will be reflected in unemployment and decreased wages here at home.
3. It will mean increasing loss of confidence, good will, and respect as a nation.

C. We, as a nation, ought to set our own house in order first, before setting out as a moral crusader.
   1. It is the old story, the man living in the glass house, the mote and the beam. (Matthew 7:3).
      a. Even Roosevelt said in this connection, "We have plenty of sins of our own to war against."
   2. It is no wonder that some foreign countries doubt the sincerity of the United

States when our government interferes in some small country because of disorder, bandits, or the need of protecting our citizens there.

a. The bandits in Nicaragua are no worse than the gang wars with machine guns in Chicago.
b. The lives of foreigners are no more endangered than they are in many of our cities.
c. There is no city south of the Rio Grande with as large a percentage of murders year after year as Memphis, Jacksonville or Nashville.
d. There is no town in Latin America with more disorder than Herrin, Ill.
e. In 1891 eleven Italians were lynched by a mob in New Orleans, an incident that threatened for a time to cause international complications.
f. In 1900 a mob seeking to lynch a Negro prisoner burned the city hall at Akron, Ohio. [See *A Centennial History of Akron,* p. 109-12].
g. American lynchings, sometimes burning the victim alive, even delaying the event until excursion trains can bring crowds from neighboring towns, occasionally prolonging the torture for an hour in the presence of women and children, displays a mob fury and savagery worse

than anything that ever occurred in Latin America. (See *Current History*. 15:897-902. March, 1922; and Cutler, J. E. *Lynch Law*.)

3. Why should the United States worry so much about treaties being broken when this country has continually broken treaties, even the first ones it made.
   a. We broke our first treaty with France, which provided that we would not make peace with England until France did.
   b. We broke our first treaty with England, which provided that debts owing English citizens should be paid, and that loyalists in this country should not be molested, both of which provisions were not kept.
4. Sometimes this country has intervened because of the repudiation of debts, another sin of which this country has been guilty.
   a. The above mentioned debts from individuals in this country to British citizens were repudiated.
   b. Eight of our southern states repudiated debts amounting to almost a hundred million dollars, the principal and interest of which now amounts to about four hundred million dollars.
   c. The entire debt incurred by the Confederate States of America was repudiated by provision of

the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.

5. Dishonest elections in Nicaragua or Haiti ought not to provoke the United States to intervention.
   a. Not many years ago a considerable part of the voters in Adams county, Ohio, was found to be making a regular practice of selling their votes. (*Literary Digest.* January 7, 1911.)
   b. A little later similar conditions were found in Vermilion county, Illinois. (*Literary Digest.* February 4, 1911.)
   c. Election frauds in many of the larger cities are a matter of common knowledge.
   d. The senatorial elections in Pennsylvania and Illinois in 1926 are still fresh in mind, and some can even remember the senatorial elections of Lorimer, Newberry and Clark of Montana.
6. Roosevelt was strong in his talk for inculcating civic virtues in the smaller Latin American republics, but perhaps here also we might best begin at home.
   a. A majority of our own people wont even vote, make an honest tax return or serve on a jury.
   b. Public sentiment in many communities often favors criminals, and juries will often refuse to convict even the most obviously guilty criminals.

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GENERAL DISCUSSION

RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA SINCE 1898[1]

1. Our Policy in South America

Since the close of the Spanish-American war the United States government has had no single policy for the whole of Latin America. It has had, instead, distinctive sets of regional policies—one for the South American countries, another for the weak countries of the Caribbean area and another for Mexico. As regards its policies toward the South American countries, the United States government has, since the independence of Panama in 1903, been content with endeavoring to allay the fears which those countries entertain of Yankee imperialism and hegemony, with promoting inter-American cooperation and friendship and with upholding mediation and arbitration as means of settling international disputes.

Some of the highest officials of the United States government during the last two decades have persistently sought to convince Latin Americans in general and South Americans in particular that they have nothing to fear from their powerful northern neighbor. Concrete statements to this effect are contained in the well-known address of Secretary of State Root in Rio de Janeiro on July 31, 1906, in President Wilson's statement of policy toward Latin America on March 12, 1913, in his Mobile address of October 27, 1913, and in his message to Congress on January 22, 1917, in President Harding's address at the unveiling of the monument to Bolívar on April 19, 1921, in two notable addresses by Secretary of State

[1] By Charles W. Hackett. *Current History*. 26:833-47. September, 1927.

Hughes in 1923 on the Monroe Doctrine, and in a somewhat less positive manner in President Coolidge's address of welcome to the delegates of the Pan-American Congress of Journalists in Washington on April 8, 1926.

In promoting cooperation and friendship among the South American countries the United States government since 1903 has played a commendable and active rôle. Of the four Pan-American conferences of the twentieth century, three have assembled in South American capitals. At all these conferences the delegates of the United States have cooperated whole-heartedly in the promotion of practical, while opposing political, Pan-Americanism. At the last conference at Santiago de Chile in 1923 the United States very generously agreed, in the interest of harmony, to two important changes in the organization of the Pan-American Union, which are designed to make it more thoroughly international in character and more independent of the United States. In addition to the general Pan-American conferences, the United States has participated in numerous special Pan-American congresses, the majority of which have also assembled in South America, thereby enabling the United States government to demonstrate to the South Americans more concretely than to other Latin Americans its spirit of cooperation in Pan-American matters.

A very positive advance in Pan-American cooperation was made in 1915 when the representatives of five South American countries accepted the invitation of Secretary of State Lansing to help decide whether Villa or Carranza merited recognition as the head of the *de facto* government of Mexico, the outcome being the recognition of the latter by the United States and eight associated Latin-American states. The ratification by the United States Senate in 1921 of the treaty by which the United States government endeavored to right the wrong it had done to Colombia when Panama seceded in 1903 by paying her $25,000,000 has justified President Harding's prediction

that it "would be very helpful . . . in promoting our friendly relationships."

Arbitration and mediation have been consistently upheld and endorsed by the United States government in its relations with South American countries during the last quarter of a century. President Roosevelt in 1903 exerted sufficient pressure upon the German Kaiser to cause him to yield to the proposal to arbitrate a dispute concerning German claims against Venezuela that had led to a blockade of the Venezuela coast. In 1903 all pending claims of United States citizens against Venezuela were referred to a mixed claims commission for adjudication. Six years later certain claims arising out of the decision by the umpire of this commission were referred by the United States and Venezuela to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

Agreements for the arbitration of specific claims were made by the United States between 1898 and 1909 with Peru, Chile and Brazil. General arbitration conventions were signed with Peru in 1908 and with Ecuador, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay and Chile in 1909. In 1902 the United States and eight South American republics signed a treaty providing for the arbitration of pecuniary claims; in 1906 and again in 1909 similar conventions were signed by the United States and nine South American republics.

The United States cooperated with Argentina and Brazil in 1910 in diplomatic action that prevented a threatened war between Peru and Ecuador. The following year the United States received from Great Britain a favorable arbitral award in an important and extended controversy with Chile which had its origin in a breach of contract between Bolivia and an American corporation—the Alsop Company—doing business in what was originally Bolivian, but which later became Chilean, territory. During 1915 and 1916 the United States ratified treaties with seven South American republics which stipulated that disputes which cannot be settled by diplomacy shall

be submitted to an international commission. In April of the following year, during the crisis in the dispute between President Wilson and President Huerta of Mexico, the United States government promptly and gladly accepted the good offices and mediation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

Finally, the United States, in its efforts to bring about the settlement of disputes to which a South American nation was a party, has frequently mediated or played the rôle of arbitrator in these disputes. Secretary of State Hughes in 1924 mediated in the feud between Colombia and Panama, which dated back to the independence of Panama. As a result diplomatic relations between the two countries were established and a boundary convention between them was signed. The same year Peru and Ecuador submitted an old boundary dispute to the arbitration of the United States. The following year Brazil, Colombia and Peru accepted a solution of a boundary dispute which they had previously submitted to Secretary of State Hughes.

Especially significant have been the efforts of the United States to settle the long-standing Tacna-Arica dispute between Peru and Chile. These efforts were begun in January, 1922, when Chile and Peru were invited to send delegates to Washington to settle, if possible, the dispute, and if not successful in this to arrange for its arbitration. The outcome was that on January 16, 1923, the President of the United States was formally requested to serve as arbitrator of certain phases of the dispute. Over two years later, on March 4, 1925, President Coolidge handed down his award as arbitrator. This provided for the holding of a deferred plebiscite to determine the future ownership of Tacna and Arica and laid down the conditions for the holding of the plebiscite. The opening session of the plebiscitary commission, composed of one Chilean, one Peruvian and one American, was held in August, 1925. Soon afterward, however,

hostile feeling betwen Chile and Peru began to impede the work of the commission and finally culminated in the abandonment of the plebiscite after a majority vote of the commission had placed the responsibility for this action upon Chile. Since then efforts of the United States to settle the dispute on other bases have proved futile. A recent investigator, Professor Graham Stuart of Stanford University, has expressed surprise that the arbitrator ever decided that the deferred plebiscite was feasible. He is of the opinion that its abandonment "has been a blow to American prestige."

2. Caribbean Political and Financial Protectorates

The new interests which the United States acquired in the West Indies at the close of the Spanish-American war, the Panama Canal treaty, the construction of the canal and the growth of American investments in the Caribbean area have been responsible for the policies of the United States toward that area being quite different from those which it has pursued toward the countries south of Panama. That the United States recognizes the necessity of a distinctive set of regional policies for the Caribbean area was admitted by Secretary of State Hughes in a public address on August 30, 1923.

With four of the countries of the Caribbean area—Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti—the United States government has treaty arrangements that have given it considerable latitude in its recent relations with them. Two of these countries, Cuba and Panama, entered into such treaty agreements upon acquiring their independence.

Cuba was left in the military possession of the United States at the close of the Spanish-American war, and was permitted to govern herself only after agreeing in 1901 to certain conditions embodied in the Platt amendment. These conditions restricted the right of Cuba freely to

make treaties or to contract debts; obliged her to continue the sanitary program begun during the military occupation by the United States and to grant to the United States coaling and naval stations; and authorized the United States government to intervene in the island at its discretion "for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty," and for discharging certain obligations with respect to Cuba that were imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States.

Three outstanding incidents suffice to illustrate the effectiveness with which the Platt amendment has been applied. In the latter part of 1906 the United States proclaimed a provisional government in Cuba and maintained it in power until early in 1909. Secretary of State Lansing in 1917 warned rebellious Cuban Liberals that the United States would not recognize a government set up by force; soon afterward 400 American marines landed at Santiago and assisted in the suppression of the rebellion. President Coolidge in 1924 materially aided the recognized government of Cuba, then engaged in the suppression of internal disorders, by selling to it a considerable quantity of war materials and by maintaining an embargo of several months duration against the shipment of arms and munitions to the island. Notwithstanding the stabilizing effect upon Cuba of the Platt amendment the strength of nationalist and anti-American sentiment in the island was recognized by President Machado in May of this year when he admitted that on his recent visit to the United States he had proposed to the United States government that there should be a further severance of the bonds that bind Cuba to the United States.

The treaty which Panama made with the United States, upon acquiring independence in 1903, obliges the United States to maintain this independence. It also gives to the United States the police and sanitary con-

trol in the cities of Panama and Colón and authorizes the United States to use and occupy any lands and waters in the Republic of Panama that might be necessary for the construction, operation or protection of the canal. Thus Panama, while being recognized as a sovereign and independent state, has been since 1903 virtually a protectorate of the United States.

The right of the police and sanitary control outlined in the treaty of 1903 has been effectively and harmoniously exercised by the United States. Panama protested, however, when the United States took control of the island of Taboga, near the Pacific end of the canal. Panama also felt deeply aggrieved in 1921 when the United States forced her to accept an unfavorable arbitral award in a boundary dispute with Costa Rica. A new treaty between the United States and Panama was signed in July, 1926. Its most notable provision forces Panama to consider herself in a state of war "in case of any war in which the United States should be a belligerent." Public sentiment in Panama has repudiated this treaty, with the result that early in 1927 further consideration of it was indefinitely postponed by the Panaman assembly. This action represents the climax to date of a spirit of opposition to the United States which has been developing in Panama since 1920.

Financial difficulties of the Dominican Republic and Haiti have resulted during the last two decades in treaty arrangements that have forced them into financial, and to a lesser degree, into the political receivership of the United States. President Roosevelt in 1905 resorted to an executive agreement by which the entire collection and the application on the foreign debt of 55 per cent of the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic were assumed by the United States. Two years later this agreement was incorporated in a convention. This convention granted the United States no political rights in the Dominican Republic, but chronic internal disorders

in that country prompted the United States to send commissions on three different occasions between 1912 and 1914 to endeavor to bring order out of chaos; on another occasion the United States minister mediated between rival political factions.

Internal conditions did not improve, and in 1916 United States marines were landed to maintain order and to protect life and property. On November 29 of that year, after the Dominican government had refused to sign a new treaty which enlarged the powers of the United States, a proclamation was issued by United States naval officers which declared the Dominican Republic to be under the military administration of the United States. This military administration was maintained until 1924, although President Wilson in 1920, and President Harding in 1921, stipulated conditions for its termination which were unacceptable to the Dominicans. In 1924, after the Dominican government had agreed to ratify all the financial acts of the American military administration and to sign a new treaty providing for the collection and disbursement of Dominican revenues by a United States receiver general until all loans, including a new one not to exceed a total of $25,000,000, shall have been paid, the United States marines were withdrawn. A Dominican government headed by President Vásquez was installed on July 12, 1924, and with this government the United States signed a treaty in December, 1924, which contains the demands exacted as a condition for the termination of the military administration. Thus the Dominican Republic regained its right of self-government; it still remains in the financial receivership of the United States.

Financial difficulties of the Haitian government led the United States in 1914 to propose a convention similar to the 1907 convention with the Dominican Republic. This proposal was refused by the Haitian government. The following year internal disorders in Haiti resulted

in the landing of United States marines and the taking over by the United States naval authorities of the customs house and other public services at Port-au-Prince. On September 16 of that year a treaty was signed which virtually established Haiti as a protectorate of the United States. The Haitian Senate was virtually coerced by United States naval authorities into ratifying this treaty on November 11, 1915, and it is still in effect. Under its provisions there has been established a Haitian receivership of customs under the control of the United States; a United States financial adviser has assisted in fiscal, financial and commercial matters; all revolutionary forces have been disarmed and a native constabulary under the command of United States officers has been organized. Moreover, Haiti has guaranteed not to cede any of her territory to any nation other than the United States, and not to make any new loans or changes in her tariff without the consent of the United States. Thus Haiti, while remaining equally with the Dominican Republic in the financial receivership of the United States, is to a greater degree than its neighbor, a protectorate of the United States. The aim of the United States in her Haitian policy was declared by Secretary of State Hughes in 1923 to be none other than "to establish peace and stability."

3. Supervision and Intervention in Central America

The necessity of protecting the Panama Canal and the right which it has acquired to construct the Nicaragua Canal have caused the United States government to feel a peculiar interest in and responsibility toward the five Central American republics north of Panama. This was admitted by President Coolidge on April 25, 1927, when he said that toward those countries "we feel a moral responsibility that does not attach to other nations." This new interest and responsibility have constituted the

justification of our government in supervising and even in intervening at its discretion in the affairs of the Central American republics, despite the lack of treaty arrangements authorizing such action.

The policy of supervision and intervention in Central America is best exemplified in the relations of the United States with Nicaragua, but additional evidence is not lacking. In 1917, because the Tinoco government in Costa Rica was disposed to grant oil concessions to British interests, the United States government refrained from recognizing it, thereby hastening, if not assuring its downfall. The Acosta government, which came into power in 1919, was promptly recognized by that of the United States after it had canceled the objectionable concessions.

El Salvador in October, 1923, negotiated a loan with New York bankers. An interchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of El Salvador and the United States, with reference to the loan, resulted in El Salvador giving assurances that she would cooperate in every respect in carrying out the terms of the loan contract. The United States took cognizance of the terms of the loan contract, and under certain contingencies is to authorize the Secretary of State to carry out certain of its stipulations. Furthermore, matters in dispute concerning the loan contract are to be referred to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States "for decision, and his decision shall be final and binding."

In 1924, during a revolution in Honduras, American warships were sent to both coasts of Honduras; marines were frequently landed to protect life and property and to maintain order, and neutral zones were established at various places, including Tegucigalpa, the capital.

The United States has supervised or intervened in Nicaraguan affairs almost constantly since 1909. In the latter year the United States lent its moral support to help overthrow the notorious Liberal President, Zelaya,

and then materially aided the Conservatives by refusing to permit the Liberals to bombard a Caribbean port. With the newly established Conservative government the United States in 1910 entered into an agreement which, in part, provided for the establishment of a claims commission, with two-thirds of its membership either nominated or appointed by the government of the United States. The Conservatives were in the minority in Nicaragua, and in 1911 the Conservative President, Adolfo Díaz, confessed his inability to insure "lasting and stable peace, order, economy, moderation and liberty." The following year, in response to a request of Díaz that the United States protect the lives and property of her nationals and extend this "protection to all the inhabitants of the republic," President Taft sent a detachment of marines to Nicaragua. The avowed purpose in doing this was "to keep open communications, and to protect American life and property," to discountenance "any revival of Zelayaism" and to lend the moral support of the United States "to the cause of legally constituted good government for the benefit of the people of Nicaragua." Marines subsequently were stationed at various places in Nicaragua and before the end of 1912 even engaged in hostilities against the enemies of Díaz. For thirteen years thereafter the Conservatives were maintained in power by United States naval forces.

With a minority Conservative government, thus protected by United States marines, the United States in 1916 made the Bryan-Chamorro treaty. By this treaty Nicaragua, in return for $3,000,000 to be spent under the supervision of the United States, granted to the United States the exclusive right to construct the Nicaragua Canal, a ninety-nine-year lease of the Corn Islands, and the right to establish a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca.

Free and general elections, supervised by United States electoral experts, were held in Nicaragua in 1924,

and, as a result, a coalition Liberal Party came into power on January 1, 1925. But the Liberals had rough sailing. In August, 1925, the marines were withdrawn, and less than three months later the Conservatives restored themselves to power by a *coup d'état,* engineered by General Chamorro. The constitutional president was at first retained as a figurehead, but the Congress was illegally constituted when eighteen Liberal members were unseated and as many Conservatives seated in their stead. By this illegally constituted congress the constitutional Vice-President Sacasa was deposed and exiled in January, 1926—acts in themselves illegal because of the illegal character of the Congress itself—after which the resignation of the president was accepted. This cleared the way for the election of Chamorro, who remained in power until October 30, 1926, despite the refusal of the United States and the other Central American powers to recognize him. After Chamorro's resignation the eighteen ousted Liberal congressmen were authorized to take their seats, although there appears to be some question as to whether they did so. At all odds, this Congress, recognizing as valid the resignation of the constitutional president, but ignoring the fact that the constitutional vice-president had been deposed by an illegally constituted congress, chose Adolfo Díaz as president in November, 1926. Five days after his election Díaz appealed to the United States for aid against the rebellious Liberals, and two days later he was recognized as the constitutional president of Nicaragua.

The narrative of events in Nicaragua during the past ten months need not be retold here. Suffice it to say that by March of this year over 5,000 marines were either in Nicaragua or en route there and fourteen United States warships were in Nicaraguan waters. Díaz again has been maintained in power by armed forces of the United States, and one of the immutable bases for the negotiation of the recent agreement betwen Mr. Stim-

son, the personal representative of President Coolidge, and the Conservative and Liberal leaders of Nicaragua, was that Díaz should be retained as President until 1928, when regular elections will be held under the supervision of the United States. Furthermore, 1,500 marines are to be kept in Nicaragua for permanent duty.

The United States government has frequently endeavored to promote among the Central American republics arbitration and inter-American cooperation, and to demonstrate its readiness to offer friendly counsel or mediation. Betwen 1900 and 1909 the United States entered into agreements for the arbitration of certain claims with Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Costa Rica. In 1902 the United States and the five Central American republics signed a treaty providing for the arbitration of pecuniary claims; in 1906 and again in 1909 similar conventions were entered into by the same signatories.

Mediation between Guatemala and El Salvador was effected in 1906 by President Roosevelt, in cooperation with President Díaz of Mexico; the outcome was a general treaty of peace and amity to which all of the five Central American republics except Nicaragua were signatories. The following year the good offices of the United States were three times proffered, twice in cooperation with Mexico, to the warring republics of Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. The first proffer was refused. The outcome of the second proffer was a treaty of peace between El Salvador and Nicaragua. The outcome of the third proffer was the Central American conference at Washington in 1907, at which the five Central American republics, Mexico and the United States were represented. The most significant achievement of this conference was the signing of a convention providing for the establishment of a Central American Court of Justice. This arbitral court was formally installed on May 25, 1908, and functioned until March 17, 1918.

Unfortunately, the occasion for its dissolution was the refusal of the United States and Nicaragua to accept its decision to the effect that Nicaragua in having signed the Bryan-Chamorro treaty had violated a treaty of peace and amity signed at Washington in 1907, and also had violated certain rights of Costa Rica and El Salvador.

The United States continued after the Washington conferences of 1907 to favor the arbitration and mediation of Central American disputes. As a result of the friendly mediation of the United States, a convention for the arbitration of a boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica was signed at Washington on March 17, 1910. President Taft in 1911, at the request of President Davila of Honduras, intervened as arbitrator in a civil war; the outcome was the establishment of a provisional government and the restoration of peace. Beginning in 1913 the United States signed treaties with all the Central American republics which stipulated that disputes which cannot be settled by diplomacy shall be submitted to an international commission. In 1922-1923, in response to an invitation extended by the United States, the second Central American conference was held in Washington. This conference adopted twelve treaties and conventions, and three protocols. The United States participated in the conference, but could appropriately become a party to only the convention for the establishment of international commissions of inquiry.

The most significant achievement of this conference was the signing of a general treaty of peace and amity which provides that the governments of the signatory states "will not recognize any other government which may come into power in any of the republics through a *coupe d'état* or a revolution against a recognized government so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country." By this treaty the Harding administration induced the Central American states to adhere to the

Wilson policy, first applied in Mexico, of maintaining orderly constitutional governments as opposed to revolutions and dictatorships.

Finally, in 1924, in response to the invitation of Secretary of State Hughes, the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala participated with the United States in a conference at Amapala, Honduras, the object of which was to mediate between warring factions in that country. The outcome was the signing of a convention and the official restoration of peace on May 5, 1924.

4. Cordial Relations With Mexico, 1898-1910

Varying conditions in Mexico have made for varied relations between that country and the United States since 1898. In no period in the past, however, have the relations between the two countries been more cordial than from 1898 to 1910. During those years there was splendid cooperation between the two governments for the elimination of the border problem which had many times endangered relations and had even threatened to provoke war between the two countries. In the same period four conventions concerning the water boundary between the two countries, two extradition treaties, and one convention providing for the equitable distribution of waters of the Rio Grande for irrigation purposes, were signed.

The two governments also had frequent recourse to arbitration. In 1902 they signed the protocol of an agreement by which the claim known as the Pious Fund of the Californias was settled by the Permanent Court at The Hague in 1904. Three treaties providing for the arbitration of pecuniary claims were signed by the United States and Mexico between 1902 and 1910, as were a general arbitration convention in 1908, and two years later, a convention and a supplementary protocol for the arbitration of the controversy over the ownership of a tract of land

near El Paso, known as the Chamizal case. This question was submitted to a mixed commission in 1911, but the award was indecisive, and the question has frequently been the subject of diplomatic negotiation since 1911. The achievements of Presidents Roosevelt and Díaz in mediating between the warring Central American states in 1906 and 1907 have already been noted.

At the same time that relations between the governments of the United States and Mexico were so extremely cordial, between 1898 and 1910, American investments in Mexico increased enormously. In the decade preceding 1912 approximately $500,000,000 of American money was invested and in the latter year between 40,000 and 75,000 Americans were living in Mexico. The official and public opinion held of Mexico in the United States was well expressed by Secretary of State Root in 1907 when he said that the government of Mexico had attained a "high standard of statesmanship. . . There has grown up and is continually developing between the people of the two countries a knowledge of each other, an appreciation of each other, a kindlier feeling toward each other."

5. Relations With Mexico During the Revolution, 1910-1917

During the revolution against Díaz (1910-1911), and the later turbulent administration of Madero (1911-1913), President Taft, while endeavoring to secure guarantees for the safety of American lives and property in Mexico, twice mobilized thousands of soldiers along the international frontier and also sent warships to Vera Cruz. In each instance congressional and public opinion in the United States strongly opposed his apparent intervention program. President Taft turned over the unsolved Mexican problem to President Wilson on March 4, 1913—twelve days after the *coup d'état* of the reactionary Huerta, and ten days after the assassination of President Madero.

Wilson's policy toward the usurper Huerta evolved gradually. From the beginning he refused to recognize him on the grounds that he had obtained power "by treachery and violence." In the summer of 1913 he intervened indirectly in Mexico when he sent John Lind to Mexico City with instructions looking toward the elimination of Huerta and the restoration of peace through a fair election. Lind's mission was a failure, but before the end of 1913, in three celebrated public utterances, Wilson made it clear that he did not intend to intervene with armed forces to oust Huerta, but that the entire moral force of his position would be put behind those in Mexico who were opposing Huerta. In keeping with this policy, Wilson early in 1914 placed an embargo upon the shipment of arms to Mexico. Soon afterward Huerta's hostile attitude and particularly his refusal to salute the American flag after it had been insulted at Tampico, induced Wilson to intervene with force in Mexico. The occupation of Vera Cruz and the interception of arms and munitions designed for Huerta followed, resulting in the severance of diplomatic relations, the mediation of the A B C powers and the Niagara Falls conference. By this conference little was accomplished toward pacifying Mexico, but the successful mediation of the A B C powers helped to dispel Latin American fear of the United States and prepared the way for Wilson, in due course, to withdraw gracefully the troops from Vera Cruz.

Out of the turmoil of civil war between the Liberal leaders that followed the overthrow of Huerta, Carranza emerged as the dominant Mexican chieftain. Accordingly, he won on October 19, 1915, the recognition of the United States and of eight associated Latin American nations as the head of the *de facto* government. This success piqued his rival, Villa, who, by way of retaliation started upon a career as an audacious bandit and murderer. The Santa Ysabel massacre, the Columbus raid

and the Pershing expedition sent into Mexico to capture Villa were but the outstanding incidents in the deliberate attempt of Villa to embarrass Carranza by involving him in serious difficulties with the United States. That Villa did not succeed in all his ulterior designs was due most of all to the forbearance of President Wilson. Furthermore, as the Pershing expedition recrossed into the United States early in 1917 a new Constitution was promulgated at Queretaro. In generalizing upon significant developments between 1913 and 1917 it may be said that from the standpoint of the Mexican revolution the historic mission of Wilson had been to help prevent a permanent Conservative reaction under Huerta and to make possible, under the leadership of Carranza, the incorporation into the Mexican Constitution of the socio-economic aims of the revolution of 1910.

6. Relations With Mexico Endangered by 1917 Constitution

The constitutional provisions embodying the socio-economic aims of the Mexican revolution which have resulted in strained relations between the United States and Mexico relate to agrarian reforms, the nationalization of subsoil deposits, and the limiting of land, particularly agricultural land, which foreigners may own in Mexico. As regards the agrarian reforms, the payment in bonds, instead of in cash for a just value thereof, to American land owners in Mexico for lands expropriated under the authority of the agrarian provisions of the Mexican Constitution, was largely responsible for strained relations between the governments of the United States and Mexico between 1917 and 1920. This was partially responsible for the refusal of the United States to recognize Obregón after he became President in 1920, and for a diplomatic deadlock between the two governments between 1921 and 1923. In a joint conference in 1923, however, it was agreed that thenceforth Mexico would limit

the amount of land belonging to Americans that might be expropriated on the basis of payment in bonds and that all claims of Americans resulting from the carrying out of the agrarian program of the Mexican government should be adjudicated, as is now being done by the General Claims Commission at Washington. A Special Claims Commission has also been created to pass upon claims resulting from damages incurred by Americans in Mexico as a result of revolutionary conditions between 1910 and 1920.

Nationalization of subsoil deposits was not one of the primary aims of the Mexican revolution in 1910. Provisions authorizing such action, however, were incorporated in the Constitution of 1917, and executive action taken by Carranza to put them into operation before his death in 1920 resulted in a concerted but futile effort in the United States to bring about intervention in Mexico. Carranza's death relieved the diplomatic friction, but the inability of the United States government to secure from Obregón, as a condition for his recognition, what it regarded as essential guarantees for the protection of American property rights in Mexico against the enforcement of the constitutional provisions authorizing both agrarian reforms and the nationalization of subsoil deposits, made complete the diplomatic deadlock of 1921-1923. In the joint conference of 1923 the Mexican commissioners agreed, with respect to the petroleum controversy, that their government would recognize the right to the subsoil deposits of all owners of the surface who before the promulgation of the Constitution had performed a positive act indicative of their intention to exploit the subsoil. With respect to owners who, before the promulgation of the Constitution, had not performed such a positive act, the Mexican commissioners, without repudiating their contention that in principle such owners had forfeited their rights to the subsoil, recognized the right of the United States to make "any reservation of or in behalf

of the rights" of such nationàls before an arbitral claims commission.

After the recognition of Obregón, accorded on the basis of the understandings reached by the joint conference of 1923, and after the creation of the General and Special claims commissions, relations between the United States and Mexico were very cordial until November, 1925. As proof of this, mention may be made of the very generous material and moral support which the government of the United States lent to the Obregón government during the de la Huerta revolution of 1923-1924, and its very positive acts of hostility toward the revolutionists.

Serious friction again developed between the two governments in the latter part of 1925 when the Mexican Congress passed legislation putting into operation the provisions of the Constitution relating to the nationalization of subsoil deposits—which provisions thereto had been put into operation only by executive decree—and also passed legislation putting into operation the constitutional provisions limiting the amount of agricultural land which foreigners may own in Mexico. It is the contention of the United States government that both laws are retroactive and confiscatory in character and in violation of the understandings reached with the Obregón government before its recognition by that of the United States. In a final note terminating a voluminous correspondence on the probable effect of these laws, Secretary of State Kellogg, on October 30, 1926, notified the Mexican government that the United States did not expect it to take any action that would deprive Americans in Mexico of their property rights.

Meanwhile the land law, as a result of its having been accepted by many aliens, including Americans, offers some prospect of provoking no further serious diplomatic friction between the two governments. As regards the controversy over the petroleum law, a lull has developed since

the aggrieved petroleum companies have appealed to the Mexican Supreme Court against its alleged retroactive and confiscatory features. Should the Supreme Court rule against the petroleum companies, and should the Mexican government take steps to enforce the law as it is now regulated by executive decree, the diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico would probably again become very strained.

BILLIONS OF OUR CAPITAL INVESTED IN LATIN AMERICA[2]

American investments in Latin America are a product of the twentieth century. Before 1900 American capitalists and industrialists had penetrated into Mexico, Cuba, Central America and even into South America, but the movement was a sporadic one and of little moment. The domestic demand for funds and the consequent high rate of interest here made the export of capital unprofitable. But in the last twenty-five years we have become the Latin-American investors *par excellence* in the Caribbean area, and even in South America. These financial ventures have both an economic and a political phase which deserves attention.

We turn first to the economic side of the matter. At the outset it should be made clear that we have not invested money in Latin America because we wanted to control Latin-American politics or economics. Money is not so magnanimous as to serve political interests first. Capitalists demand interest rather than intervention. We have invested in Latin America since 1900 because it was a better place to invest than in the United States. Capitalists are greedy—like everybody else. Since 1900 the United States has produced more capital than could be employed here at high rates of interest, hence some of it —the most daring part—sought lucrative investment abroad. Secondly, we reached a point long before the

[2] By Harry T. Collings. *Current History*. 26:848-53. September, 1927.

World war where our 100,000,000 people could not consume all we made. Production outran population. We needed foreign markets for our factories if they were to run at capacity. To secure foreign markets we had to invest in them. Consumption of goods, services and capital tend to lag behind production. The capitalist class, therefore, which is in control of modern business, constantly demands new markets and new opportunities for investment. Formerly it may have been true that "trade follows the flag"; the twentieth century motto is, "trade follows investment." We invested in Latin America extensively since 1898, because it was the best and most logical place for surplus funds and products.

At the beginning of the present century our holdings abroad totaled approximately $455,000,000, distributed as follows:

Mexico	$185,000,000
Canada	150,000,000
Cuba	50,000,000
Other Latin-American republics	55,000,000
Europe	10,000,000
Orient	5,000,000

Our investments abroad had risen to $1,500,000,000 some time before the World war, but we owed to foreign nations $6,500,000,000. We have now become a creditor nation to the extent of $22,000,000,000. The Controller of the United States Treasury summarized "our contributions to financing the outside world" from August, 1914, to August, 1922, as follows:

American securities repurchased abroad	$ 3,000,000,000
American government loans	10,000,000,000
Interest accrued on the above	2,000,000,000
Commercial credit extended abroad	3,000,000,000
Dollar securities bought abroad	2,731,000,000
Foreign money securities sold here	620,000,000
Foreign currencies bought by America	500,000,000
Total	$21,851,000,000

Some $10,000,000,000 of the above consist of government loans to Europe for war and postwar purposes. This may therefore be dropped from consideration; more than one-half of it has already been canceled. Of the remaining $12,000,000,000, more than one-third is invested in Latin America. On December 31, 1925, the Department of Commerce estimated that the total investments of the United States in Latin America amounted to $4,240,000,000. Of this amount, $910,000,000 was in government securities or in government-guaranteed obligations and $3,330,000,000 in industrial and other private securities. During 1926, about $1,000,000,000 additional foreign investments were bought by United States citizens, and of this amount $354,989,700 went to Latin America. About $70,000,000 of the 1926 investments went to private industrial and commercial corporations. The remainder was borrowed by national governments, states or municipalities, and was largely destined for the construction of railways, highways or other public works. A more recent estimate by the Department of Commerce (June 30, 1927) placed our Latin-American investments at $4,800,000,000.

Interests in Cuba

Among the Latin-American republics, Cuba now leads in the amount of American investment, with more than a quarter of the total. The Department of Commerce in 1924 estimated that $1,360,000,000 of money was invested in that island. Of this sum $110,000,000 was in Cuban government bonds and the remainder in the following:

Sugar properties	$ 750,000,000
Railroads	110,000,000
Public utilities	110,000,000
Hotels, office buildings and other real estate	80,000,000
Tobacco and cigars	50,000,000
Miscellaneous factories	40,000,000
Mining properties	35,000,000

Merchandise	$ 30,000,000
Agricultural land other than sugar and tobacco land	25,000,000
Banking	20,000,000
Independent docks, warehouses and terminal facilities	10,000,000
Total	$1,250,000,000

By November 30, 1926, American capital invested increased to $1,470,500,000.

That Cuban railroads should be the product of American money and American engineering seems a natural concomitant of our economic and political interest in the Pearl of the Antilles. Telephone and telegraph companies, power companies, mining interests in iron, copper and manganese, newspapers, oil, meat packing, cement and fruit growing consume many millions of dollars of American capital. So extensive are the Cuban holdings of Americans that it may truly be said that the "business life of Cuba is dominated by American money." The National City Bank, with twenty-four branches in Cuba; the American Foreign Banking Corporation, the Trust Company of Cuba, organized by Norman H. Davis in 1905; the First National Bank of Boston and the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston have played a large part in the financial and commercial activities of Cuba since the Spanish war.

Mexico stands second to Cuba in the amount of American capital. In 1902, Mr. Andrew D. Barlow, an American consul in Mexico, stated after a careful estimate: "Five hundred million dollars of gold is, in round numbers, the American capital invested in Mexico." The year 1912, perhaps, represented the maximum investment period for American funds in Mexico. Revolutionary disturbances after 1913 lessened all economic activities in oil and mining properties, the two fields of special interest to American capitalists. During December, 1926, at the request of the State Department, the American

consuls in Mexico reported to that department the value of American holdings in Mexico as follows:

Rural property	$ 166,047,000
Urban property	35,771,000
Oil lands	318,638,000
Refineries	50,070,000
Mines	317,427,000
Smelters	25,180,000
Timber	10,935,000
Railways	248,158,000
Manufacturing enterprises	27,716,000
Merchandising enterprises	26,140,000
Public utilities	30,799,000
[3] Concealed interests	6,938,000
Miscellaneous investments not included above	125,242,000
Total	$1,389,061,000

At the close of 1926 Americans had invested in the South American continent approximately $1,250,000,000. Chile led the list with $400,000,000, followed by Brazil with $300,000,000, Argentina with $235,000,000 and Peru with $100,000,000. North American need for coffee, oil, manganese, meat and nitrates has helped to bring about this export of capital, but South American need for foreign capital has been even more compelling.

Our financial interests in Chile have doubled in value since 1920, when $200,000,000 was invested there. Between 1921 and 1926 American financiers have purchased Chilean government bonds to the sum of $62,000,000 United States currency; a smaller additional sum was invested in bonds payable in sterling, sold originally on the London market, and internal bonds payable in Chilean currency were sold in this country during that same period in a sum exceeding $5,000,000. By 1926 industrial holdings by Americans aggregated some $350,000,000, chiefly investments of the Guggenheim interests in

[3] American capital invested in Mexican companies, facts about which are not easily obtainable from public records.

copper (the Anaconda Copper Company and the Braden Copper Company); by the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in iron; by W. R. Grace & Co. in exporting and importing facilities, banks and transportation and in the nitrate plants of the Anglo-Chilean Consolidated Nitrate Corporation. Copper mining, developed principally by American engineers and money, has attained such proportions as to rank Chile second in the world's production. Gold, silver and coal are also mined, but exploitation of these mines has been fostered largely by domestic capital. Southern Chile is excellently adapted to wool production, which is conducted on a scientific scale, but the investment is chiefly Chilean and British.

Brazil stands second among South American republics as to amount of American capital invested. Of the total of $300,000,000, one-half was held in state and municipal bonds, according to figures for 1923:

Bonds of Brazilian Federal Union and District	$104,316,000
State bonds	27,761,000
Municipal bonds	15,338,559
Paulista R. R. bonds	3,619,032
Total dollar bonds	$151,034,591

On December 31, 1926, American capital invested in Brazil amounted to $222,356,500 in bonds of the federal, state and municipal governments and $100,000,000 in industrial enterprises. The United States Steel Corporation, with its manganese production; Wilson, Swift and Armour in meat-packing plants, and the Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company are the outstanding industrial activities employing American capital in Brazil. This vast country has just begun its economic development. The two most important industries, coffee and rubber, have been operated with domestic capital. They, with manufacturing plants for textiles, shoes and the simpler household articles, have absorbed all available

funds. But Brazil has over 1,000,000 square miles of untouched forests; there are mines, coal beds, iron fields and agricultural possibilities which guarantee fertile fields for the future investment of American capital.

Investments in Argentina

Probably $40,000,000 represented the amount of American funds invested in Argentina in 1920. Since then we have invested more heavily, as is shown in the following figures furnished by the Department of Commerce for 1924:

Government bonds	$117,000,000
Industrial securities	100,000,000
Municipal securities	17,500,000
Total	$234,500,000

At the end of 1925, American capital invested in Argentina was estimated at $134,500,000 in bonds of the federal, state and municipal governments and $100,000,000 in other investments, a total of $234,500,000. Dr. Alberto B. Martinez, the Argentine statistician, recently stated it was "reasonable to suppose that $250,000,000 of American money is now invested in Argentina." He also estimated that the total foreign investment in his country was $3,600,000,000, although, according to *La Nacion* of Buenos Aires (April 28, 1927) the total foreign capital invested in Argentina at the end of March, 1927, was $2,500,000,000.

American industrial investments here are mainly in meat-packing plants (*frigoríficos*), oil fields, cement plants, public utilities, banking houses, factories for automobiles, textile mills, leather, lead and aluminum production. The total investment of American capital in Argentine meat-packing plants in 1926 was placed at $80,000,000. The percentage of such companies con-

trolled by American capital has been rapidly increasing. The following table gives evidence:

Controlled by	Year 1909	Period 1918–1920
British companies	37.0	22.1
Argentine companies	27.0	9.8
American companies	35.3	68.1

The American packing houses of Swift, Armour, Morris and Wilson are the dominant factors in this control. The Compañía Swift Internacional owns the entire stock of the Compañía Swift de la Plata, and with an invested capital of $20,000,000 operates eight slaughter houses, freezing plants and distribution works. Armour & Co. de la Plata operates two meat-packing plants in Argentina. The following table issued by the Department of Commerce shows the paid-up capital that these companies have invested in Argentina, and also their profits from operation for the calendar year 1916, a year of great prosperity, and for an average year, 1923:

Companies	Paid-up capital	Profits 1916	Profits 1923
		Gold Pesos	
Armour & Co. de la Plata	20,000,000	672,463	2,554,978
La Blanca (Morris-Armour)	10,000,000	1,529,901	2,118,875
Swift de la Plata	20,000,000	2,758,940	2,174,944
Argentina Central (Wilson & Co.)	5,000,000	915,035	1,725,738

The oil investments controlled by American capital are operated for the Standard Oil Company of California, with a capital of $1,000,000, and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, with $3,000,000.

Our interest in Peru is vested chiefly in copper mining and in oil. The Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation controls 730 mineral claims, comprising 5,900 acres. It owns the largest copper-producing mine in Peru; production in a single month (September, 1923) amounted to 11,000,000 pounds. This company also controls a railroad, coal mines and haciendas. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey is represented in Peru by the International Petroleum

Company, whose properties cover 1,000,000 acres. This company controls 70 per cent of the Peruvian petroleum output, while British capital controls 27 per cent and Italian companies the remaining 3 per cent. The two principal Peruvian cotton mills are owned by W. R. Grace & Co. This company also owns estates, banks and factories along the entire west coast of South America. In importing and exporting in Chile, Peru and Ecuador, W. R. Grace & Co., with their ships, wharves and warehouses, have the bulk of the trade. Total American investments in Peru amount to approximately $100,000,000, while British capital invested there exceeds ours by 25 per cent.

Colombia is becoming an increasingly attractive field for investment of our surplus funds. We hold more than $13,000,000 of Colombian government, state and municipal bonds, and probably $75,000,000 of other securities. The International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company, by completing its 360-mile pipe line in Colombia, becomes one of the largest oil-producing companies in the world. A similar sum of American money is invested in Venezuela, about one-half of it in oil developments and the remainder in sugar, mines, banks and public utilities. In Bolivia $50,000,000 out of a total of $80,000,000 American capital is being used in producing tin and petroleum.

Central American agriculture, transportation, banking, railroads and public utilities are utilizing American capital. The United Fruit Company alone has $200,000,000 invested in its banana plantations, wharves, railroads and other facilities in the Caribbean countries. The report of this company for 1923 shows the following investment in Central America:

Costa Rica	$ 8,585,268
Guatemala	3,944,762
Honduras	24,232,275
Nicaragua	170,000
Panama	8,253,226

"Facts," says Owen D. Young, "are our scarcest raw material." But as raw material, facts need "working up," that is, interpretation. And in the interpretation it is very difficult to keep them free from the "import tariff of prejudice, self-interest and narrow nationalism." To know what we have invested and where in Latin America, may be less valuable than to know why we have invested there. Three things seem clear regarding American investments in Latin America: (1) They are made for constructive purposes; (2) They are subject to close scrutiny and supervision by investors; (3) An official adviser system is set up in republics with unstable governments.

One conclusion is patent from even a cursory examination of our investments south of the Rio Grande. They are placed in constructive enterprises. American money grows sugar rather than ships of war; it builds canals rather than cannons; the products of our loans are roads and railroads, copper and coffee, telephones and telegraphs, machines and meat plants. Neither the munitions of war nor the instruments of social disintegration have come to Latin America from our enterprise there. We raise the level of living. We place men in occupations of which they may be proud. American money keeps men employed at good wages. That such constructive work is altruistic need not be argued; it is pursued for gain. It is profitable, but it can scarcely be a bonanza "beyond the dreams of avarice"; else would competition soon flood the field and level profits. Nor is the investment profitable to our capitalists only; in larger taxes, increased employment, higher wages and a higher standard of living, Latin Americans profit much.

Investment Policy

It can safely be said that our government has had no clearly defined foreign investment policy. As a borrowing rather than a lending nation we had no need for it.

But we have now become a powerful financial unit in the comity of nations. We are now developing a definite policy. One of the essential elements of this policy is supervision by the State Department. This supervision over American investments abroad is essentially negative. It aims to prevent American money from exploitation by foreigners, and foreigners from exploitation by American money. Secretary Knox once embodied his policy in the words: "The State Department will give all proper support to legitimate and beneficial enterprises in foreign countries." On another occasion (January, 1912) he said: "A leading government should deter its nationals from making loans not of a sufficiently broad purpose to secure the approval of said government in consultation with the other interested powers." Speaking before the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce on May 28, 1927, Secretary Mellon declared that American bankers owe it to their clients to exercise "unusual care" in investigating the securities back of foreign loans. But, he added, "the investor must make his own decision as to whether the security of any foreign loan is ample." Our government desires to be informed when extensive credit or large loans are made abroad that it may afford advice. As Mr. Hughes, while Secretary of State, expressed our policy (August 30, 1923) it is this: "It must be remembered that the government of the United States has no power to compel its citizens to lend money or to fix the terms of their investment. Nor is it in a position to control the action of other governments who desire to borrow. In this situation, our government endeavors by friendly advice to throw its influence against unfairness and imposition."

Recent history has shown that private investments in foreign countries with weak or unstable governments, by nationals of strong governments, easily lead to spheres of influence with extraterritorial privileges for the strong investing country. From spheres of influence, by short and easy steps, the powerful investing country passes

to political control of the weak borrower's foreign relations. From political control of foreign relations to control of domestic affairs is a natural and logical step. Thus is the aggrandizing nation in complete control of the economic life of the borrower. Against such a series of events our government guards. The first step in this series is brought about by a default in the payment of interest or principal. Then, again, "friendly advice against unfairness and imposition" may be of no avail if the borrowing government is weak and unstable. The party in power for a season may invest or deliberately squander borrowed funds with no regard for civic welfare. Service on a foreign debt may mean little to such a party in comparison with the feathering of its own nest. Here is the province for the "adviser system." Supervision has been applied in all areas, the advisory system more particularly in the republics of the Caribbean.

American foreign investments constitute today our widest departure from the policy of isolation. In no part of the world have we larger or more important investments than in Latin America. Here we lay the corner stone of our policy. To date, that policy seems to tend toward constructive enterprise rather than exploitation in the foreign field, and toward supervision to prevent injustice to either borrower or lender.

EXPANSION AND INTERVENTION [4]

President Coolidge, in his last Decoration Day address, said: "When this nation has been compelled to resort to war, it has always been for a justifiable cause. . . No lust for conquest, no craving for power, no greed for territory, no desire for revenge has ever caused us to violate the covenants of international peace and tranquillity. We have robbed no people of their independence, we have laid on no country the hand of oppression." Mr.

[4] By Kirby Page. *Dollars and World Peace.* p. 27-38.

Otto Kahn, one of the leading bankers of the nation, said recently in a public debate: "I do not hesitate to say that never, in the thirty years concerning which I can speak from personal observation, have I encountered imperialism in this country." [5]

Territorial Expansion

In an effort to discover whether or not we have ever been aggressive, it may be worth while to survey rapidly the various stages in the expansion of the United States. Two American diplomatists, Monroe and Livingston, purchased Louisiana—an area equal in extent to the original thirteen states—from France, without the knowledge or authorization of President Jefferson or the Congress of the United States.[6] Many historians are of the opinion that Napoleon could not give a legal title to this region. Henry Adams, for example, declared: "The sale of Louisiana to the United States was trebly invalid." Professor Edward Channing said: "In taking Louisiana we were the accomplices of the greatest highwayman of modern history, and the goods which we received were those which he compelled his unwilling victim to disgorge." Several modern historians sharply dissent from this point of view.

In 1810 an attempt was made to secure part of Florida from Spain. America "negotiated vainly, threatened war, and finally took forcible possesion of this western portion of West Florida. In default of other means, or perhaps in preference to other means, the balance of West Florida was seized in 1813." [7] Spain and Britain both protested but to no avail.

[5] *The Myth of Imperialism.* p. 3.

[6] See J. H. Latané, *American Foreign Policy.* p. 101-19.

[7] H. H. Powers, *America Among the Nations.* p. 44. In commenting upon Germany's defense of the invasion of Belgium on grounds of necessity, Theodore Roosevelt said: "England's conduct toward Denmark in the Napoleonic wars, and the conduct of both England and France toward us during those same wars, admit only this species of justification; and with less excuse the same is true of our conduct toward Spain in Florida nearly a century ago." *The Outlook.* September 23, 1914, p. 171.

As a result of the Mexican war, we secured a vast territory, including Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, Nevada and California. That we were the aggressors in this conflict is maintained by many historians and statesmen. Abraham Lincoln regarded the war as aggression on our part and sought to prevent it. On the floor of Congress, Joshua R. Giddings condemned the proceedings as "a war against an unoffending people, without adequate or just cause, for the purpose of conquest." [8] General Grant strongly protested against our action. "For myself," he said, "I was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war which resulted as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. It was an instance of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory." [9] In his History of the American People, Woodrow Wilson refers to our "inexcusable aggression" in the Mexican war.[10] Cyrus Townsend Brady says the Mexican war was "the spoilation of a weaker power by a stronger, and is the one serious blot upon our national history. The conduct of the United States was wholly indefensible in a large part of the operations." [11]

The record of our dealings with the Indians is one that makes it necessary "to draw a black border around that page in American history." "The warfare of subjugation," say Mr. and Mrs. Beard, "begun by the federal government in 1862, was continued for nearly thirty years, accompanied by cruelty, treachery and injustice on both sides, the white man proving himself on the whole little if any above the red man in morals or humanity." [12] President Hayes, in his message to Congress,

[8] Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization.* v. 1, p. 606.
[9] Louis A. Coolidge, *Ulysses S. Grant.* p. 27.
[10] *History of the American People.* Woodrow Wilson. v. 4, p. 122.
[11] *The Conquest of the Southwest.* p. 4.
[12] *The Rise of American Civilization.* v. 2, p. 146.

in 1877, said: "Many, if not most of our Indian wars have had their origin in broken promises and acts of injustice on our part."

In 1867 Alaska was purchased from Russia for the sum of $7,200,000. Hawaii was the first territory outside of this continent to be annexed by the United States. In 1893, American citizens in the islands engineered a revolution which deposed the Queen. In his Presidential message on December 18, 1893, Grover Cleveland said: "The lawful government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot, by a process every step of which is directly traceable to and dependent for its safety upon the agency of the United States, acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives." The President sent his regret to the Queen for the "reprehensible conduct of the American minister." On February 7, 1894, the House passed resolutions 177 to 78, "condemning Mr. Stevens for illegally aiding in overthrowing the constitutional government of the Hawaiian islands." On May 31st, the Senate, by a unanimous vote, declared that the Hawaiians should maintain their own government. Yet within five years we annexed Hawaii, over the protests of Great Britain and Japan. A month after Dewey's victory at Manila Bay, McKinley remarked to Cortelyou: "We need Hawaii just as much and a good deal more than we did California. It is manifest destiny."[13] We acquired Samoa in 1899 as a result of a deal with Great Britain and Germany, after having joined the former in a bombardment of certain Samoan villages.

As a result of the Spanish-American war we acquired Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, as well as a protectorate over Cuba. That this war could have been prevented and all our major demands secured by peaceful means is now admitted by many historians. In 1910, John W. Foster said: "In the light of Woodford

[13] Quoted by Robert McElroy, *Grover Cleveland.* v. 2, p. 72.

despatches, we must conclude that had President McKinley displayed the same firmness as Grant and Cleveland, and continued to 'keep hold of the reins of diplomacy,' the Spanish war with its long train of consequences might never have come upon us."[14] Woodrow Wilson speaks of the Spanish-American war as "a war of impulse."[15] Professor E. J. Benton says: "Except for an uncontrollable desire for war on the part of the United States, diplomacy might, within all human probability, have accomplished the emancipation of Cuba. . . In the opinion of nearly all writers on international law, the particular form of intervention in 1898 was unfortunate, irregular, precipitate and unjust to Spain. The same ends—peace in Cuba and justice to all people concerned—in themselves good, could have been achieved by peaceful means safer for the wider interests of humanity."[16]

The way in which we secured the right to build the Panama Canal affords a good illustration of the extremes to which governments resort under the guise of national interest.[17] It will be recalled that Panama had been a province of Colombia for eighty years. In January, 1903, President Roosevelt negotiated a treaty with Colombia which gave the United States the right to construct a canal across the Isthmus. This treaty was unanimously rejected by the Colombia Senate. Thereupon a movement was initiated, of which high officials of the United States were cognizant, for the rebellion of Panama. Our warships prevented the landing of Colombian troops and the suppression of the revolt. This action enabled the revolutionists to gain complete control in Panama and to form a provincial government. Two days later this government was recognized by the United States—a record

[14] Quoted by J. F. Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations.* p. 64.

[15] *History of the American People.* v. 5, p. 275.

[16] *International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War.* p. 95, 108.

[17] For an authoritative and documented account of this transaction, see *Roosevelt and the Caribbean,* by Dr. Howard C. Hill, p. 30-68.

for speedy recognition. Fourteen days later a treaty was signed, by the terms of which the United States promised to maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. In return for $10,000,000 and an annual subsidy of $250,000, the United States was granted the control of a zone of land ten miles wide extending across the Isthmus from Colon to Panama.

Concerning this transaction an Atlantic Monthly article says: "This decisive result was, of course, due to coercion by the United States upon Colombia—no less so, though less directly, than if war had been declared upon that state. It is a fact not to be denied or glossed over, but to be openly commended." [18] Professor Clarence H. Haring, of Harvard University, says in this connection: "The intervention of the United States was a clear violation of Colombian sovereignty and roused strong resentment in all parts of Latin America." [19]

In his Autobiography, Theodore Roosevelt says that if there had been no revolution in Panama he was "prepared to recommend to Congress that we should at once occupy the Isthmus anyhow, and proceed to dig the canal; and I had drawn out a draft of my message to this effect." [20] Speaking at Berkeley, California, on March 23, 1911, Mr. Roosevelt said: "I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started it. If I had followed traditional, conservative methods I should have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two hundred pages to Congress, and the debate on it would be going on yet; but I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate and while the debate goes on the canal does too." [21]

In 1917 we acquired the Virgin Islands by purchase from Denmark. Part of the purchase price was the expressed willingness on our part to see Denmark extend

[18] H. H. Chittenden, *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1916. p. 56.

[19] *These Eventful Years.* v. 2, p. 373.

[20] p. 563.

[21] Quoted by Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time.* v. 1, p. 308.

its "political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland." [22]

Aggressive Ambitions

Whatever the citizens of the United States may think of the record of the territorial expansion of their country, outsiders regard it as an aggressive one. Critics of our policy also point out that many of the most aggressive ambitions of our statesmen have not been realized. For example, repeated efforts have been made by various high officials of our government to acquire Canada. As early as 1782, Benjamin Franklin sought to secure this fair prize from Great Britain.[23] One of the primary causes of the War of 1812 was the eager desire of powerful groups of Americans to seize Canada and during the period of hostilities two unsuccessful attempts were made to accomplish this end. Concerning this point, Professor and Mrs. Beard say: "The men who voted in 1812 for the declaration of war on England represented the agrarian constituencies of the interior and their prime object was the annexation of Florida and Canada. . . Clay, in a blaze of enthusiasm, announced that 'the militia of Kentucky alone are competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet'." [24] Calhoun predicted that within four weeks "the whole of upper Canada and a part of lower Canada will be in our power." On the floor of Congress, Josiah Quincy denounced the attack on our northern neighbors as "less defensible than the conduct of Captain Kidd, the pirate, and the West Indies buccaneers." [25]

In 1837 two unsuccessful revolutions occurred in Canada. The leader of one of these revolts, Wm. Lyon Mackenzie, fled to the United States, where he was received with great enthusiasm. When the British Royal

[22] See Luther K. Zabriskie, *The Virgin Islands of the United States.* p. 270.

[23] Latané, *American Foreign Policy.* p. 40-2.

[24] *The Rise of American Civilization.* v. 1, p. 393, 416.

[25] *Ibid.* p. 422.

Navy attacked the insurgents' steamship Caroline near the American shore of the Niagara River, a sharp protest was filed by the United States government and for a few days war seemed imminent.[26] During the fourth decade of last century we had a serious controversy with England concerning our northern boundary. The slogan of the pro-war party in the United States was "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight," in spite of the fact that, in the words of Professor Latané, "no one had ever seriously maintained that the United States had a valid claim to the whole territory." [27] In 1866 armed bodies of Irishmen from New York undertook the invasion of Canada but were repulsed by Canadian volunteers. The Government of the United States also took prompt measures against the invaders.[28] In 1871 Secretary Seward issued an ultimatum demanding that Great Britain withdraw entirely from Canada. "To make the settlement complete," he said, "the withdrawal should be from this hemisphere, including provinces and islands." [29]

Time and again various officials of the United States government have advocated the annexation of Mexico. As early as 1825 Secretary Clay sought to purchase Texas from Mexico. A few years later Butler, American Minister in Mexico, advised President Jackson to seize the coveted territory by force.[30] In 1842 Commodore Jones, on hearing a rumor that war had broken out, seized Monterey Bay and temporarily hoisted the Stars and Stripes.[31] In spite of the enormous territory secured by the United States as a result of the Mexican war, many of our citizens were sorely disappointed. Bancroft thought that we should "rescue a large part of Mexico" by annexing it, while Cass urged the policy of rescuing the whole by this means.[32] Secretary Seward was the arch-advocate

[26] Latané. p. 201-7.
[27] *Ibid.* p. 231.
[28] *Ibid.* p. 433-4.
[29] *Ibid.* p. 448.
[30] Beard, *Rise of American Civilization.* v. 1, p. 591.
[31] *Ibid.* p. 603.
[32] Latané. p. 279.

of territorial expansion. As early as 1846 he said: "Our population is destined to roll its resistless waves to the icy barriers of the North, and to encounter oriental civilization on the shores of the Pacific." Fourteen years later he elaborated this idea, as follows: "I can look southwest and see amid all the convulsions that are breaking the Spanish-American republics, and in their rapid decay and dissolution, the preparatory stage for their reorganization in free, equal and self-governing members of the United States of America." He went further and predicted that the City of Mexico would be "the ultimate central seat of power of the North American people." [33]

Military Intervention

In 1914 a serious dispute with Mexico occurred. When Huerta failed to salute our flag by way of reparation for an alleged insult, President Wilson ordered the bombardment of Vera Cruz. The American forces captured that city and retained control for seven months.[34] At the end of 1916 a punitive expedition was sent into Mexico in the effort to capture the bandit Villa. The net result of this expedition was the expenditure of 130 million dollars and the irritation of all Latin America. For several years our government has been engaged in a continuous controversy with the Mexican government. Secretary Fall is not the only prominent official who has urged that we "go down and clean up Mexico."

Cuba, likewise, has been looked upon with covetous eyes by many of our statesmen. In his instructions to our new minister to the Court of Madrid in 1823, John Quincy Adams said: "In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it seems scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indis-

[33] *Latané.* p. 418.

[34] Nearing and Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy.* p. 100-8.

pensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself."[35] Professor Latané says that following the Mexican war "our foreign policy assumed a much bolder and more aggressive character, and during the next fifteen years all manner of schemes for the southward extensions of our territory were suggested and many of them actually undertaken." Numerous attempts were made to annex Cuba to the United States, "both by purchase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering expeditions."[36] In 1854 our ministers to Madrid, Paris and London made the joint recommendation to our State Department that an offer of 120 million dollars be made to Spain for Cuba and expressed the opinion that if the offer should be refused, "we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power."[37]

Following the Spanish-American war our troops occupied Cuba until May 20, 1902. Before we withdrew Cuba was compelled to accept the so-called Platt amendment, which gives us the right to intervene whenever we think it necessary, "for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty."[38] Under this provision we have intervened on three occasions. We have also retained a permanent naval base at Guantanamo.

Many efforts have also been made by the United States to secure permanent control of Santo Domingo and Haiti. In his message to Congress in 1868, President Johnson advocated the annexation of Santo Domingo and a joint resolution was introduced in the House but failed to pass.[39] President Grant also urged this procedure in his message of 1870. He actually negotiated a treaty of annexation with a puppet-president of that

35 Latané. p. 287.
36 *Ibid.* p. 291.
37 *Ibid.* p. 303.
38 *Ibid.* p. 498-516.
39 *Ibid.* p. 419.

country, but it was rejected by the Senate. In his message of 1876 President Grant lamented the failure of his Santo Domingo policy because "the soil would soon have fallen into the hands of the United States capitalists."[40] In 1916 the United States landed troops in Santo Domingo and set up a military government which lasted until 1924. For eight years that country was ruled by officers of the United States Navy. Even at present the general receiver of the Dominican customs is an American citizen appointed by the President of the United States.

In 1915 American marines were landed in Haiti for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of our citizens.[41] In putting down the "insurrection" more than two thousand Haitians were killed by our forces.[42] Since that time the marines have controlled the government of that country. "American approval is needed," says Professor Paul H. Douglas, "for the enactment of laws, the revenues of the country are collected under the supervision of Americans, and the budget is drawn up by the American financial adviser. . . The control over the gendarmerie is in American hands, as are also the services of health and public works, and agriculture. Only justice and education are outside American control."[43] There has not been a meeting of the Haitian Congress for nearly a decade. An official of the Department of State confessed recently that "the American occupation of Haiti is one for which there is no strictly legal ground."[44]

In referring to Haiti in a campaign speech at Marion in August, 1920, Mr. Harding said: "If I should be elected president . . . I will not empower an Assistant

[40] Beard. v. 2, p. 352.

[41] For an authoritative history of our occupation of Haiti see two articles by Professor Paul H. Douglas, *Political Science Quarterly*, June and September, 1927. p. 228-58; 368-96.

[42] U. S. Senate. Haiti and Santo Domingo Select Committee, Hearings. v. 1, p. 433, 434.

[43] *Occupied Haiti.* p. 33.

[44] Sumner Welles. The *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1924, p. 420. For a defense of our occupation see *The American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1926, p. 353-66.

Secretary of the Navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the points of bayonets borne by United States marines, nor will I misuse the power of the executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated acts of unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the little republics of the western hemisphere, such as in the last few years have not only made enemies of those who should be our friends, but have rightfully discredited our country as their trusted neighbor." [45]

Since 1912 the United States marines have controlled the government of Nicaragua, except for a brief period. In 1916 the Senate ratified a treaty with the Nicaraguan government, which at that time was under our control, giving us the right to construct a canal across that country. After an occupation lasting thirteen years, the marines were withdrawn in August, 1925.[46] Within two months Chamorro, a defeated presidential candidate, staged a revolution and forced the president, Solorzano, and the vice-president, Sacasa, to leave the country. When Chamorro failed to secure recognition from the United States and other powers, he turned the executive office over to Uriza, one of his followers, who in turn called a meeting of the Assembly. This body elected Adolfo Díaz, a supporter of Chamorro, as president. Within three days Díaz was recognized by the United States. In November, 1926, Sacasa returned to Nicaragua and attempted to regain the office of which he claimed he had been illegally deprived. On December 23, Admiral Latimer, of the United States Navy, landed a force of bluejackets and later heavy reinforcements were rushed to the scene. In May, 1927, Colonel Henry L. Stimson, the personal representative of President Coolidge, issued an ultimatum to the effect that unless the Liberals, the fol-

[45] *New York Times.* August 31, 1920, p. 12.

[46] For a history of our occupation, see Nearing and Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy.* p. 151-71.

lowers of Sacasa, laid down their arms the United States forces would "disarm forcibly those who will not do so." All the Liberals yielded to this threat except a small body under the command of General Sandino. When Sandino was rash enough to attack an outpost of the marines at Ocotal, five American bombing planes with machine guns and bombs left "300 dead Nicaraguans for the vultures to feed on."[47] The situation is now well in hand, with the United States in complete control. A new presidential election is to be held in 1928.

Summary of Our Expansion

Before considering the question of our future policy, it may be well to summarize our record of expansion. In this connection the following chart, prepared by Professor Parker T. Moon of Columbia University, is very revealing:[48]

	Area (*Square Miles*)	*Population*	*Commerce*
OUTLYING TERRITORIES			
Alaska	590,884	60,000	$ 88,905,000
Hawaii	6,449	307,000	188,541,000
DEPENDENCIES			
Philippine Islands	115,026	11,076,000	243,356,000
Porto Rico	3,435	1,347,000	172,478,000
Virgin Islands	132	26,000	2,559,000
Samoa	58	8,000	294,000
Guam	210	13,000	967,000
Wake and Midway Is.	29		
LEASED TERRITORY			
Panama Canal Zone, Guantanamo, Fonseca Bay, Corn Island	527	27,000	
Total Possessions	716,750	12,864,000	$ 697,100,000

[47] *Nation*, July 27, 1927, p. 75; *Financial Chronicle*, July 23, 1927, p. 429.

[48] *Imperialism and World Politics*, p. 524.

	Area (*Square Miles*)	*Population*	*Commerce*
NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT DEPENDENCIES			
Cuba	44,164	3,369,000	$ 724,595,000
Haiti	11,072	2,045,000	28,872,000
Dominican Republic.	19,325	897,000	51,843,000
Panama	33,667	443,000	16,250,000
Nicaragua	49,200	638,000	21,797,000
Liberia	36,834	1,500,000	2,528,000
Total nominally independent dependencies.	194,262	8,892,000	$ 845,885,000
Grand total	911,012	21,756,000	$1,542,985,000

In this brief review we have made no effort to assess the relative merits and defetcs of our administrative control of other peoples. A very strong case can be made for our regime in the various dependencies. Beyond question we have done a vast deal of good, as well as much evil, in the Philippines, Haiti and elsewhere.[49] We have not gone into this aspect of the problem because we have been seeking light on the primary question as to whether or not the United States is imperialistic. Much of the imperialism of Great Britain has been benevolent, but this fact has not prevented numerous wars as a result of imperialistic rivalries. If one is willing to admit that the United States is imperialistic and to contend that imperialism should be defended and encouraged, we would reply that the dangers inherent in the system seem to us to be far greater than the resultant benefits.

This long survey of the record of our territorial expansion and of the numerous attempts to extend our sway over other regions, reveals certain things very clearly. We have on several occasions taken territory by encouraging revolution and by waging war. On other occasions we have resorted to threats and intimidation. Frequently we have been domineering and aggressive in our relations

[49] For a series of articles on "How American Business Lifts Backward Peoples to Health and Happiness," see *World's Work*, June-September, 1927.

with our neighbors. With the result that in many quarters we are feared as a powerful bully who is careless about encroaching upon the rights of others. At the Williamstown Institute of Politics recently, Horace G. Knowles, former American Minister to Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Bolivia, said: "We have been guilty of violating the sovereign rights of neighbors and proceeding contrary to the universally recognized principles of international law. We have imposed our force upon weak, helpless and defenseless countries, and slaughtered thousands of their citizens. We have attacked them when they expected we would defend them. We have used the Monroe Doctrine to prevent sympathetic European nations going to their rescue when we abused them." [50]

INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW [51]

The right of independence conferred by international law upon each fully sovereign member of the family of nations involves, as we have seen, complete liberty on the part of every state to manage its affairs according to its own wishes. It may change its form of government, alter its constitution, form its alliances, and enter upon its wars, according to its own views of what is just and expedient. But sometimes it happens that another state, or group of states, interferes with its proceedings, and endeavors to compel it to do something which, if left to itself, it would not do, or refrain from doing something which, if left to itself, it would do. Interference of this kind is called intervention. The term would have much more technical value, and the exposition of the ideas which it represents would be clearer if it were recognized that it has three distinct meanings:—(a) Interference by one state between disputing sections of the community in

[50] *New York Times*, August 23, 1927.

[51] By T. J. Lawrence. *Principles of International Law.* 3d ed. D. C. Heath & Co. Boston. 1900.

another state, the matter of dispute being usually, but not necessarily, some constitutional change. This is by far the commonest sense, and might be styled *internal intervention.* (b) Interference by one state in the relations—generally the hostile relations—of other states. This is usually called *external intervention.* (c) A punitive measure adopted by one state against another in order to compel the latter to observe its treaty engagements or to redress some breach of law which it has committed. This might be styled *punitive intervention.* The importance of this classification lies in the fact that it does not merely distinguish three kinds of the same thing but refers to three quite different things, which for historical and etymological reasons happen to have acquired the same name. The only really appropriate matter for discussion under "Intervention" in the law of peace is *internal* intervention. *Punitive* intervention should be relegated to "Methods of redress falling short of war," like embargo, and pacific blockade. In fact such intervention often has taken the form of pacific blockade. As to *external* intervention, it is doubtful whether it has, as such, any logical place at all in modern international law. As has been indicated, the typical example of it is where state A takes part, or threatens to take part, in a war actual or pending between states B and C. Is the action of state A really within the region of international law at all? It can remain neutral or join in the war as it thinks fit. If it joined in the war for no reason whatever, or if its entry therein were a palpable breach of law, international law would condemn it, but beyond that it could not go; for modern international law does not profess to classify the causes of war. In fact it would puzzle even a moralist or a theologian to say whether some of the bloodiest wars in modern history were right or wrong. Let us first distinguish intervention from other forms of interference that might possibly be confounded with it; and having done this, we shall then be in a position

to discuss whether it is ever justifiable, and, if so, in what circumstances.

The essence of intervention is force, or the threat of force in case the dictates of the intervening power are disregarded. It is, therefore, clearly differentiated from mere advice or good offices tendered by a friendly state without any idea of compulsion, from mediation entered upon by a third power at the request of the parties to the dispute, but without any promise on their part to accept the terms suggested or any intention on its part to force them to do so, and from arbitration, which takes place when the contestants agree to refer the dispute to an independent tribunal and consent beforehand to abide by its award, though it possesses no power to compel obedience to its decisions. There can be no intervention without, on the one hand, the presence of force, naked or veiled, and on the other hand, the absence of consent on the part of both the combatants. There have been instances where one party to the dispute has asked for the intervention of a third power; but if both parties agree in such a request, the interference ceases to be intervention and becomes mediation. Should the mediating state find the parties unwilling to accept its proposals and decide to compel them by force of arms, its action would then lose the character of peaceful mediation and assume that of warlike intervention.

There are few questions in the whole range of international law more difficult than those connected with the legality of intervention, and few that have been treated in a more unsatisfactory manner. An appeal to the practice of states is useless; for not only have different states acted on different principles, but the action of the same state at one time has been irreconcilable with its action at another. On this subject history speaks with a medley of discordant voices, and the facts of international intercourse give no clue to the rules of international law. We might, indeed, deem that the search for rules of any

kind was hopeless, were it not that it is possible to infer certain clear and unmistakable precepts from fundamentals admitted on all sides. No one doubts the existence of the right of independence, or the duty of self-preservation, and from these we are able by a process of deduction to obtain what we are seeking. When practice is diverse, the only thing left is an appeal to first principles, which may at least give us moral precepts, even when it fails to supply us with legal rules.

In most cases the question of intervention is a question of policy. But there are exceptional circumstances in which it is a matter of legal right, as Oppenheim points out, though the right is sometimes merely technical and not susceptible of exercise without moral wrong. Strict legality can be claimed for

Interventions in pursuance of a right to intervene given by treaty or by the common law of nations.

If a state has accepted a guarantee of any of its possessions, or if its reigning family, or of a special form of government, it suffers no legal wrong when the guaranteeing state intervenes in pursuance of the stipulations entered into between them, though it may suffer moral wrong when those stipulations are in restraint of functions which it ought to exercise freely, for example, the choice of its rulers. Further, client states are under obligation to submit to such interference and direction as are provided for in the instruments that define the relation between them and their patron states. The intervention, for instance, of the United States in Cuba in 1906 was perfectly legal, as it came well within the terms of the Treaty of Havana, 1903. It is perhaps to this right to intervene in pursuance of a treaty that the course of action adopted towards Greece by the allied powers, Great Britain, France and Russia, during 1915-1917, must be referred. By the Treaty of London, 1863, Greece was put under the guarantee of these powers as a "mon-

archical, independent and constitutional state." At the outbreak of the great war, in 1914, Greece was neutral, and nominally continued to be so until shortly after the abdication of its king, Constantine, in June, 1917, when it entered the war on the side of Great Britain and her allies; but even at the beginning of the war, in 1914, the great majority of the nation was enthusiastically in favor of the Entente cause, and of giving effect to a treaty with Serbia (an ally of Great Britain, France and Russia) under which Greece was bound to assist Serbia in the event of war between Serbia and a third power, or of an attack upon her by important Bulgarian forces. Upon both these points, King Constantine was in sharp conflict with his ministry (at the head of which was M. Venizelos) and his subjects. His sympathies were strongly pro-German, and his interpretation of the Serbian treaty was that it applied only if Bulgaria alone attacked Serbia, and not if she did so in combination with other powers, e.g., Austria. Being unable to enforce his views in any other way, the king resorted to thoroughly unconstitutional government which led to the resignation of M. Venizelos in March, 1915, though he resumed office in August of that year. On October 2, 1915, the British and French governments landed 150,000 troops at the Greek port of Salonika. They did this, with the hearty approval of M. Venizelos and of an overwhelming majority of the Greek populace, for the purpose of aiding Serbia, who at that moment was at war with Austria and Germany, though not with Bulgaria whose attitude was nevertheless threatening. But the British and French governments had not the formal consent of the Greek government nor even that of M. Venizelos, who entered a protest against their action as a breach of Greece's neutrality. This complaint was, however, merely a formal one. From this point onwards, until his abdication in 1917, Greece was the prey of further unconstitutional government by the king, by

means of which he committed continual breaches of neutrality against Great Britain and her allies. His action was countered by progressively drastic steps on the part of Great Britain, France and Russia, culminating in demands for the demobilization of the Greek army, the holding of new elections, the surrender of the Greek fleet, and finally the abdication of the King. Such appear to have been the facts on the sources at present available. Can then the conduct of the three powers be justified as a lawful intervention in Greece? An impartial jurist must hesitate long before answering this question. For the facts are not perfectly known, and they were complicated at every turn by political considerations. But there should be little doubt that Great Britain, France and Russia had a right to intervene under the treaty of London, cited above, in view of King Constantine's unconstitutional government, to which are traceable all the violations of Greek neutrality which he perpetrated. If this be so, what particular form the intervention took, and whether it constituted an attack on Greece's neutrality, are questions which seem to be irrelevant. Once admit the right of intervention in any particular case, surely the means by which it is carried into effect are not material, unless they are excessive or inhuman. It may also be argued that what seemed to be breaches of Greek neutrality by the three powers were merely acts that Greece would have done or adopted herself if her king had not consistently prevented any constitutional government from doing them; in other words, if he had not indulged in conduct of the very kind which justified the powers in intervening under the Treaty of London. It remains to add that other acts were done by Great Britain and France on Greek territory during the war which had no reference to the intervention against King Constantine, and which were alleged to be pure breaches of Greek neutrality. Interventions undertaken for the purpose of preventing or ending

illegal interventions on the part of another state are lawful, as when in 1866 the United States, by significant references to the possibility of war, caused Napoleon III to withdraw his troops from Mexico. The French expedition had been sent in 1861, along with English and Spanish forces, to compel the payment by the Mexican government of certain pecuniary claims and the redress of other grievances; but Great Britain and Spain withdrew from the enterprise on discovering that France was determined to interfere in the domestic affairs of Mexico. On their departure a French army established the Archduke Maximilian of Austria as Emperor of Mexico; but after its withdrawal he lost in a few months his throne and his life. Here what began as a lawful punitive intervention by three powers ended as an unlawful internal intervention on the part of one of them. Interventions by right are clearly lawful; but whether they are just also the circumstances of each case must determine. Certainly they do not violate any right of independence, because the states that suffer them have either conceded a liberty of interference beforehand by treaty, or accepted it as part of the law of the society to which they belong.

We now turn to interventions that are technical violations of the right of independence. Therefore no strict legality can be claimed for them, yet in certain circumstances international law may excuse or even approve of them. The first cases to be considered are

Interventions to ward off imminent danger to the intervening power.

The right of self-preservation is even more sacred than the duty of respecting the independence of others. If the two clash, a state naturally acts on the former. Nor is the doctrine that self-preservation overrides ordinary rules, peculiar to the law of nations. In every civilized state a woman who slays a man in defense of

her honor is accounted blameless, and during invasion the military authorities are allowed to destroy property, if such destruction is necessary for the performance of warlike operations against the enemy. By parity of reasoning we obtain the rule that intervention to ward off imminent danger to the intervening power is justifiable. But we should note carefully that the danger must be direct and immediate, not contingent and remote, and, moreover, it must be sufficiently important in itself to justify the expenditure of blood and treasure in order to repel it. The mere fear that something done by a neighboring state today may possibly be dangerous to us in the future if that state should happen to become hostile, is no just ground of intervention. If it were, nations might always be at war today to prevent war fifty years hence! Further, the cause that justifies intervention must be important enough to justify war. Governments constantly submit to small inconveniences rather than resort to hostilities; and an evil that is not sufficiently grave to warrant a recourse to the terrible arbitrament of battle is not sufficiently grave to warrant intervention. Moreover, intervention would not be justifiable if the danger could be met in any other way. But inasmuch as the intervening state must be itself the judge of the necessity of the intervention, there is a tendency for her to magnify dangers in order to justify attacks really due to ambitious aims or unscrupulousness as to means. On the other hand, harsh judgments have sometimes been pronounced against her out of dislike of her policy and dread of her power. Add to these causes of bias, honest differences of opinion, and we shall deem it in no way wonderful that many interventions have been subjects of much controversy both at the time and afterwards. In all probability men will differ as long as international law is studied, about the seizure of the Danish fleet by Great Britain in 1807 and the intervention of the United States between Spain and Cuba in 1898.

It should be noted that self-preservation is not merely a defense to intervention, but must also be regarded more widely as an independent right which, subject to the limits stated, may afford a justification for any infraction of another state's independence. Thus, in 1838, Canadian insurgents seized an island at Niagara within the frontier of the United States of America and made preparations there for crossing into British territory on board a steamer, the *Caroline*. The United States government had shown itself powerless to prevent this hostile invasion, and the British authorities therefore cut the moorings of the *Caroline*, and she drifted over Niagara Falls. The United States government complained, and required Great Britain "to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation," and this the British government was able to do. On the other hand, the allegation of necessity by Germany as a justification for her invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg, in 1914, was quite unsound. Her argument that if she had not abused Belgian neutrality, Great Britain and France would have done so, had no foundation in fact; and it was put forward to conceal her real motive, which was to use Belgium and Luxemburg as the shortest roads to the speedy defeat of France.

The next class of cases for which the permission and possibly the approval of the law of nations may be claimed is

Interventions on the ground of humanity.

In the opinion of some writers such interventions are legal. But we cannot venture to bring them within the ordinary rules of international law, which does not impose on states the obligation of preventing barbarity on the part of their neighbors. At the same time, it will not condemn interventions for such a cause, if they are undertaken with a single eye to the object in view, and without

ulterior considerations of self-interest and ambition. Should the cruelty be so long continued and so revolting that the best instincts of human nature are outraged by it, and should an opportunity arise for bringing it to an end and removing its cause without adding fuel to the fire of the conflict, there is nothing in the law of nations which will brand as a wrongdoer the state that steps forward and undertakes the necessary intervention. Each case must be judged on its merits. There is a great difference between declaring a national act to be legal, and therefore part of the order under which states have consented to live, and allowing it to be morally blameless as an exception to ordinary rules. A state may, in a great emergency, set aside everyday restraints; and neither in its case nor in a corresponding case of individual conduct will blame be incurred. But, nevertheless, the ordinary rule is good for ordinary cases, which, after all, make up at least ninety-nine hundredths of life. To say that it is no rule because it may laudably be ignored once or twice in a generation, is to overturn order in an attempt to exalt virtue. An intervention to put a stop to barbarous and abominable cruelty is a question rather of policy than of law. It is above and beyond the domain of law. It is destitute of technical legality, but it may be morally right and even praiseworthy to a high degree. When in 1860 the great powers of Europe intervened to put a stop to the persecution and massacre of Christians in the district of Mount Lebanon, their proceedings were worthy of commendation, though they could not be brought within the strict letter of the law.

From the middle of the seventeenth century it has been a maxim of European diplomacy that

Interventions in order to preserve the balance of power

were necessary and just. The significance attached to the theory of a balance of power has varied from time

to time. It used to be held that a sort of international equilibrium of forces had been established, and that any state that attempted to destroy its nice adjustments might be attacked by others whose relative importance would be diminished if it were permitted to carry out its projects. For a long time this doctrine was accounted axiomatic. It had only to be stated to be accepted. To preserve the balance of power, states kept up standing armies, entered into wearisome negotiations and waged incessant wars. And the history of some of these wars furnishes a most complete condemnation of the theory that was invoked to justify them. If, for instance, success had attended the attempt of the allies in the war of the Spanish Succession to seat the Archduke Charles instead of Philip V on the throne of Spain, they would have brought about the very disturbance of the European equilibrium that they took up arms to prevent; for Philip never inherited the French kingdom, whereas Charles unexpectedly became emperor in 1711. Had he reigned in Madrid, the Imperial and Spanish crowns would have been united on one head,—a consummation as full of danger to the balance of power as the union of France and Spain under one king. If the allies had been content to wait for the anticipated peril to become real before they took up arms to avert it, they need not have gone to war at all.

A political system that tends to stereotype the existing order of things in international affairs is fatal to progress. Yet underlying the older theory of the balance of power was always the assumption that the division of territory and authority among the chief states of Europe at any given time was the right and proper division, and must be maintained at all costs. In actual fact, the order which it was sought to preserve was constantly changing. At one period the state of possession established by the Peace of Vienna of 1815 was regarded as sacred, at another the appeal was to the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, at a third to that of Westphalia of 1648. The world moved in spite

of the efforts of rulers to keep it stationary, and they had to adjust their schemes to its changes. But in doing so they found in the idea of a balance of power a cloak for ambitious designs. If one state desired to pick a quarrel with another, it was easy to allege that some action on the part of the latter threatened the European equilibrium. Under cover of such an accusation demands for concessions of all kinds could be made. The last development of the balance theory in this direction was due to the ingenuity of the Emperor Napoleon III. He put forth the doctrine that whenever another state was greatly aggrandized, France must have territorial compensation, in order that the relative power of the two nations might remain constant. He obtained the cession of Savoy and Nice in 1860 as compensation for the union of central Italy and Piedmont; but he failed entirely in his efforts to obtain similar territorial compensation for the unification of North Germany in 1866. Prince Bismarck alleged that such a spirit of German patriotism had been aroused by the victories of Prussia, that it was impossible for him to cede a yard of German territory to France. In saying this, he incidentally laid bare the main defect of the original theory of a balance of power. It distributed provinces and rounded off the boundaries of kingdoms without regard to the wishes of the populations and their affinities of race, religion and sentiment. It repressed popular movements when they interfered with its calculations. Italian unity and German unity were achieved in spite of it; and it is bound to lose influence as the wishes of peoples become more and more a necessary element in the calculations of rulers. It can be credited with but one good result. It did sometimes act as a restraint upon unscrupulous rulers, as when, in 1668, the Triple Alliance of England, Sweden and Holland, without firing a shot, caused Louis XIV to renounce for a time his designs upon the Spanish Netherlands. But such satisfactory effects were rather accidental than essential. If would-be

plunderers could agree beforehand on a division of the spoil, and contrive to silence the objections of less interested neighbors, their victim would not be saved by any regard for a balance of power which remains unaffected by the transaction. This statement finds ample proof in the history of the three partitions of Poland between Austria, Prussia and Russia. Fortunately for them, the people of the United States have never been brought face to face with an international system based upon the old version of the doctrine of a balance of power. The political circumstances of the New World have prevented the growth of such a system on the American continent, and its importation from Europe has been avoided, owing to the wise policy of successive administrations from that of President Monroe onwards.

But in modern times the theory has taken another form which embodies a great truth and is not so easily perverted to evil as was the original version. As we have seen, the existence of international law involves the existence of a society of nations. Membership of a society implies social duties, and among them a foremost place is held by the duty of abstaining from conduct that endangers the vital interests of the society as a whole. When a member persistently violates this duty, another member or group of members may vindicate social well-being by active measures of restraint. If, therefore, a powerful state frequently endeavors to impose its will on others, and becomes an arrogant dictator when it ought to be content with a fair share of influence and leadership, those who find their remonstrances disregarded and their rights ignored perform valuable service to the whole community when they resort to force in order to reduce the aggressor to its proper position. As the duty of self-preservation justifies intervention to ward off imminent danger to national life or honor, so the duty of preserving international society justifies intervention to bring to an end conduct that imperils the existence or healthful order

of that society. It is true that in each case the independence of the offending state is for the moment violated; but the less must give way to the greater in order to attain a good end. Conduct so unsocial as to endanger society may be restrained in the interests of society. But it is not lightly to be assumed that a great advance in the power and wealth of a state will be used to endanger the common weal. Something more than the mere existence of increased resources is necessary in order to justify complaint. It is wise to remember that the power to do evil is harmless unless it is accompanied by the will to do evil. When this last is shown by unmistakable signs, then, but not before, does a case for intervention arise.

There are two grounds of intervention that will not bear investigation, though they have been put forward on several occasions. It has been maintained that the request of one of the parties to a civil war justifies a neighboring power in rendering it assistance, as Russia at the request of the Austrian government helped it to crush the Hungarian insurgents in 1849. Some publicists deny the legality of intervention at the request of rebels, but are disposed to look more favorably on intervention at the request of established governments. Others hold that foreign powers may assist the party that appears to them to have justice on its side. Neither view can be regarded as sound. Any intervention in an internal struggle is an attempt to prevent the people of a state from settling their own affairs in their own way. It might conceivably be justified on grounds of humanity or by some of the other considerations that we have already examined; but if all that can be said in its favor is that it was entered upon by request, the case for it breaks down completely. It is an attack on independence without adequate cause, and consequently a gross violation of international law. In no case can an incitement to do wrong render the act done in consequence of it lawful and right. The same reason-

ing applies to interventions for the purpose of putting down revolution. When in 1820-1823 the Holy Alliance was crushing by means of Austrian troops movements in favor of political liberty in Naples, Piedmont and other states, and inciting France to invade Spain in order to restore Ferdinand VII to the plenitude of his absolute power, Great Britain, by the pen of Canning "disclaimed any general right of interference in the internal concerns of independent nations." Undoubtedly the brilliant minister enunciated a true doctrine. No such right exists. The assumption of it by the monarchs of the Holy Alliance was an offense against that principle of international solidarity which they professed to hold so dear. A successful revolution in favor of a republic is doubtless unwelcome to monarchical states, and a successful revolution in favor of a monarchy is equally unwelcome to republican states. But all alike must allow their neighbors to make such changes in their governments and institutions as seem best to them, and to make them by force as well as by constitutional means. Any real dangers to other states which may arise in the process can be dealt with under one or more of the recognized grounds of intervention.

Hitherto, for the sake of clearness, we have treated each separate case as if it came entirely and exclusively under one of the various heads into which we have divided interventions. But in actual life matters are not so simple. The same intervention often possesses a variety of aspects, and attempts are made to justify it on several grounds. The formation of a judgment upon it is difficult in proportion to its complication. Few international proceedings of recent years have been more bitterly attacked and more strongly defended than the British intervention in Egypt, which began in 1882. It involved for Great Britain questions of safeguarding vital interests in connection with the Suez Canal and the route to India, questions of national honor with regard to the promises

made to Tewfik Pasha in 1879, questions of good government with regard to the suppression of the Arabist movement and the reform of the administration, questions of finance with regard to the Egyptian debt, and questions of the rights of other states in connection with the dual control which was shared with France, and the suspension of the Law of Liquidation which was signed by no less than fourteen powers. It will not be necessary to enter into the controversies which this intervention aroused. We have referred to it in order to show how complicated such a proceeding can be, and how at every turn it involves disputes on matters of fact as well as legal principles. We may add to them a few others, which will be found useful guides to correct conclusions. From what has been already said it follows, as a corollary, that interventions in the internal affairs of states are greater infringements of their independence than interferences with their external action, which must, from the nature of the case, be concerned with other powers. Such interventions, therefore, should be watched with the utmost jealousy, and require the strongest reasons in order to justify them. Further, interventions carried on by the great powers as the representatives of civilization, or by the great powers of Europe as the accepted leaders of the states of Europe, are more likely to be just and beneficial than interventions carried on by one power only. But history seems to show that when two or three states combine in a temporary alliance for the purpose of regulating the affairs of some neighbor, they not only possess none of the moral authority attaching to the proceedings of the great powers, but are exceedingly likely to quarrel among themselves. The joint intervention of France and England in Egypt is a case in point. It may be held to have begun in 1878, and it ceased in 1882 by the withdrawal of France when it was deemed necessary to put down the Arabist rebellion by armed force. It is not too much to say that from that date till 1904, when the

Declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco put an end to the friction between the two powers, the policy of France was directed towards making the British position in Egypt as uncomfortable as possible. The intervention of the German Confederation in the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1864 is a more conspicuous warning still; for it ended in the war of 1866 between Austria and Prussia, the two chief intervening powers.

So prone are powerful states to interfere in the affairs of others, and so great are the evils of interference, that a doctrine of absolute non-intervention has been put forth as a protest against incessant meddling. If this doctrine means that a state should do nothing but mind its own concerns and never take an interest in the affairs of other states, it is fatal to the idea of a family of nations. If, on the other hand, it means that a state should take an interest in international affairs, and express approval or disapproval of the conduct of its neighbors, but never go beyond moral suasion in its interference, it is foolish. To scatter abroad protests and reproaches, and yet to let it be understood that they will never be backed by force of arms, is the surest way to get them treated with angry contempt. Neither selfish isolation nor undignified remonstrance is the proper attitude for honorable and self-respecting states. They should intervene very sparingly, and only on the clearest grounds of justice and necessity; but when they do intervene, they should make it clear to all concerned that their voice must be attended to and their wishes carried out.

INTERVENTION A LAST RESORT [52]

While awaiting an official explanation of the movement of troops to the Mexican border, it may be profitable to consider the worth of some of the unofficial or semi-official explanations of these "maneuvers."

We were told, for example, by the Associated Press

[52] By Amos S. Hershey. *Independent.* 76: 708-11. April 6, 1911.

correspondent who accompanied the President on his journey to the golf links of Augusta:

> The United States had determined that the revolution in the republic to the south must end. The American troops have been sent to form a solid military wall along the Rio Grande to stop filibustering and to see that there is no further smuggling of arms and men across the international boundary.

From another "unofficial but authoritative" statement we learn:

> No invasion of Mexican territory is now contemplated by the United States; but should the Mexican authorities prove unable within a reasonable period, possibly six months or longer, to stamp out warfare, the services of the army would doubtless be offered for purposes of pacification.

Secretary Dickinson has told us that the troops were sent "in order to maintain our neutrality laws." But he gives us the somewhat comforting assurance that "there can be no excuse for intervention unless the Mexican government were negligent in protecting persons and property." He adds: "There are no conditions existing now that would warrant any such action on our part."

But Senator Burton tells us that the United States will probably intervene "if the insurrectos captured the city of Chihuahua." However, it is reported that the President said emphatically, "that no move toward intervention would be made by the administration unless it is directed expressly by Congress after the latter is informed of all the facts."

Now let us see how these explanations stand the test of the law of nations. The merest tyro in international law knows that neither the law of nations nor our neutrality laws prohibit the supply of arms and ammunition either to belligerents or insurgents. There should be no need of smuggling. The trade may be carried on openly. But anything in the nature of an organized military expedition (filibustering) and the use of a part or a portion of our territory as a regular and continuous base of supplies for military operations is forbidden.

Neither is enlistment prohibited either by our neutrality laws or the law of nations. Our neutrality laws do prohibit foreign enlistment or the acceptance of a foreign commission within the territory of the United States. They also prohibit any one from hiring any person to enlist or from hiring another to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted. But it was held in the case of United States v. Kazinski (2 Sprague, 7) that it would not be a violation of our neutrality laws merely to leave this country with intent to enlist. On the other hand, the levying or recruiting of troops within the jurisdiction of the United States for foreign belligerent service would undoubtedly be a violation of international law.

Is it likely that an army of 20,000 men is needed to prevent recruiting and filibustering on our territory?

Much has been made of the supposed duty of our government to protect American life and property, the safety of which, it is assumed, is endangered by revolutionary movements in Mexico; and the Monroe Doctrine has been invoked as evidence that we are responsible for foreign investments as well.

No overt acts indicating the actual destruction of American life and property have thus far been alleged —a remarkable proof of forbearance or self-restraint on the part of the Mexican people under the circumstances. Imagine a Japanese or even a British army threatening our frontier during a time of insurrection or civil war! Would Americans be likely to show a similar degree of self-control?

To secure an adequate or absolute protection of property interests in times like these we should have to resort to forcible intervention. And as Señor Limantour has well said, this means invasion, occupation, war. It is undoubtedly the right and duty of a government to use its best offices and to bring to bear all the influence it can command in a peaceable way to secure adequate protec-

tion of the lives and property of its nationals during times of riot, insurrection, or civil war.

But even at such times foreigners who have suffered injury must ordinarily, in the first instance, have recourse to the courts or local authorities of the place or district in which they are domiciled. The general rule of international law is that "a sovereign is not ordinarily responsible to alien residents for injuries they receive on his territory from belligerent action, or from insurgents whom he could not control." The law of necessity or the physical inability to furnish adequate protection generally absolves governments from responsibility in such cases.

> Foreigners are not entitled to greater privileges or immunities than other inhabitants of the insurrectionary districts. . . By voluntarily remaining in a country in a state of civil war they must be held to have been willing to accept the risks as well as the advantages of that domicile.

These principles have been repeatedly enunciated by leading American and European statesmen, and they have the almost unanimous sanction of leading authorities on international law. Several exceptions must, however, be made to these general principles. Indemnity would seem to be due in the following cases: 1. Where the acts complained of have been directed against foreigners because they are foreigners. 2. Where the injuries result from violations of the laws or treaties of the country in which they have been sustained. 3. In case of a serious violation of international law, more particularly of the rules of civilized warfare. 4. In cases of an evident denial, or of a palpable violation of justice, or of undue discrimination against foreigners on the part of the authorities.

But it should be noted that even in these cases, the proper remedy is that of diplomatic interposition rather than of forcible intervention. Only after all amicable or peaceable modes of redress (including that of arbitration) have been refused may the use of force be regarded as permissible. *Mere danger of injury to the lives or*

property of foreigners affords no ground for intervention in any case.

Nor does the Monroe Doctrine give us good ground for intervention. In its existing form, that doctrine may be defined as the prohibition of any further acquisition, colonization, or permanent occupation of American territory by any European (or Asiatic) power. It has frequently been claimed of late years that the Monroe Doctrine involves duties and responsibilities as well as rights, more especially that it imposes upon us a certain responsibility for the good behavior (by which is generally meant good financial behavior) of Latin-American states.

It may be admitted that this doctrine does impose upon us a certain measure of responsibility, viz.—that of seeing to it that there is justice and fair-dealing in the relations (financial and otherwise) between European and American states. But it does not impose upon us the duty of seeing to it that Shylock receives his pound of flesh, that either foreign or American syndicates be "protected" from loss on their investments (whether watered or legitimate). The law of nations imposes no such obligation, and our responsibilities cannot possibly extend beyond the requirements of international law.

Public loans and investments which have been guaranteed by the Mexican government, i. e., those based upon contract, are provided for by the conventional law of nations. The Porter convention adopted by the second Hague peace conference of 1907 expressly declares the use of force for the collection of contract debts illegitimate unless there has been a refusal to arbitrate or failure to submit to an arbitral award. There is no good reason why the same principle should not be applied to all claims of a pecuniary nature.

There is one issue between the United States and Mexico which is almost certain to arise, viz.—whether, in view of the suspension of constitutional guarantees of personal liberties, the Mexican authorities have the right

of summary execution of Americans taken in arms against their government. Provided there be no discrimination against them, the rights of such adventurers would seem to depend upon the question whether a status of insurgency or belligerency of the revolutionists has been recognized by our government. It is to be hoped that our State Department has learned by experience and will show more wisdom in dealing with this class of cases than it did in the Nicaraguan affair.

There is another aspect of this threatened intervention in Mexican affairs which does not appear to have been duly considered, viz.—its possible or probable effect upon our reputation in the world at large, more especially in Latin America.

In spite of our professions in favor of peace, we are an object of fear and suspicion to the nations. How do our professions as a peace power square with our practice of imperialism? Would an invasion of Mexico assist the cause of Canadian reciprocity? What would be its effect upon the cultivation of closer commercial and political relations with the states of South America? What will become of the field of cooperation with these countries sown by Secretary Blaine and so brilliantly cultivated by Secretary Root? In this connection it may be well to recall a portion of a speech delivered by Mr. Root in Buenos Aires on August 17, 1906:

> The United States has never deemed it to be suitable that she should use her army and navy for the collection of ordinary contract debts of foreign governments to her citizens. For more than a century the State Department . . . has refused to take such action, and that has become the settled policy of our country. We deem it to be inconsistent with that respect for the sovereignty of weaker powers which is essential to their protection against the aggression of the strong. We deem the use of force for the collection of ordinary contract debts to be an invitation to abuses in their necessary results far worse, far more baneful to humanity than that the debts contracted by any nation should go unpaid. We consider that the use of the army and navy of a great power to compel a weaker power to answer to a contract with a private individual is both an invitation to speculation upon

the necessities of weak and struggling countries and an infringement upon the sovereignty of those countries, and we are now, as we have been, opposed to it; and we believe that, perhaps not today nor tomorrow, but through the slow and certain process of the future, the world will come to the same opinion.

It may be noted that Secretary Root speaks of the forcible collection of *contract* debts. The case for the forcible collection of ordinary debts would be still weaker.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE ROOSEVELT DOCTRINE[53]

Did the Monroe Doctrine compel the government of the United States to intervene when European powers sent battleships to Latin-American countries to collect debts for their merchants and investors? The records give two answers. When in 1859 Great Britain proposed a naval demonstration at Vera Cruz to collect debts, the Secretary of State said on that occasion that the United States assumed "no right to sit in judgment upon the causes of complaint which Great Britain may prefer against Mexico nor upon the measures which may be adopted to obtain satisfaction." Again in 1897 a similar position was taken when the German imperial government sent war vessels to Haiti, demanded an indemnity of $30,000 for a subject imprisoned as the result of a curious part in a wrangle involving approximately twenty-five cents, and called for an apology satisfactory to German national honor. In this affair also the State Department at Washington declined to interfere or to assume the duty of protecting its American neighbors from "the responsibilities which attend the exercise of independent sovereignty."

But that was the echo of a dying age. By the dawn of the new century, the investments, claims and hopes of American capitalists in the Caribbean region had mounted so high that no quarrel could now arise between a Euro-

[53] By Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. *The Rise of American Civilization.* p. 525-7.

pean power and Latin-American governments without drawing the attention of Washington forcibly to the existence of positive interests—besides vague responsibilities under the Monroe Doctrine. As the needle the magnet, so public policy followed the course of economic events, and it so happened that the German Emperor felt the first shock of the reverse drive.

When in 1901 Germany, Italy and England united in a naval demonstration against Venezuela with a view to collecting bills presented by their citizens, President Roosevelt sprang upon the stage with alacrity, proposing arbitration as a means of settlement. England and Italy adopted the suggestion, but Germany, it appears, waived aside the proposal in a haughty manner. Thereupon the President called the German ambassador to the White House and told him in plain English that unless his imperial master consented to pacific proposals, Admiral Dewey would be ordered to Venezuelan waters with full authority to act. A week passed and no answer came from Berlin. Roosevelt then served notice on the German ambassador that within a specified time American battleships, already coaled and cleared, would sail for the scene of trouble, a hint sufficient. With seemly grace the kaiser agreed to a judicial inquiry, receiving from the President a nice compliment on being "so staunch an advocate of arbitration." Such, at least, is the story as told by Roosevelt himself long afterward without supplying any documentary support from official sources.

Successful in this episode, Roosevelt gave the screw another turn in applying the Monroe Doctrine to a similar crisis in Santo Domingo. When certain European powers threatened armed intervention there on behalf of their citizens, the United States, besides objecting to the procedure in accordance with the Venezuelan precedent, traveled beyond the confines of that incident. It did not even suggest arbitration; it seized the bankrupt republic, adjusted its assets, and ordered a settlement of its bills—

not without appropriate consideration for American investors, some of whom had acquired Dominican bonds on favorable terms. Before long, as we have seen, American hegemony was spread far and wide in Latin America.

Although the government of the United States made it plain, in the course of the forward movement, that it did not rely for moral sanctions on the Monroe Doctrine alone, a great deal was said about that historic creed during those adventurous years. Roosevelt warned all the parties involved that wrongdoing, disorder, the lessening of the ties of civilized society, and the failure to pay debts would force the United States to exercise its international police power. That was specific. Taft, angered by the assertions of critics to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine was only a shield to cover the seizure of lands and privileges by the United States, replied that such base insinuations would not prevent this country from discharging its duty as occasions arose. That was the age of "dollar diplomacy."

It was followed by the age of "the new freedom." Soon after his inauguration Wilson, as we have said, announced in a speech at Mobile a humanistic twist to the doctrine. Turning the tables on his predecessors, he bluntly declared that capitalists, not content with getting into Latin-American republics, were trying to dominate their domestic affairs; and he informed the world that those states were about to be emancipated and treated as friends and equals on terms of honor. That manifesto too, was perfectly explicit as far as the language went, but the natives of Haiti, Santo Domingo, Mexico and Nicaragua found difficulties in grasping its practical implications—difficulties not entirely dissipated when Charles E. Hughes, as Secretary of State, in a carefully prepared address explained that the Monroe Doctrine did not infringe upon the sovereignty of the Latin-American states or exhaust the rights and responsibilities of the United States in the Caribbean.

STATISTICS OF LATIN AMERICA

Country	Area	Population	Foreign trade 1925	Men in armies
Argentina	1,153,417	9,839,000	$1,692,434,000	54,924
Bolivia	560,000	2,820,000	73,067,000	8,000
Brazil	3,276,358	33,737,000	889,920,000	47,984
Chile	290,160	3,905,000	377,426,000	16,248
Colombia	495,522	6,760,000	165,087,000	6,448
Costa Rica	23,005	498,000	30,237,000	37,605
Cuba	44,164	3,369,000	648,146,000	12,443
Dominican Rep.	19,332	897,000	52,109,000	1,578
Ecuador	118,627	2,000,000	62,085,000	5,500
Guatemala	42,364	2,185,000	53,056,000	7,525
Haiti	10,207	2,045,000	39,641,000	2,595
Honduras	46,262	650,000	24,736,000	2,253
Mexico	760,290	14,235,000	536,740,000	57,368
Nicaragua	49,213	690,000	22,736,000	337
Panama	32,388	446,000	17,388,000	756
Paraguay	97,722	1,000,000	32,333,000	1,717
Peru	532,185	6,000,000	194,514,000	9,445
Salvador	13,176	1,650,000	33,498,000	4,000
Uruguay	72,172	1,632,000	200,594,000	8,252
Venezuela	393,977	2,562,000	121,000,000	7,500
Total	8,030,341	96,920,000	$5,266,750,000	292,478
United States	3,627,557	107,321,000	9,136,437,000	391,392

OUR STAKE IN LATIN AMERICA[54]

DISTRIBUTION OF OUR LATIN-AMERICAN INVESTMENTS
(In Millions of Dollars)

	1912	1928	Per Cent Increase
1. Cuba	200	1,400	536
2. Mexico	800	1,288	61
3. Chile	15	451	2,906
4. Argentina	40	450	1,025
5. Brazil	50	388	676
6. Peru	35	169	382
7. Venezuela	3	162	5,300
8. Colombia	2	125	6,150
9. Bolivia	10	86	760
10. Uruguay	5	77	1,440
11. Costa Rica	7	46	557
12. Honduras	3	40	1,233
13. Guatemala	20	37	85
14. Salvador	3	35	1,066
15. Panama	5	31	520
16. Ecuador	10	30	200
17. Haiti	4	28	600
18. Santo Domingo	4	28	600
19. Nicaragua	3	20	566
20. Paraguay	4	18	350
21. Guianas	5	8	60

[54] From *Literary Digest*. 96:60. January 28, 1928.

UNITED STATES INVESTMENTS ABROAD

Latin America	$5,200,000,000
Europe	4,300,000,000
Canada	3,900,000,000
China, Japan and Philippines	700,000,000
Miscellaneous	400,000,000

LATIN-AMERICAN INVESTMENTS

United States	$5,200,000,000
Great Britain	5,200,000,000
Other Nations	2,200,000,000

These tabulations accompany the New York *Times* article by Evans Clark. The first table (at the top) is drawn from governmental and other authoritative sources. The second is compiled by Dr. Max Winkler, an authority on foreign investments; and the third is based on Department of Commerce statistics.

BRIEF EXCERPTS

An inherited distrust of the Yankee persists in South America.—*Clarence H. Haring. Foreign Affairs.* 5:366. *April,* 1927.

It [the Monroe Doctrine] stands today [1900] as a cardinal policy of our government.—*John W. Foster. A Century of American Diplomacy. p.* 477.

Intervention when exercised by a single power, responsible only to itself, is likely to be abused.—*Raymond L. Buell. International Relations. p.* 374.

Increased return and nothing else is the reason why any American dollar goes south of the Rio Grande.—*Amos Pinchot. Forum.* 78:436. *September,* 1927.

The ownership of Cuba lies almost completely in the hand of the National City Bank [of New York].—*Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman. Dollar Diplomacy. p.* 193.

There is a need for international justice and morality on the part of the creditor powers as well as on the part of the debtor nations.—*John H. Latané. America as a World Power. p.* 275.

All the governments of America stand, so far as we are concerned, upon a footing of genuine equality and unquestioned independence.—*Woodrow Wilson. Message to Congress. December 7,* 1915.

These black republics [Haiti and Santo Domingo] probably represent the lowest civilization to be found in our hemisphere.—*Frederic C. Penfield. North American Review.* 178:83. *January,* 1904.

European competitors, particularly British and German, are working overtime to undermine the position that the United States won in South America during the war.—*Editorial. Outlook.* 145:138. *February* 2, 1927.

The right of the American government to intervene for the protection of its subjects, whenever a foreign government is unable or unwilling to extend such protection, is unquestioned.—*Nation.* 95:226. *September* 12, 1912.

I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.—*Woodrow Wilson. Address to the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile. October* 27, 1913.

Dollar diplomacy is the American equivalent of financial imperialism. It is a phrase which came first into use in this country during the administration of President Taft.—*Frederick C. Howe. Atlantic Monthly.* 120:477. *October,* 1917.

We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.—*Theodore Roosevelt. Message to Congress. December* 3, 1901.

Intervention in the affairs of another country to maintain or establish a particular form of government is not recognized today as justifiable or legal.—*W. E. Lingelbach. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 16:10. *July,* 1900.

Latin America accounts for 43 per cent of the total American foreign investments, as compared with Canada and Newfoundland 27 per cent, Europe 22 per cent, Asia and Oceania and Africa only 8 per cent.—*Parker T. Moon. Imperialism and World Poltics. p.* 415.

Intervention is not a mere landing of armed forces for the protection of property. Intervention is war. It is war whether there be a declaration of war or note.—*George Huddleston. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January* 13, 1927. *p.* 40.

The Mexican population has always been poor, illiterate. Even today not more than sixteen per cent can read and write. In consequence local capital and enterprise have been feeble, the vast wealth of the country has lain unutilized, a tempting prey to foreign plunderers.—*Editorial. New Republic.* 6:333. *April 29,* 1916.

One may ask whether, when armed intervention seemed necessary, we could not call upon some international body such as the Pan-American Union to attempt conciliation, endorse the justice of our cause, and clear us of all suspicion of unjustified aggression or imperialism. —*Parker T. Moon. Survey.* 58:24. *April* 1, 1927.

Incalculable opportunities for American commercial expansion exist in Latin America provided there is developed in the United States sufficient skill in employing its creditor position for the permanent development of the resources and people of the borrowing nations.—*Henry Bruere. American Economic Review.* 13:70. *March,* 1923.

The actual story of the American intervention in Haiti bears a very faint resemblance to the noisy speeches or superficial articles that from time to time are offered to the American people in statements that are uninformed, misinformed, or even deliberately false.—*Charles E. Chapman. Hispanic American Historical Review.* 7:299. *August,* 1927.

We must not permit Latin-American adventurers and dictators to look upon the Monroe Doctrine as a cloak for specious dealings with Europeans, but make it plain that the United States government will not stand between them and the penalties which their misconduct invites.—*Frederic C. Penfield. North American Review.* 178:83. *January,* 1904.

In 1909 revolution broke out in Nicaragua against Zelaya. This revolution was supplied with money and arms by Americans. All Americans there were with the revolution.—*Toribio Tijerino. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate. 69th Congress. 2d Session, pursuant to S. Con. Res.* 15. 1927. *p.* 2.

The rapid advance of the United States in the Caribbean naturally aroused the fears of the smaller Latin-American states and lent color to the charge that the United States had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a policy of benevolent protection to one of imperialistic aggression.—*John H. Latané. A History of American Foreign Policy. p.* 557.

The Dominican Republic has for forty years been getting daring speculators to take its paper at 60 or 80 per cent discount, and repudiating the debt as often as convenient. Her borrowings, like those of several other of the smaller Latin-American republics, have always had *caveat emptor* [let the buyer beware] written legibly upon them.—*Nation.* 82:66. *January* 25, 1906.

It is unfortunate that publicists have not laid down broadly and unanimously that no intervention is legal, except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless the whole body of civilized states have concurred in authorizing it.—*William E. Hall. A Treatise on International Law. (Eighth edition) p.* 343-4.

In 1845, without mentioning this shibboleth [the Monroe Doctrine] by name, President Polk declared that the United States would not permit any European intervention on the North American continent. This pushed the theory further than it has been carried out in practice, although it restricted the original idea by leaving South

America out of account.—*Hiram Bingham. The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth. p.* 7-8.

Once again oil attracts the attention of the world. The Standard Oil Company of New York and the Royal Dutch-Shell combination [of Great Britain] have declared open warfare upon each other. The centre of interest in the oil drama of today is the scramble to stake out or control the remaining undeveloped sources of supply—Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Persia, and the various fields that lie in Russian territory.—*Evans Clark. New York Times. January* 22, 1928.

German merchants controlled about nine-tenths of Haiti's foreign trade and showed a concern in local affairs that was artistically proportioned to the flow of goods. In the press of things they were able to place a loan of half a million at thirty-five per cent interest and later they managed to float a smaller issue of three hundred thousand dollars which yielded a net sum of about half that amount to the Haitian treasury.—*Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. The Rise of American Civilization. v.* 2, *p.* 506.

To intervene in behalf of humanity demands a clean heart on the part of the nation. It must be made clear that we seek no Mexican territory, no indemnities, no concessions, no feeding of the vultures which already swarm along the feverish border. . . And if we failed to remember our loftiest purpose, it [intervention] would not rise above the level of the first Mexican war, which has stood as a blot on the history of the republic for the past seventy years.—*David Starr Jordan. Independent.* 87:54-5. *July* 10, 1916.

The policy of the Monroe Doctrine does not infringe upon the independence and [sic] sovereignty of other American states. . . The Monroe Doctrine does not attempt to establish a protectorate over Latin-American

states. Certainly, the declaration that intervention by non-American powers, encroaching upon the independence of American states will be regarded as dangerous to our own safety, gives no justification for such intervention on our part.—*Charles E. Hughes. Report of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association.* 1923. *p.* 251-2.

The movement for overseas investments began about 1880. It had its origin in surplus wealth seeking investment. This surplus wealth could be invested at home only at low rates of interest. . . It is urged by many that financial aid must be extended to weaker peoples in order that they may be developed. But an examination of the unhappy experiences of weaker countries shows that there is scarcely an instance, outside the countries protected by the Monroe Doctrine, in which the borrowing countries have not lost their independence as the price of financial assistance.—*Frederic C. Howe. New Republic.* 7:170-1. *June* 17, 1916.

All Latin-American countries are borrowers abroad and virtually all of them have turned from Europe to borrow in the American market, or to attempt to do so. In the field of Latin-American government finance it is unlikely that the American banks will soon again have important competition from Europe, except to a limited extent from England. Consequently, during the coming years there will doubtless be a steady stream of dollars exported to the south and with every dollar there will go just so much of practical American concern for the economic development and political well-being of those countries.—*Henry Bruere. American Economic Review.* 13:69-70. March, 1923.

Mexico is not in our sense of the word a nation at all, but a collection, loosely organized, of more or less developed and more or less widely sundered Indian tribes. The census classes about 19 per cent of the popu-

lation as white, though it is notorious that there are few native Mexicans without more or less Indian blood. None of these Mexican Indians are [sic] to be compared with the Creek and Cherokee nations in Oklahoma. Mexico is in fact not a nation, but a country peopled by many tribes of Indians of varying degrees of development, none reaching what we would call civilization, who have been ruled for centuries by a thin veneer of white men comprising not more than five per cent of the population.—*Roland G. Usher. North American Review.* 200: 45-6. *July,* 1914.

The substitution of Pan-American intervention for United States intervention, and of international financial receiverships for United States financial protectorates, in the region between the equator and the United States, would perhaps keep order there more effectively, and conciliate South America, and therefore aid American trade with South America. But such a substitution would be possible only when public opinion in the United States divests itself of the spirit of domination, discards the "big stick" along with "dollar diplomacy" and learns to treat Latin-American nations as associates rather than proteges. The great obstacle is not material interests, but a psychological factor, national pride, and national pride is the mother of imperialism.—*Parker T. Moon. Imperialism and World Politics. p.* 455-6.

Recent developments all show that intervention is becoming more and more recognized as the legal means by which the society of nations enforces its rights. This is true whether it is carried out by several states or by an individual state, acting in accordance with precedent and the consensus of international public opinion, although the modern practice shows a strong tendency towards action in concert. Intervention, therefore, instead of being outside the pale of the law of nations and antagonistic to it, is an integral and essential part of it; an act of

police for enforcing recognized rights, and the only means, apart from war, for enforcing the rules of international law.—*W. E. Lingelbach. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 16:31-2. *July,* 1900.

In those places where European powers did not keep order, there were periodic uprisings against the titular governments, revolts often purely factious, sometimes the efforts of honest men to oust corrupt and tyrannical adventurers, occasionally the outcome of a failure to appreciate the merits of foreign investors. Regardless of their source, they were always disturbing to business interests, particularly to the holders of local bonds. As a rule the outstanding obligations of Latin-American republics were large for the pertinent revenues. In fact they were generally inflated to a high pressure; for at each uprising the debts of the defeated party were added to those of the victors, thereby preventing any such magnificent repudiation as had occurred when the government of Abraham Lincoln triumphed over that of Jefferson Davis.—*Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. The Rise of American Civilization. v.* 2, *p.* 501.

The right of a nation to rule or riot as it wills is going the way of the right of a private person to do what he wills with his own property. There is no absolute, sovereign nation, immune by natural or divine law from influences originating beyond its own borders. The Turk can no longer assert that what he does with the Armenians is his private business. What Russia does with her Jews, what England does with her Irish, are matters of international concern. Not less is it a matter of international concern what Mexico does with her peons, her land holders, her merchants and bankers. Wisdom or unwisdom in the treatment of these classes may make for harmony or civil war. But civil war is always potentially international. Any flame of war may spread, as the embers of

the Albanian and Macedonian revolts were fanned into the Balkan wars, which produced the present [1916] world conflagration. The peace of Europe might have been preserved if its diplomacy had proved equal to the Macedonian question.—*New Republic.* 8:207. *September* 30, 1916.

We are unfortunately too familiar with complaints of the delay and inefficiency of the courts in the South American republics. We must, however, continue to repose confidence in their independence and integrity, or we must take the broad ground that those states are like those of Oriental semi-civilized countries—outside the pale within which the law of nations, as generally accepted by Christendom, is understood to govern. The people who go to these regions and encounter great risks in the hope of great rewards, must be regarded as taking all the circumstances into consideration, and cannot with reason ask their government to complain that they stand on a common footing with native subjects in respect to the alleged wants of an able, prompt and conscientious judiciary. We cannot undertake to supervise the arrangements of the whole world for litigation, because American citizens voluntarily expose themselves to be concerned in their deficiencies.—*William H. Seward. Communication from the Secretary of State to the American Minister to Colombia. Diplomatic Correspondence.* 3:522-3. 1866.

This power of the President to land armed forces of the United States for the protection of the life and property of American citizens, is an arbitrary and discretionary power. There are no limits placed upon it. It has just grown up and developed from the general power of the President as Commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and his general power to direct foreign relations. The number of cases probably runs up to a hundred. They range all the way from a request of a

consul, without an order from Washington, for the landing of a few marines to protect citizens of the United States, to the action of President McKinley in the case of the Boxer uprising, when he sent a large army into China without asking Congress, by your consent or leave, and that army waged war. It stormed and carried the walled city of Tientsin, and advanced to Peking, and the strange thing is that when the treaty at the conclusion of hostilities was made, it was not submitted to the Senate for ratification.—*John H. Latané. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January* 12, 1927. p. 19-20.

American "dollar diplomacy" and financial control backed up by occasional naval demonstrations or by the landing of marines, is not a unique method of controlling disorderly or insolvent countries. On the contrary, franc diplomacy and pound sterling diplomacy were conspicuous in Morocco, Tunis and Egypt, as was ruble diplomacy in Persia, mark diplomacy in Turkey, and yen diplomacy in China. Lending money to unstable governments, or investing money in unruly countries, has been one of the most widespread features of imperialism, and has usually led to annexations in European practice, whereas in American practice dollar diplomacy leads to financial receiverships, that is, to the collection of the customs duties of a Haiti or a Santo Domingo by American officials, or to other methods of financial supervision. It may be pointed out in this connection that the American method is more subtle, achieving as it does the desired financial and economic domination without political annexation and often, as in the case of Cuba, without much impairing political self-government. As an attempt to reconcile business interests with political principles, it has its philosophical as well as its practical attractions.—*Parker T. Moon. Imperialism and World Politics. p.* 415.

Oil is and long has been the bone of contention be-

tween Mexico and this country. And naturally so, for the stake of American companies in Mexico is immense. In 1924 our government estimated American investments in Mexican oil lands and refineries at $478,000,000. In the same year Mr. Doheney, who subsidized Secretary of the Interior Fall and had ex-Secretary of the Interior Garfield and ex-Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo on his payroll, valued his Mexican interests at $218,000,000. In 1925 a Wall street firm put American investments in Mexican oil at $700,000,000. President Harding put Fall, an ardent interventionist and owner of Mexican properties, in the cabinet and President Coolidge kept him there till the oil bribe from Doheney was revealed by Senator Walsh's investigation. The Standard Oil Company has vast interests in Mexico. So have Secretary of the Treasury Mellon and Harry Sinclair of Teapot Dome fame. On April 25 President Coolidge announced that the question of American oil titles in Mexico was not arbitrable, a disquieting statement, since a man who repudiates arbitration is generally either tremendously right or tremendously wrong. And one would feel more confidence in the President's position, had some of the individuals claiming title in Mexico shown themselves better citizens in their own country.—*Amos Pinchot. Forum* 78:440. *September,* 1927.

The contest between the states of the North and the South seemed at times evenly balanced and the outcome doubtful, but the result was never in reality uncertain if it should continue a domestic contest. The great danger for the Union was in the unfriendly conduct of European nations and especially of Great Britain, and our diplomacy was steadily taxed to the utmost to prevent intervention [p. 358]. For more than two years the danger of European intervention was a constant menace. Of all these nations the only staunch friend of the Union cause was Russia, all the others being openly unfriendly or indif-

ferent to the result. It was Russia that gave us the first notice, early in 1861, of the efforts of the French Emperor to effect a coalition against us of the then three great powers. She not only declined the coalition, but again, in 1862, when the formal proposition for European intervention was proposed, it also was declined. In the darkest days of the struggle, her fleet appeared in American ports, as an earnest of her friendship. Failing in support from Russia, the French Emperor turned with better success to Great Britain. He had fully committed himself to his scheme of a Latin empire in Mexico, and he well knew it was impossible of realization without a dismembered Union. To execute his hostile designs against the United States, the cooperation or neutrality of England was a necessity, and he early secured a pledge of joint action.—*John W. Foster. A Century of American Diplomacy. p.* 358 *and* 372.

AFFIRMATIVE DISCUSSION

THE BASIS OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE CARIBBEAN[1]

When the small republics of Central America and the West Indies obtained their independence, barely a century ago, there were many factors which made difficult the establishment of stable political institutions. Under Spanish rule there had been virtually no self-government of any kind. The newly adopted republican constitutions were incomprehensible to the illiterate Indian or negro peons who made up the great mass of the population, and were but imperfectly understood even by those who signed them. The evil traditions of corruption and favoritism inherited from the colonial regime made it difficult to inculcate respect for law or honesty in administration. The holding of real elections proved to be utterly impossible, for the result of the voting could always be determined in favor of the government by corruption, official pressure and fraud. The party in power maintained itself by force and could be displaced only by the same means. Political changes were thus almost invariably accompanied by disorder.

Some of these conditions have existed in several of the Caribbean countries down to the present day, and recurrent civil wars, with the economic and political demoralization which has accompanied them, have inevitably involved the governments of these countries in difficulties with foreign powers. Foreign property has been destroyed; foreign investors have been exposed to extortion at the hands of irresponsible military leaders; and foreign lives have sometimes been sacrificed. Further-

[1] By Dana G. Munro. *Current History.* 26: 857-61. September, 1927.

more, government loans have been contracted abroad, and foreign interests have been besought in some cases and encouraged in others to construct railroads and develop mines and plantations. Because of the risks involved, and sometimes because of the inexperience or venality of local officials, many of these investments were made under concessions granting privileges which later proved distasteful and burdensome, and subsequent administrations, coming into power by revolution, have sought to evade or repudiate the obligations assumed by their predecessors, or found that disturbed conditions made compliance impossible.

Among the foreigners so affected were many citizens of the United States, and our government has naturally been called upon to protect them, just as it protects American citizens in other parts of the world. Where contract rights or the safety of property have been involved, its action has ordinarily been confined to diplomatic representations, followed sometimes by formal claims for damages which could be settled by arbitration after normal conditions had been restored. When the lives of American citizens were in actual, imminent danger, however, it has not infrequently proved necessary to send a warship or to land a small force of marines, almost always without bloodshed, to prevent murder and outrage until the local authorities could again extend adequate protection. In taking such action, which is entirely in accord with established international practice, the United States is merely discharging a duty incumbent upon civilized governments.

Where the interests and the lives of citizens of other world powers are endangered, however, a more difficult situation is created, for complications with non-American powers inevitably raise questions connected with the Monroe Doctrine. More than once, as in the case of the British efforts to obtain control of possible Isthmian canal routes before 1860, the French intervention in

Mexico during our Civil war, and the European intrigues in Haiti before 1914, we have seen foreign powers seeking to take advantage of political instability in countries close to us in ways very dangerous to our own interests. On other occasions, as during the disturbances of the past four years in Honduras and Nicaragua, European governments have made it clear to us in a more friendly spirit that we must do something to protect foreign interests if we do not desire them to intervene themselves. Such warnings cannot lightly be disregarded. The territories of our Caribbean neighbors are close to our own coast and command many of our trade routes. They also command the approaches to the Panama Canal—a fact which is of the utmost importance. It is unthinkable that we should ever permit other powers to intervene in their internal affairs, for the history of weak and disorderly countries in other parts of the world shows that such intervention too often leads to permanent control.

Permanent Control Not Desired

Since we have no desire whatever to establish any permanent control ourselves, we can only safeguard our vital interests by endeavoring to help these nations to reach a point where they can manage their own affairs in a manner which will leave no pretext for interference by ourselves or by any one else. This has been the central purpose of our Caribbean policy during the past twenty years.

In 1907, when international conflicts and the continual interference of certain governments in the internal affairs of the others had produced a serious situation in Central America, the United States invited the governments of Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica to send delegates to a conference which met at Washington to consider measures which would place their relations on a better basis. Among other important treaties adopted at this meeting, there was one in

which the contracting parties agreed not to attempt any direct or indirect interference in one another's political affairs and to submit all disputes between themselves to an international court for adjudication. In 1923, when a second conference met in Washington, at the invitation of the United States, to revise the original treaties and to make them more effective, a further provision was adopted to the effect that no administration coming into power by revolution or unlawful means in a Central American country should be recognized by the other governments until a free election should have been held, and not even then if one of the leaders of the revolution should have been elected president.

The results of these treaties have on the whole been excellent. Although international wars had been frequent in Central America before 1907, not one has occurred since that year, and revolutions caused by outside influence have been far less frequent. The United States has adopted as its own the policy laid down by the Central American nations themselves, and has endeavored by withholding recognition of revolutionary governments to discourage the seizure of power by military leaders and to promote the settlement of political difficulties so far as possible by constitutional means. Nevertheless, the treaties could not be expected to put an end to disorderly conditions caused by underlying economic and social factors which could be modified only by a slow process of development. Unfortunately, there have been disastrous, if less frequent, civil wars in several of the Central American states since 1907, and these have continued to present difficult and troublesome problems for the government of the United States.

A revolution which occurred in Nicaragua in 1909-1910 left that country in a condition of economic prostration and complete political demoralization, with the foreign debt held by British investors in default and many other foreigners clamoring for payment for losses suf-

fered during the conflict. The United States exercised its good offices to bring about an agreement among the rival leaders of the victorious party, and later, at the request of the President of Nicaragua, intervened by force to protect foreign life and property and to restore peace when a new outbreak of disorder occurred. The presence in Managua of a legation guard of about one hundred American marines contributed to the maintenance of order for the next thirteen years, because it was generally regarded as an evidence of the moral support accorded by the United States to the established government.

Nicaraguan Financial Reform

During this period it was possible, through the assistance of the United States, to place Nicaragua's finances in a better position than those of any other Caribbean country. In consideration of the establishment of a customs collector nominated by themselves and approved by the Department of State, two New York banking firms advanced somewhat over $2,000,000 to place the new government on its feet financially and to stabilize the depreciated and fluctuating paper currency. The British bondholders were induced to accept a lower rate of interest on their bonds and the internal debt was paid off or refunded. There has been much misinformed criticism of these operations both in Nicaragua and the United States, but it is impossible for any fairminded and competent student who takes the trouble to analyze the numerous complicated transactions involved not to reach the conclusion that Nicaragua was infinitely better off as a result of them. Many of the charges which have been made seem simply ridiculous when one realizes the smallness of the sums involved as compared with the risks incurred.

In 1925 the legation guard was withdrawn from Managua, and within three months from its departure a revolution broke out. The painful events which have since

occurred are so fresh in the memory that it is unnecessary to recount them. It may be pointed out, however, that the settlement reached through Mr. Stimson's mediation is in substantial accord with our general policy. The constitutionally established government is maintained in office and the selection of its successor by legal and peaceful means is assured by the fact that next year's elections, at the request of both parties, will be held under American supervision.

In Cuba, where we have special obligations because of the Platt amendment, the United States government has endeavored to aid in the establishment of conditions under which our right of intervention to maintain the constitutional order will become obsolete because there will be no occasion to invoke it. In particular, we have aided in drafting and executing electoral laws designed to assure orderly changes of government. General Crowder, who has represented the United States in Cuba in many capacities, has rendered services of inestimable value, not only in this connection but also in aiding Cuba to emerge from the disastrous economic and financial situation brought on by the fall in sugar prices in 1920. The independent, stable and prosperous Cuba of today owes much to his work and counsel.

By means of the customs receivership treaty entered into with the Dominican Republic in 1907, we enabled that country to unravel the apparently hopeless financial tangle in which it had become involved through internal disorder and maladministration and reckless borrowing from foreign interests. Unfortunately, a subsequent renewal of revolutionary disturbances made impossible the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by both governments under the treaty. After prolonged and fruitless efforts to help the Dominicans to remedy the situation themselves, it was finally deemed necessary, in 1916, to establish an American military government in the republic. Six years later, however, a plan of withdrawal was

worked out in agreement with the leaders of all of the Dominican political parties, and in 1924, upon the establishment of a popularly elected native government, all the American forces were evacuated. The Dominican government resumed full control of all branches of the public administration except the customs, which continued to be administered by an American general receiver as under the treaty of 1907.

In Haiti the situation is somewhat different. Revolutions had become so frequent and so destructive in the years immediately preceding 1915 that it was clear that stable goverment could never be established without outside help. The lives and interests of foreigners were in constant danger, and reckless borrowing abroad had been carried to a point where the republic was on the verge of complete and hopeless bankruptcy. There was no question but that one or more European powers would sooner or later assume control of affairs if the United States took no action, and the intrigues which defeated American efforts to improve conditions made it seem probable that there were powers which would welcome an opportunity to do so.

In July, 1915, therefore, when all vestiges of established authority had disappeared after President Guillaume Sam had been taken from the French legation and torn to pieces by a mob in Port-au-Prince, and when French marines had already been landed to protect French interests, the United States took control of the situation. Under the protection of American naval forces, the Haitian Congress met and elected a new president in accordance with the constitution. The United States and the new government entered into a treaty under which American assistance would assure the maintenance of order and the improvement of the condition of the Haitian people to a point where the events which had compelled our intervention could not recur. The finances were placed under the general supervision of officials nominated by

the President of the United States and a constabulary was organized under American officers. Other American officials were appointed as technical directors of sanitation and public works. More recently, an American expert has been employed to establish a system of agricultural education and to direct the systematic development of the country's agricultural resources, and another has undertaken the creation of a system of vocational schools. In 1921, to ensure proper coordination of the activities of these so-called treaty officials, their activities were placed under the supervision of Brigadier General J. H. Russell, as high commissioner with the rank of ambassador.

The result has been little short of miraculous. While the lower type of politicians and the former professional revolutionists have objected loudly to the new state of affairs, the masses of the Haitian people have shown their practical appreciation of what has been done for them by renewing the cultivation of the lands which had been abandoned because of military depredations, by using the new roads which have been constructed, and by making the greatest use of the free medical and veterinary clinics which have been established in districts where no medical attention of any kind had ever before been available. In all the departments under American supervision an effort is being made to train Haitians so that they may take over the work as soon as possible. The results which have been accomplished have been due in large part to the intelligent cooperation of President Borno, the enlightened statesman now at the head of the Haitian government.

How Order Is Established

In none of the countries above referred to has the United States attempted to exercise any lasting control. Our government has in fact shown itself extremely reluctant to interfere in their affairs at all until it was ob-

vious that there was no alternative. Except in Haiti, where conditions are not yet ripe for such action, it has terminated its intervention as soon as there seemed to be a reasonable prospect that the people of the country involved would be able for the time being to maintain order and protect life and property without outside assistance. Its consistent endeavor has been to create conditions which would ultimately make outside interference unnecessary. By discouraging revolt and disorder, by extending moral support to administrations constitutionally established, and by assisting in the development of adequate electoral systems, it has sought to aid its neighbors in laying the foundations for stable, democratic government. By making expert financial assistance available and cooperating in establishing conditions where refunding operations could be effected on advantageous terms, it has sought to remove one of the principal sources of difficulties with European powers as well as to make it possible to provide funds for internal development. By encouraging the establishment of adequate police forces it has attempted to assure the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property.

While the sole justification for our policy in the Caribbean has been the necessity for defending the interests and the national security of the United States, we have scrupulously regarded such control as we have temporarily assumed in individual countries as a trust to be managed for the sole benefit of their inhabitants. No discriminations against foreign trade have followed the establishment of American customs receiverships. Our influence has been used against the granting of concessions even to American interests, unless their provisions were advantageous to the country which was asked to grant them. When our government has cooperated with the Caribbean governments in obtaining loans from American bankers, it has insisted that the terms of the contract be fair to the borrowing country. The bankers have, of course, made

profits from such transactions, for bankers do not underwrite bond issues from philanthropic motives or even primarily from a desire to assist in the conduct of our foreign relations, but it can be demonstrated that the cost of the loans to the borrowers has been far less than the cost of loans obtained without the good offices of the Department of State.

Such a policy is obviously not imperialistic. On the contrary, it aims primarily to do away with any reason or excuse for the extension of our own power at our neighbors' expense. The extreme reluctance with which our government has acted in situations where it would clearly be compelled ultimately to intervene, and the prompt withdrawal of our intervention when it had served its purpose, show clearly that our policy is the reverse of imperialism as it has been practiced elsewhere.

There are, of course, persons who sincerely believe that every nation should be permitted to manage its own affairs in its own way, however badly, and that foreigners who go to disorderly countries must take the consequences upon themselves. Those who have dealt with such questions officially find it difficult to believe that very many of the persons who hold such theories, if placed in a position of authority, would actually sacrifice a group of American citizens in a Caribbean port where all semblance of government had disappeared, when they could be saved by the appearance of an American warship or the bloodless landing of a few marines. Furthermore, they could hardly hope to persuade other powers to adopt a similarly idealistic but cruel policy, and very few of them would care to assume the responsibility for the consequences which would follow should other governments actively undertake the protection of their own citizens.

Basis of Intervention Policy

If a Secretary of State should attempt to adopt a policy of absolute non-interference, moreover, he could not free

himself from the responsibility resting upon him by reason of the fact that American influence, even if not consciously exercised, is always a dominant factor in the affairs of the small Caribbean countries. He would still be besieged with requests for advice and assistance when these countries became involved in complications with foreign powers or in internal political difficulties. He could not escape the responsibility for deciding whether or not to extend to a new government or to one of two rival governments the usually decisive moral support of recognition by the United States. Complete inaction by the Department of State may have as positive an effect in a Caribbean political crisis as the enunciation of a definite policy. It is obviously better that our tremendous moral influence should be consciously and intelligently directed than that we should attempt or pretend to close our eyes to its existence.

Our relations with our Caribbean neighbors can never be placed upon a wholly satisfactory basis until the problems which they present are better understood in the United States itself. Our government needs the support of an enlightened public opinion in dealing with them. This does not mean, of course, that the Department of State should be defended blindly in whatever it does. The critic, with the inestimable advantage of hindsight, will always find much to which he can properly object in the manner in which particular situations have been handled. But he should bear in mind the fact that mistakes are hard to avoid in dealing with peoples of a different civilization and a different psychology, and that in any event few of the problems arising in our Caribbean relations are susceptible of a really satisfactory settlement, because the solution of the basic problem—the establishment of stable government—will probably require several generations of economic and social development. Above all, he should be very slow to attribute to his government hidden or improper motives. In matters of foreign policy

it is especially important that criticism be fair and based on facts.

INTERVENTION OFTEN NECESSARY[2]

The inhabitants of Mexico and Central America have my sympathy. Their troubles for the most part are anthropological and meteorological in their origin and consequently not easily removed. In other words, the weather is largely responsible for the variations in the color and the conduct of men and women the world over, and the weather is something the Senate has not yet resolved to investigate and punish for misconduct. Where food can be had for the gathering and clothing is required for ornamental purposes only, people have much spare time; and while it would seem that nations so favored by nature should be among the first to find and frequent the paths of peace and progress, a glance at the map of the earth clearly indicates that such is not the case. Indeed, the physiological and psychological effect of an excess of leisure, near the Equator or elsewhere, is both startling and alarming.

If our proud and belligerent neighbors just below the Rio Grande had the intelligence and the diligence to ascertain and comprehend the reasons why, with untold wealth beneath their feet and peace and sunshine over their heads, they have not paid and will not pay the interest upon their defaulted national obligations they would know what has been and still is the matter with Mexico. And they would realize that they will remain in their present condition until they can rear generations of men and women who will use their spare time for other purposes than those of self-destruction. If the weather has endowed the Mexican with a congenital incapacity to preserve order or pay his debts; if neither precept nor persuasion from outside nor anything they can claim as their own will undo the work of untold centuries of warm weather—then what? Will

[2] By George P. McLean. *Congressional Record.* 68: 2226-7. January 25, 1927.

Mother Nature stick to her knitting and in conscientious disregard of the doctrine of self-determination, will she continue to help only those who can and do help themselves?

I am aware that the civilized nations have blessed and published this doctrine of nonintervention or self-determination, regardless of its consequences to those in whose interest it is invoked. The immortal Lincoln preached it, as have his successors who have occupied the pulpit of democracy; but neither Lincoln nor anybody else ever carried it beyond the edges of expediency. When a larger portion of the earth than is now the case was owned and occupied by their weaker brethren and title by conquest was the order of the day, every great power hoped that this doctrine would keep its rivals in the real-estate business on the neutral side of the fence until it could trump up a casus belli that would serve as an excuse for getting its muskets first into the field, not for the purpose of protecting the weaker brother but for the sole purpose of securing title to his land.

There are instances where international jealousies and fears have applied the nonintervention gospel as promising the least of many unpleasant possibilities. And it may be that in some cases fewer men and women have been killed and robbed and ravished in its observance than in its breach. But the point that I want to emphasize is the unblushing fact that this doctrine is founded upon the assumption that might or the largest mob is always right when it asserts itself in domestic upheavals. In other words, it assumes that outsiders are morally bound never to interfere in domestic quarrels however brutal and revolting their consequences to insiders. Moreover, had the white man observed it, he would have been excluded from the western hemisphere, and the civilizations of the eastern hemisphere would have remained tied to the stake of barbarism.

Virtuous or vicious as this doctrine may be if literally

and universally applied, the map of the earth, to which I have called attention, clearly indicates that it is a doctrine which heretofore has been happily disregarded by forces which have been and I think will continue to remain beyond the control of treaties and treaty makers.

For many years the people of Mexico and Central America have enjoyed to the full the right to settle their domestic affairs, mental, moral and material, without interference from outside. They have established representative democracies, and they have adopted model and humane constitutions. Yet their story, for the most part, has been one of revolution, which has resulted in stagnation or retrogression. It may be that outsiders have obtained property rights in Mexico and the Central American countries at much less than their real value. It may be that public officials have been bribed to grant concessions which have been very profitable to the grantees.

Much as we may regret these circumstances, it still remains to be said that if these transfers to aliens were tainted with fraud they could have been set aside by the domestic courts, if these courts had been presided over by honest judges. And with the taxing power they could have got a reasonable share of the profits enjoyed by the outsider had they been able to find and elect honest law-making bodies. If, as free and independent democracies, their nationals have preyed upon each other, and if while so engaged they have sold revolutions to the highest bidder, foreign or domestic, whose fault is it? And certainly they would have been drawn and quartered and consumed by foreign powers long ago but for the protecting arm of the United States in its strict enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. They may deny anything that anybody may say about them today; they may accuse the United States of hostile and imperialistic intentions; and their denials and accusations may be repeated and sustained by their friends in other countries; nevertheless, their lamentable political, industrial and sociological record is written

in indelible ink of their own manufacture. That they envy and hate us is a matter of course. That our less fortunate neighbors in other lands should sympathize with them is natural. That many well-meaning Americans should cry imperialism at this time is to be expected. From Queen Elizabeth to Thomas Jefferson and from Thomas Jefferson to Calvin Coolidge the English-speaking inhabitants of America have been denounced as wanton and aggressive imperialists by those who were not affiliated with the party in power when additional territory was acquired. It is my belief that these same objectors would have cried the dominant administrations to perdition had they failed to do precisely what they did do or had they ever, under any circumstances, suffered without protest invasions upon the personal safety or property of American citizens "by anybody, anywhere, at any time."

I think all this means that those responsible for Uncle Sam's conduct must be patient but exceedingly firm. We are a great and powerful people. Our progress has been rapid and phenomenal in its proportions, and the time has arrived for better or worse when we do not want a square rod of land belonging to our neighbors.

But there are many kinds of imperialism, and among them is the imperialism of science and peace and justice. It is this kind that Uncle Sam is guilty of advancing, and none other. A few years ago he gave peace and liberty to Cuba and the Philippines; the greatest philanthropy in history. About eight years ago he helped make the world safe for democracy, and in this endeavor he saved his associates from irreparable humiliation and defeat. He is now "reaping the old reward," the blame of those he has bettered and the hate of those he has protected, and the voice of the distinguished gentleman who uttered the prophecy, which I have quoted in substance, is now heard among those who are illustrating its accuracy. Whether it was the climate or its Creator that called Uncle Sam to the tasks he has so well performed, I do not know. It

is my belief that up to date the weather and the Creator have acted as partners, and it is my opinion that this partnership will be continued as a solvent and going concern in spite of human resolutions to the contrary.

I am brave enough to hope that the people who reside in the center of America and all other centers will some day reach a stage of civilization that will enable them to settle their domestic affairs without bloodshed and pillage, and that until they do this somebody will step in and protect the lives and property of law-abiding foreigners. Among the moral standards that we know anything about up to date, there is no difference between the obligation that rests upon the citizens of Washington to rescue a citizen of New York who is being murdered on Pennsylvania Avenue and the duty of the United States to protect the lives and property of its law-abiding citizens in Central America or Central Asia or Central Europe or Central Africa. And if we do not recognize this obligation and enforce it to the letter in Mexico and Central America, other nations under like hazards will step in and do it for us.

No nation is bound to wait until its citizens have been killed and their property destroyed. No nation is bound to postpone intervention until it is too late to accomplish its only purpose, and nations in which the normal condition is that of insurrection and violence must expect that prompt and effective precautionary measures will be invoked. The statements and claims of those who oppose intervention in Nicaragua merely emphasize the fact that both sides to the controversy are now in battle array, ready to settle their differences in historic Central American style, and with the chances all pointing to the immediate removal of minority statesmen to the nearest cemetery.

Now that the President has taken time and Nicaragua by the forelock, the rival forces, according to their usual custom, will smile and smile and promise to settle their

differences with the ballot, and if we remain and watch them, American lives and property will be safe until the votes are counted. Then the defeated candidates will cry fraud, and immediately upon our retirement the open season for Nicaraguan officials-elect will begin, with no bag limit.

The disturbance now on the stage in Central America does not compare with the hubbub of mush and muck which Colombian statesmen of the old school kicked up when we recognized the independence of Panama. To allay and quiet the cries of the Colombian infant we administered financial Castoria to the extent of $25,000,000; when Colombia in good conscience and equity should have been assessed more than that amount as a small portion of the benefits accruing to her by reason of the construction of the canal.

Responding to this same motherly regard for the young, we have already given Nicaragua $3,000,000 for the right to build a canal across her territory, which if built will make Nicaragua rich in spite of herself.

I think we safely may expect that the Central American incident of 1926 and 1927, like its predecessors of similar nature, will soon be closed and that the empire of science and peace and justice to which I have referred will continue to expand north and south and east and west in spite of the doctrine of self-determination or in harmony with it, as the climate and the Creator may direct. As for the future of Mexico, the good people in the United States who love peace and hate war, even as I do, can as well reach the conclusion now as later that the nation or the race that is too lazy to work, too weak to keep the peace, too ignorant to teach itself, and too proud to learn from others will find no permanent habitat where the temperature is below the combustion point.

THE INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA[3]

To the Congress of the United States:

While conditions in Nicaragua and the action of this government pertaining thereto have in general been made public, I think the time has arrived for me officially to inform the Congress more in detail of the events leading up to the present disturbances and conditions which seriously threaten American lives and property, endanger the stability of all Central America, and put in jeopardy the rights granted by Nicaragua to the United States for the construction of a canal. It is well known that in 1912 the United States intervened in Nicaragua with a large force and put down a revolution, and that from that time to 1925 a legation guard of American marines was, with the consent of the Nicaraguan government, kept in Managua to protect American lives and property. In 1923 representatives of the five Central American countries, namely, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador, at the invitation of the United States, met in Washington and entered into a series of treaties. These treaties dealt with limitation of armament, a Central American tribunal for arbitration, and the general subject of peace and amity. The treaty last referred to specifically provides in Article II that the governments of the contracting parties will not recognize any other government which may come into power in any of the five republics through a coup d'etat or revolution and disqualifies the leaders of such coup d'etat or revolution from assuming the presidency or vice-presidency. Article II is as follows:

> Desiring to make secure in the republics of Central America the benefits which are derived from the maintenance of free institutions and to contribute at the same time toward strengthening

[3] Message of President Coolidge to Congress. January 10, 1927.

their stability, and the prestige with which they should be surrounded, they declare that every act, disposition or measure which alters the constitutional organization in any of them is to be deemed a menace to the peace of said republics, whether it proceed from any public power or from the private citizens.

Consequently, the governments of the contracting parties will not recognize any other government which may come into power in any of the five republics through a coup d'etat or a revolution against a recognized government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country. And even in such a case they obligate themselves not to acknowledge the recognition if any of the persons elected as President, Vice-President or Chief of State designate should fall under any of the following heads:

1) If he should be the leader or one of the leaders of a coup d'etat or revolution, or through blood relationship or marriage, be an ascendant or descendant or brother of such leader or leaders.

2) If he should have been a Secretary of State or should have held some high military command during the accomplishment of the coup d'etat, the revolution, or while the election was being carried on, or if he should have held this office, or command within the six months preceding the coup d'etat, revolution, or the election.

Furthermore, in no case shall recognition be accorded to a government which arises from election to power of a citizen expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the Constitution of his country as eligible to election as President, Vice-President or Chief of State designate.

The United States was not a party to this treaty, but it was made in Washington under the auspices of the Secretary of State, and this government has felt a moral obligation to apply its principles in order to encourage the Central American states in their efforts to prevent revolution and disorder. The treaty, it may be noted in passing, was signed on behalf of Nicaragua by Emiliano Chamorro himself, who afterwards assumed the presidency in violation thereof and thereby contributed to the creation of the present difficulty.

In October, 1924, an election was held in Nicaragua for president, vice-president, and members of the Congress. This resulted in the election of a coalition ticket embracing Conservatives and Liberals. Carlos Solorzano, a Con-

servative Republican, was elected president and Juan B. Sacasa, a Liberal, was elected vice-president. This government was recognized by the other Central American countries and by the United States. It had been the intention of the United States to withdraw the marines immediately after this election, and notice was given of the intention to withdraw them in January, 1925. At the request of the President of Nicaragua this time was extended to September 1, 1925. Pursuant to this determination and notice, the marines were withdrawn in August, 1925, and it appeared at that time as though tranquillity in Nicaragua was assured. Within two months, however, further disturbances broke out between the supporters of General Chamorro and the supporters of the President, culminating in the seizure of the Loma, a fortress dominating the city of Managua. Once in possession of the Loma, General Chamorro dictated an agreement which President Solorzano signed the next day. According to the terms of this agreement the President agreed to substitute supporters of General Chamorro for certain members of his cabinet, to pay General Chamorro $10,000 for the expenses of the uprising, and to grant amnesty to all those who participated in it. Vice-President Sacasa thereupon left the country. In the meantime General Chamorro, who, while he had not actually taken over the office of president, was able to dictate his will to the actual executive, brought about the expulsion from the Congress of eighteen members, on the ground that their election had been fraudulent, and caused to be put in their places candidates who had been defeated at the election of 1924. Having thus gained the control of Congress, he caused himself to be appointed by the Congress as designate on January 16, 1926. On January 16, 1926, Solorzano resigned as president and immediately General Chamorro took office. The four Central American countries and the United States refused to recognize him as president. On January 22 the Secretary of State addressed to the

Nicaraguan representative in Washington the following letter:

DEAR DOCTOR CASTRILLO:

In your communication of the 19th instant addressed to the Secretary of State you advise that President Solorzano having resigned his office General Emiliano Chamorro took charge of the executive power on January 17.

The hope expressed in your letter that the relations which have been close and cordial for so many years between Nicaragua and the United States will continue and grow stronger has been noted with pleasure. The government and people of the United States have feelings of sincerest friendship for Nicaragua and the people of Nicaragua and the government of the United States will of course continue to maintain the most friendly relations with the people of Nicaragua. This government has felt privileged to be able to be of assistance in the past at their request not only to Nicaragua but to all countries of Central America more especially during the conference on Central American affairs which resulted in the signing of a general treaty of peace and amity on February 7, 1923, between the five republics of Central America. The object of the Central American countries with which the United States was heartily in accord, was to promote constitutional government and orderly procedure in Central America and those governments agreed upon a joint course of action with regard to the nonrecognition of governments coming into office through coup d'etat or revolution. The United States has adopted the principles of that treaty as its policy in the future recognition of Central American governments as it feels that by so doing it can best show its friendly disposition towards and its desire to be helpful to the republics of Central America.

It is therefore with regret that I have to inform you that the government of the United States has not recognized and will not recognize as the government of Nicaragua the regime now headed by General Chamorro, as the latter was duly advised on several occasions by the American Minister after General Chamorro had taken charge of the citadel at Managua on October 25 last. This action is, I am happy to learn, in accord with that taken by all the governments that signed with Nicaragua the treaty of 1923.

Notwithstanding the refusal of this government and of the other Central American governments to recognize him, General Chamorro continued to exercise the functions of president until October 30, 1926. In the meantime, a revolution broke out in May on the east coast in the neighborhood of Bluefields and was speedily sup-

pressed by the troops of General Chamorro. However, it again broke out with considerably more violence. The second attempt was attended with some success and practically all of the east coast of Nicaragua fell into the hands of the revolutionists. Throughout these events Sacasa was at no time in the country, having remained in Mexico and Guatemala during this period.

Repeated requests were made of the United States for protection, especially on the east coast, and, on August 24, 1926, the Secretary of State addressed to the Secretary of the Navy the following communication:

> I have the honor to suggest that war vessels of the special service squadron proceed as soon as possible to the Nicaraguan ports of Corinto and Bluefields for the protection of American and foreign lives and property in case that threatened emergencies materialize. The American Chargé d'Affairs at Managua has informed the department that he considers the presence of war vessels at these ports desirable, and the American consul at Bluefields has reported that a warship is urgently needed to protect life and property at that port. An attack on The Bluff and Bluefields is expected momentarily.

Accordingly, the Navy Department ordered Admiral Latimer, in command of the special service squadron, to proceed to Bluefields. Upon arriving there he found it necessary for the adequate protection of American lives and property to declare Bluefields a neutral zone. This was done with the consent of both factions, afterwards, on October 26, 1926, reduced to a written agreement, which is still in force. In October, 1926, the good offices of the United States were sought by both parties for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the conflict. Admiral Latimer, commanding the special service squadron, brought about an armistice to permit of a conference being held between the delegates of the two factions. The armistice was originally for 15 days and was later extended for 15 days more. At the request of both parties, marines were landed at Corinto to establish a neutral zone in which the conference could be held. Doctor Sacasa

was invited to attend this conference but refrained from doing so and remained in Guatemala City. The United States government did not participate in the conference except to provide a neutral chairman; it simply offered its good offices to make the conference possible and arranged a neutral zone at Corinto at the request of both parties during the time the conference was held. I understand that at this conference General Chamorro offered to resign and permit the Congress to elect a new designate to assume the presidency. The conference led to no result, since just at the time when it seemed as though some compromise agreement would be reached the representatives of Doctor Sacasa suddenly broke off negotiations.

According to our reports, the Sacasa delegates on this occasion stated freely that to accept any government other than one presided over by Doctor Sacasa himself would be a breach of faith with their Mexican allies. Hostilities were resumed on October 30, 1926. On the same date General Chamorro formally turned over the executive power to Sebastian Uriza, who had been appointed designate by the Congress controlled by General Chamorro. The United States government refused to recognize Señor Uriza, on the ground that his assumption of the presidency had no constitutional basis. Uriza thereupon convoked Congress in extraordinary session, and the entire eighteen members who had been expelled during the Chamorro regime were notified to resume their seats. The Congress which met in extraordinary session on November 10 had, therefore, substantially the same membership as when first convened following the election of 1924. This Congress, whose acts may be considered as constitutional, designated Señor Adolfo Díaz as first designate. At this session of Congress fifty-three members were present out of a total membership of sixty-seven, of whom forty-four voted for Díaz and two for Solorzano. The balance abstained from voting. On November 11

Señor Uriza turned over the executive power to Díaz, who was inaugurated on the 14th.

The Nicaraguan constitution provides in Article 106 that in the absence of the president and vice-president the Congress shall designate one of its members to complete the unexpired term of president. As President Solorzano had resigned and was then residing in California, and as the vice-president, Doctor Sacasa, was in Guatemala, having been out of the country since November, 1925, the action of Congress in designating Señor Díaz was perfectly legal and in accordance with the constitution. Therefore the United States government on November 17 extended recognition to Señor Díaz.

Following his assumption of office, President Díaz, in the following note, dated November 15, 1926, requested the assistance of the United States government to protect American and foreign lives and property:

> Upon assuming the Presidency I found the republic in a very difficult situation because of the attitude, assumed without motive by the government of Mexico in open hostility to Nicaragua. It must be clear to you that, given the forces which that government disposes of, its elements of attack are irresistible for this feeble and small nation. This condition places in imminent risk the sovereignty and independence of Nicaragua, and consequently, the continental equilibrium on which the Pan-Americanism is founded which the United States has fostered with such lofty spirit.
>
> Naturally the emergency resulting from these conditions places in peril the interests of American citizens and other foreigners residing in our territory and renders it impossible for a government so rudely attacked, to protect them as is its duty and as it desires.
>
> For these reasons and appreciating the friendly disposition of the United States toward weak republics and the intentions which your government has always manifested for the protection of the sovereignty and independence of all the countries of America by morally supporting legitimate governments in order to enable them to afford a tranquil field of labor for foreigners which is needed for the stimulation of the growth of the prosperity of these countries, I address myself to you in order that, with the same good will with which you have aided in Nicaraguan reconciliation, you may solicit for my government and in my name the support of the Department of State in order to reach a solution

in the present crisis and avoid further hostilities and invasions on the part of the government of Mexico.

I desire to manifest to you at the same time that whatever may be the means chosen by the Department of State, they will meet with the approval of my absolute confidence in the high spirit of justice of the government of the United States.

Immediately following the inauguration of President Díaz and frequently since that date he has appealed to the United States for support, has informed this government of the aid which Mexico is giving to the revolutionists, and has stated that he is unable solely because of the aid given by Mexico to the revolutionists to protect the lives and property of American citizens and other foreigners. When negotiations leading up to the Corinto conference began, I immediately placed an embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition to Nicaragua. The Department of State notified the other Central American states, to wit, Costa Rica, Honduras, Salvador and Guatemala, and they assured the department that they would cooperate in this measure. So far as known, they have done so. The State Department also notified the Mexican government of this embargo and informally suggested to that government like action. The Mexican government did not adopt the suggestion to put on an embargo, but informed the American ambassador at Mexico City that in the absence of manufacturing plants in Mexico for the making of arms and ammunition the matter had little practical importance.

As a matter of fact, I have the most conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities have been on several occasions since August, 1926, shipped to the revolutionists in Nicaragua. Boats carrying these munitions have been fitted out in Mexican ports, and some of the munitions bear evidence of having belonged to the Mexican government. It also appears that the ships were fitted out with the full knowledge of and, in some cases, with the encouragement of Mexican officials and were in one instance, at least, commanded by a Mexi-

can naval reserve officer. At the end of November, after spending some time in Mexico City, Doctor Sacasa went back to Nicaragua, landing at Puerto Cabezas, near Bragmans Bluff. He immediately placed himself at the head of the insurrection and declared himself President of Nicaragua. He has never been recognized by any of the Central American republics nor by any other government, with the exception of Mexico, which recognized him immediately. As arms and munitions in large quantities were reaching the revolutionists, I deemed it unfair to prevent the recognized government from purchasing arms abroad, and, accordingly, the Secretary of State has notified the Díaz government that licenses would be issued for the export of arms and munitions purchased in this country. It would be thoroughly inconsistent for this country not to support the government recognized by it while the revolutionists were receiving arms and munitions from abroad.

During the last two months the government of the United States has received repeated requests from various American citizens, both directly and through our consuls and legation, for the protection of their lives and property. The government of the United States has also received requests from the British chargé at Managua and from the Italian ambassador at Washington for the protection of their respective nationals. Pursuant to such requests, Admiral Latimer, in charge of the special service squadron, has not only maintained the neutral zone at Bluefields under the agreement of both parties but has landed forces at Puerto Cabezas and Rio Grande, and established neutral zones at these points where considerable numbers of Americans live and are engaged in carrying on various industries. He has also been authorized to establish such other neutral zones as are necessary for the purposes above mentioned.

For many years numerous Americans have been living in Nicaragua developing its industries and carrying on

business. At the present time there are large investments in lumbering, mining, coffee growing, banana culture, shipping, and also in general mercantile and other collateral business. All these people and these industries have been encouraged by the Nicaraguan government. That government has at all times owed them protection, but the United States has occasionally been obliged to send naval forces for their proper protection. In the present crisis such forces are requested by the Nicaraguan government, which protests to the United States its inability to protect these interests and states that any measures which the United States deems appropriate for their protection will be satisfactory to the Nicaraguan government.

In addition to these industries now in existence, the government of Nicaragua, by a treaty entered into on the 5th day of August, 1914, granted in perpetuity to the United States the exclusive proprietary rights necessary and convenient for the construction, operation and maintenance of an oceanic canal. Articles I and II of said treaty are as follows:

Article I. The government of Nicaragua grants in perpetuity to the government of the United States, forever free from all taxation or other public charge, the exclusive proprietary rights necessary and convenient for the construction, operation and maintenance of an interoceanic canal by way of the San Juan River and the great Lake of Nicaragua or by way of any route over Nicaraguan territory, the details of the terms upon which such canal shall be constructed, operated and maintained to be agreed to by the two governments whenever the government of the United States shall notify the government of Nicaragua of its desire or intention to construct such canal.

Article II. To enable the government of the United States to protect the Panama Canal and the proprietary rights granted to the government of the United States by the foregoing article, and also to enable the government of the United States to take any measure necessary to the ends contemplated herein, the government of Nicaragua hereby leases for a term of ninety-nine years to the government of the United States the islands in the Caribbean Sea known as Great Corn Island and Little Corn Island; and the government of Nicaragua further grants to the

government of the United States for a like period of ninety-nine years the right to establish, operate and maintain a naval base at such place on the territory of Nicaragua bordering upon the Gulf of Fonseca as the government of the United States may select. The government of the United States shall have the option of renewing for a further term of ninety-nine years the above leases and grants upon the expiration of their respective terms, it being expressly agreed that the territory hereby leased and the naval base which may be maintained under the grant aforesaid shall be subject exclusively to the laws and sovereign authority of the United States during the terms of such lease and grant and of any renewal or renewals thereof.

The consideration paid by the United States to Nicaragua was the sum of $3,000,000. At the time of the payment of this money a financial plan was drawn up between the Nicaraguan government and its creditors which provided for the consolidation of Nicaragua's obligations. At that time the bondholders holding the Nicaraguan external debt consented to a reduction in interest from 6 to 5 per cent, providing the service of this loan was handled through the American collector of customs, and at the same time a series of internal guaranteed customs bonds amounting to $3,744,000 was issued by the Nicaraguan government to pay off the claims which had arisen against it because of revolutionary disturbances from 1909 to 1912. The other outstanding external bonds, amounting on February 1, 1926, to about £772,000, are held in Great Britain. Of the guaranteed customs bonds, $2,867,000 were on February 1, 1926, still in circulation, and of these about $1,000,000 were held by Nicaraguans, $1,000,000 by American citizens, and the balance by nationals of other countries. The bonds held in the United States are held by the public in general circulation and, so far as the department knows, no American bankers are directly interested in the Nicaraguan indebtedness. This financial plan was adopted by an act of the Congress of Nicaragua on August 31, 1917. The National Bank of Nicaragua was made the depository of all government revenues. The internal revenues were, as heretofore, to be collected by

the government. Collection of the internal revenue, however, was to be taken over by the collector general of customs, an American citizen appointed by the Nicaraguan government and approved by the Secretary of State of the United States, if the product should average less than $60,000 a month for three consecutive months. This has never yet been necessary. The proceeds of the customs revenues were to be applied, first, to the payment of such sums as might be agreed upon in the contemplated contracts for the service of the foreign loan, the internal loan, and claims against the Nicaraguan government. From the balance of the revenue $80,000 a month was to be used for the ordinary budget expenses and an additional $15,000 for extraordinary expenses.

Under this financial plan the finances of Nicaragua have been rehabilitated in a very satisfactory manner. Of the $3,744,000 of internal customs bonds issued in 1917 about $900,000 have been paid. Of the external debt, bonds issued in 1909 amounting to £1,250,000, there now remain only about £770,000. The total public debt of Nicaragua has been reduced from about $22,000,000 in 1917 to $6,625,203 at the beginning of 1926. Furthermore, the country in time of peace has ample revenues for its ordinary budget expenses and a surplus which has been used in extensive public improvements. The Nicaraguan National Bank and the National Railroad, controlling interests in which were formerly owned by American bankers, were repurchased by the Nicaraguan government in 1920 and 1924, and are now wholly owned by that government.

There is no question that if the revolution continues American investments and business interests in Nicaragua will be very seriously affected, if not destroyed. The currency, which is now at par, will be inflated. American as well as foreign bondholders will undoubtedly look to the United States for the protection of their interests.

It is true that the United States did not establish the

financial plan by any treaty, but it nevertheless did aid through diplomatic channels and advise in the negotiation and establishment of this plan for the financial rehabilitation of Nicaragua.

Manifestly the relation of this government to the Nicaraguan situation, and its policy in the existing emergency, are determined by the facts which I have described. The proprietary rights of the United States in the Nicaraguan canal route, with the necessary implications growing out of it affecting the Panama Canal, together with the obligations flowing from the investments of all classes of our citizens in Nicaragua, place us in a position of peculiar responsibility. I am sure it is not the desire of the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of Nicaragua or of any other Central American republic. Nevertheless it must be said that we have a very definite and special interest in the maintenance of order and good government in Nicaragua at the present time, and that the stability, prosperity and independence of all Central American countries can never be a matter of indifference to us. The United States cannot, therefore, fail to view with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interests, especially if such state of affairs is contributed to or brought about by outside influences or by any foreign power. It has always been and remains the policy of the United States in such circumstances to take the steps that may be necessary for the preservation and protection of the lives, the property, and the interests of its citizens and of this government itself. In this respect I propose to follow the path of my predecessors.

Consequently, I have deemed it my duty to use the powers committed to me to insure the adequate protection of all American interests in Nicaragua, whether they be endangered by internal strife or by outside interference in the affairs of that republic.

INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI[4]

The select committee of the Senate to investigate the occupation and administration of territories of the Republic of Haiti and of the Dominican Republic by American naval forces presents herewith a report upon the occupation of Haitian territory and the relation of the United States to the government of Haiti.

The Island of Haiti, midway between Cuba and Porto Rico, supports a population as numerous as that of Cuba (about three and a quarter million souls) upon a territory about three-quarters as large as that of Cuba. It is therefore noteworthy in considering the economic and social condition of the inhabitants of the Island of Haiti that during recent years the export and import trade of the island has averaged perhaps one-tenth of the volume of Cuban foreign trade. Porto Rico, with a territory equal to one-fifth of that of the Island of Haiti and with a population of about a million and a quarter, has exported and imported about twice as much as has the neighboring island.

While the Cuban interior may be reached from all ports by connecting railways, and while Porto Rico is covered with a network of splendid highways, and while its ports are united by a coastwise railway system, the whole island of Haiti prior to the coming of the Americans in 1915 had absolutely no through and thorough highways and no railways other than half a dozen unremunerative, unsuccessful and incomplete spurs of track running inland from different points of the coast. In a country without highways and without railways, and in which even the few trails were impassable during unseasonable weather, it is not surprising that agriculture, industry and trade all languished and that the overwhelming majority of the population has been utterly poor and illiterate.

[4] Part of *Senate Report No. 794, 67th Congress, 2d session*, 1922.

Improved roads are an index to the industrial development of any country.

The French prior to 1800 had built about 550 miles of public roads in Haiti. Some of these were said by French writers to equal the best highways in France leading to the Versailles. The Haitians overthrew the French in 1804. The roads fell in disuse. The torrential rains which visit the island and the tropical vegetation which grows rapidly in the island soon made these roads for the most part almost impassable. When the Americans took possession there were not to exceed 210 miles of these French roads which were passable by wheeled vehicles even in dry weather.

The American authorities since their intervention in 1915 have built 385 miles of new construction and repaired 200 miles of old construction. Such highways as were passable even in dry weather were for the most part along the coast line. With these exceptions there was no way of getting to or from the coastal cities and towns to the interior except over trails through the forests no more clearly defined than were the Indian trails through the virgin forests of America before the white man had set foot therein.

Women and burros were the burden bearers of the country. All products which were brought into the market or taken into the interior from the coastal cities and towns were borne by the women carrying their burdens upon their heads or upon the backs of their burros.

The territory of the Republic of Haiti comprises one-third of the area of the island, the other two-thirds being included in the territory of the Dominican Republic. Three-quarters of the total population of the island inhabits the one-third of its area, which is subject to the sovereignty of the Haitian Republic.

There are two distinct social entities in Haiti—two Haitis as it were. One living in the coastal cities and towns. About 2 per cent, and certainly not exceeding 5

per cent, of the total population represents the wealth and culture of the island. They embrace the governing class. They do not divide politically as our people do. The dividing line politically is between the "outs" and the "ins." A substantial army has been maintained by the government. Without it in the past no government could have come into existence or could have maintained its existence for any length of time. The "outs" seeking to get in have never hesitated to make an alliance with the Caco or bandit chiefs and organize revolutionary forces to march against the capital at any time they thought to be propitious.

The other very distinct element embraces 95 per cent or more of the entire population. They constitute the peasant class. They can neither read nor write. They have no conception of government. They have been the pawns of the governing class. Their condition is truly pathetic. Naturally generous and kind, with proper training and education they can become prosperous cultivators, capable of guarding their own interests.

Before the American marines landed in 1915 men did not dare to leave their humble homes in the interior recesses of the island lest they should be impressed into military service by either the government or the revolutionists. They knew not what hour of the day or the night they might be seized by military officers or Caco chiefs, taken from their homes and forced into service.

Their animals and the products of their little gardens were continuously being confiscated without compensation, and when the women took their produce to the markets in the cities and towns they were never certain that the little money they received for it would not be taken from them.

Now conditions are changed. Naturally, the peasants want Haiti for the Haitians. But at the same time, with very rare exceptions, the peasant class realize that since the American intervention for the first time in their his-

tory they are free from impressment into military service. They are no longer plundered by Cacos and bandits, and they are secure in the possession of their families and their property.

Haitian government prior to 1915 afforded neither protection nor service to the Haitian people. The Haitian peasant was burdened with heavy taxes, and for the most part no account was kept of the receipts or disbursements. No police protection was furnished the people in the interior. Hospital facilities in the cities and towns were inadequate and insanitary. No internal improvements were made for the benefit of the people.

One single disclosure made during the course of the hearings in Port au Prince will be interesting. It is typical.

Doctor Sylvain, president of the Union Patriotique, was before the committee. He was asked concerning their educational system. He testified that the Republic of Haiti had compulsory education in the island since 1864; and yet only 2 per cent of the people can read and write. What a commentary on Haitian administration!

Under Haitian government teachers of music were hired who could not tell whether a sheet of music was right side up or upside down; teachers of drawing who could not draw a picture of an ordinary bucket; and in their courts subordinate judges who could neither read nor write. And it may be said that no other branch of governmental activity was far in advance of their educational system.

One word as to the material progress of the peasant class. Before the American intervention few of the Haitians had ever seen a plow. The peasant class had never seen and did not know how to use a shovel. At first when shovels were given to them for use they would take them to a pile of gravel, pick the gravel up in their hands, put it in the shovel, and then carry it to the place where it was intended to be placed. When the American marines began

road building in the island, a schooner with road-building machinery was docked. In the hold of the vessel were sixty wheelbarrows. A captain of the marines in charge of the road building sent the foreman, a Haitian, with sixty men to bring the wheelbarrows to the place where the road building was in progress. After a time he looked for the men with the wheelbarrows. He saw them carrying the wheelbarrows on their heads instead of wheeling them.

The committee does not refer to these conditions in a critical spirit, or for the purpose of humiliating the Haitians, but because it is necessary that the American people shall know conditions as they are in order to enable them to determine what ought to be done at present and in the immediate future, and the committee says this looking solely to the benefit of the Haitian people and without any purpose, direct or indirect, looking to any material benefit to be derived by the Government of the United States from its temporary control or occupation of the island save and except such as would come to us as the benefactor of an unfortunate people.

Haitian History

No review of the condition of Haiti can be just to its inhabitants which does not recognize existing anomalies and the antecedent historic facts which explain the economic and political backwardness of a people among whom may be found groups whose cultivation, education and capabilities are comparable with corresponding elements of society in more advanced countries.

At the time of the overthrow of the French government and of the expulsion of their French masters by the Haitians there were among the former slaves to whom the government of the country fell few who were literate and absolutely none who were so trained in public affairs or who were so skilled in tropical agriculture as to make possible either the successful maintenance of civil order or

the necessary continued development of the country's agricultural resources. Thus the Haitians labored under insuperable handicaps. There were among them for all practical purposes no trained agriculturists and administrators, no engineers and educators. Haiti had no means of educating her people or of developing men competent to govern. Misgovernment and revolution ensued, and as a consequence Haitian trade, by comparison with that of the other West Indian Islands, diminished. Haiti drifted, as it were, out of the currents of commerce.

During the six score years of Haitian independence there have been a dozen constitutions. The people have lived under self-styled monarchs as well as under military dictators and self-constituted presidents.

Since the Haitians gained control in 1804 there have been one series of revolutions after another. Part have been successful, part unsuccessful. Since 1804 there have been twenty-nine chiefs of state. Otto Schoenrich in his work on Santo Domingo says:

> It is to be observed, however, that of the Haitian executives only one completed his term of office and voluntarily retired; of the others, four remained in power until their death from natural causes; eighteen were deposed by revolutions, one of them committing suicide, another being executed on the steps of his burning palace, and still another being cut to pieces by the mob; five were assassinated; and one is chief magistrate at the present time.

The disorders to which Haiti has been subject since the achievement of its independence attained such destructive frequency during the last decade before the American intervention in 1915, that in the space of ten years no less than eight presidents assumed office (it would be a mistake to say that they were elected) for the nominal constitutional term of seven years each. Three of the eight fled the country; one was blown up in the presidential palace; another died mysteriously, and according to popular belief by poison, while two were murdered. The last Haitian president who held office before the landing of the Ameri-

can forces was Sam, who had caused several scores of political prisoners to be massacred as they huddled in their cells. He himself was dragged from the French Legation by a mob, his head and limbs were torn from his body to be carried aloft on sticks and bayonets, while his bleeding trunk was dragged through the streets of the capital city.

It will not be wondered that under conditions thus indicated the irrigation works and highways built by the French disappeared, fertile sugar plantations vanished, coffee cultivation ceased, and that the country made no progress, material or social, political or economic. The mass of the people—gentle, kindly, generous—their peace and property threatened rather than secured by the so-called authorities, sought such quiet as they might find by hiding in the hills, where they have lived in a condition of primitive poverty and ignorance. Not only did the sugar and coffee plantations disappear, but almost all true agriculture, all organized cultivation of the soil, except as little patches of yams and plantains may be called such, ceased. The coffee crop, which is the principal article of Haitian export, is gathered from the wild trees—sprung from the stock planted by the French over a hundred years ago. The domestic animals include wretched swine, poor cattle, poultry of scrawny Tropic strains, and little asses which, as saddle or pack animals, served as the sole means of conveyance or transport in the country until the arrival of the American forces.

No Representative Government in Haiti

In brief, before American intervention there had been no popular representative or stable governmnt in Haiti. The public finances were in disarray, public credit was exhausted, and the public revenues were wasted or stolen. Highways and agriculture had given way to the jungle. The people, most of whom lived in wretched poverty, were illiterate and spoke no other language than the native Creole. The country and its inhabitants have

been a prey to chronic revolutionary disorders, banditry, and even during periods of comparative peace to such oppressive and capricious governors that the great mass of the people who, under happier circumstances might have become prosperous peasant farmers, have had neither opportunity nor incentive to labor, to save, or to learn. They had no security for their property and little for their lives. Voodoo practices, of course, were general throughout the territory of the republic.

This view has been contested by certain Americans who, equally ignorant of the facts and indifferent to them, have given voice to general and unsubstantiable charges which if credited would blacken the good name of the American navy and impugn the honor of the American government. It is, however, the view of your committee, and is supported by those informed and impartial investigators of Haitian conditions, whose opinions have come to the attention of your committee.

Lest this summary of Haitian conditions be considered prejudiced or overdrawn, the committee quotes the following from the report of the Haitian Commission of Verification of Documents of the Floating Debt.

> But neither the Pressoit-Delbau Commission, nor the successors of Mr. Barjon in the position of paymaster of the Department of the Interior have been able to tell the Secretary of State for Finance what has become of those archives. Only one fact remains, from all the preceding, and it is to be remembered; that is, that the said archives have disappeared, and that they remain unfindable, for a cause which the commission is not in a position to verify nor to comment upon. . .
>
> This great question of the revolutionary debts—of the revolutionary debt of Davilmar Theodore above all—constitutes the most delicate and certainly the most painful of the work of the commission. Without doubt, we have not the mission, Mr. Secretary of State, to judge the motives, interested or not, which determined and guided the conduct and the acts of such a chief, of such a political group, in the course of the years forever ill-omened before the month of July, 1915. In any case, this mission is not imparted to us, if at least we confine ourselves to considering strictly and narrowly our attributions of commissioners charged to investigate the arrears of the floating debt. . .
>
> This expression "revolutionary debt" carries in itself its con-

demnation, by reason of the lugubrious ideas which it awakens in the mind. From the moment that our internal torments had to have as a final consequence the issuance of certificates of indebtedness of the State, to the profit of their authors of all classes, or, which means the same things, the flood of favors to the detriment of the national treasury, a premium was thus created to the profit of Haitian revolutionaryism. And it is thus that we have attended in these recent times this sad pageant marking the pages of our history; the revolution of the day being an appeal to the revolution of tomorrow; insurrection never disarmed, always erect and campaigning, perpetually assailing the supreme power, and never stopping but to divide the spoils of the hour, after the enthronement of the new idol which it was to undermine and overthrow.

In presence of the figures at once scandalous and formidable of the debt called revolutionary and in view of the deplorable conditions in which the different original notes were issued, whether at Ouanaminthe, at Pignor, at St. Michel, at Cape Haitien, at Port-au-Prince, and even at Kingston (Jamaica), finally a little everywhere; some in Haitien gourdes, the others in American gold, pounds sterling, or in francs—the commission thinks it opportune to make without offense or passion the following remarks which it offers for the meditation of the country. . .

There is no really productive work without the help of capital.

But when the loan is contracted for an unavowable purpose, having for motive the arming of the citizens of a country against their fellows, sustaining a disastrous and debasing war, sowing terror in all the social levels, with a view of satisfying personal ambitions—oh, then the conditions are not longer the same, and we find ourselves here in face of a hidden operation.

Incontestably, wherever civil war has passed it has sowed destruction, disunion, and death; cities devastated, factories destroyed, families reduced to the most frightful misery, the pleasant fields of the north transformed into charnal places three or more years ago; all these horrors worthy of the times of antiquity and of savage hordes have caused and still cause the raising of cries of pain and of indignation, and retell for ages and ages the cruelty of the political leaders who conducted directly or indirectly the bands of madmen and who excited them to carnage in the sole and unique purpose of seizing the power for the purpose of better assaulting the public treasury.

The country can not make itself the accomplice of such financial disorder having hidden behind it crime and immorality.

The mass of notes issued, the considerable number of individuals who had or who arrogated to themselves the power of issue, and who unscrupulously, without restraint or the least reserve, thus compromised the future; the colossal figure to which these issues mounted have necessarily given birth in our

mind to this question of palpitating interest. In what case can the recognizances issued be considered sincere? In what case are they not sincere? In other terms, when is it that the amounts subscribed have been really paid? When is it that we are found in the presence of fictitious values represented by notes of complaisance? . . .

Revolutions are possible only on the condition that their authors find interested persons to finance these criminal enterprises. Unhappily with us the hard and honest work was always the exception, the revolutionary politics the rule, the great industry which attracted to it and monopolized all—energy, intelligence, and capacity. Therefore, there came a moment when the sole preoccupation for each energy unemployed, each intelligence searching its way, each capacity desirous of exerting itself; it was to clothe himself in revolutionary livery in which a campaign was instituted to gain access to the public treasury.

Testimony taken by the committee shows how the chronic anarchy into which Haiti had fallen, the exhaustion of its credits, the threatened intervention of the German government and the actual landing of the French naval forces, all imperiled the Monroe Doctrine and lead the Government of the United States to take the successive steps set forth in the testimony, to establish order in Haiti to help to institute a government as nearly representative as might be, and to assure the collaboration of the governments of the United States and Haiti for the future maintenance of peace and the development of the Haitian people.

Your committee believes that doubtless the American representatives might have done better and that they have made mistakes, which in the light of experience they would not make again; that as will presently be indicated in more detail, not only did the treaty fail to take cognizance of certain reforms essential to Haitian progress, but that in the choice of its agents and the determination of their responsibilities, the Government of the United States was not always happy.

The Occupation and the Treaty

The history of the landing of American naval forces in Haiti and of the intervention of the United States to

establish a government as representative, stable, and effective as possible, is set forth at length in the public hearings of the committee. The naval forces of the United States landed in July, 1915, when the country and more particularly the capital, after the murder of President Sam, had fallen into a condition of anarchy. The diplomatic representatives and naval forces of the United States made it possible for the Haitian assembly to sit in security. The American representatives in the opinion of your committee influenced the majority of the assembly in the choice of a president. Later, they exercised pressure to induce the ratification by Haiti of the convention in September, 1915, precisely as the United States had exercised pressure to induce the incorporation of the Platt amendment in the Cuban constitution, thus to assure the tranquillity and prosperity of Cuba. At about the same time representatives of the United States navy took over temporarily the administration of the Haitian customhouses, which were then answerable to no central control, of which the revenues were disposed of at the discretion of the various local customs officers.

The convention of 1915 provides that a receiver general of customs, a financial advisor, and directors of public works and sanitation shall be nominated by the President of the United States and appointed by the president of the Republic of Haiti. It provides furthermore, for the organization and discipline of an adequate force of constabulary or gendarmerie under the direction of officers nominated by the President of the United States, but commissioned in the service of the Haitian government by the president of the Republic of Haiti.

Your committee has sought carefully to measure the benefits accruing to the Haitian people as the result of the convention, and to determine wherein the American government or its representatives had failed in their duty and to advise as to the correction of mistakes or

abuses in order that the maintenance of American forces in Haiti may be terminated as soon as possible.

Peace, sure and undisturbed peace, has been established throughout Haiti for the first time in generations. In former years men who were peasants—countrymen—were never seen upon the trails or in the market towns. They feared to appear lest they be pressed into the wretched and underpaid forces of the republic or of revolutionary pretenders. Women only were found, driving pack animals or carrying burdens on the trails, and chaffering in the market places. The men were hidden in the hills. Today, as old travelers will bear witness, for the first time in generations the men have come down freely from their hidden huts to the trails and to the towns.

Conformably with the terms of the treaty, the Haitian customs have been administered by the American receiver efficiently and honestly, whereas in the past, by common confession, the administration of them was characterized by waste, discrimination, if not peculation. The minister of finance has acceded to the disbursement of revenues under American supervision. Finally, although the Haitian government has declined to employ American experts in the administration of internal revenues, nevertheless, under the insistence of the financial advisor and despite general business depression, the sum of internal revenue collected has increased threefold, although the internal revenue laws are unchanged.

There has been very little criticism of the collection of customs under American supervision or of the American receiver general. The financial advisor has been the object of bitter attack, partly because of his personal relations with Haitian officials, partly because under instruction of the secretary of state he withheld salaries of the principal Haitian officials as a measure of coercion and partly because he has been more than once, and for long periods, in Washington, absent from his

post of duty in Port-au-Prince. In justice to the financial advisor, it must be said that he was ordered to Washington by the State Department and has remained in Washington by order of the State Department to further the negotiation of the loan for the refunding of the Haitian debt.

The Haitian Debt

It has been stated that the Haitian government had never defaulted on the service of its foreign debts prior to the American occupation. This statement is not exactly correct, but it is undoubtedly true that it had exerted itself to an extraordinary degree to maintain the service of its foreign debts. Your committee is informed that to do this the Haitian government had, during the three years immediately preceding the occupation, floated internal loans at the rates of 59, 56, and 47, to a gold value of $2,868,131, had defaulted on salaries, pensions, etc., to the extent of $1,111,280, had borrowed from the Bank of Haiti $1,733,000, had issued fiat paper money, and had borrowed to a very large amount from private individuals at enormous discounts on treasury notes. The Haitian government had, at the time of the American intervention, totally exhausted its credit both at home and abroad. The amortization of the loan of 1875 was in arrears. A great deal has been made of the fact that after the naval forces took over the administration of the customhouses and after the outbreak of the Great war, there was a time when, despite careful administration, both interest and amortization due on the Haitian debt were unpaid. This is true, but the inability of the Haitian government and its American advisers to pay was due to the state of anarchy into which the country had fallen and to the inestimable injury to Haitian trade with Europe consequent upon the outbreak of the Great war. During the last three years, $5,000,000 of interest and principal have been paid. Today there is no inter-

est or capital overdue. The foreign debt has been reduced by one-third. On the contrary, there is a surplus in the treasury and it is proposed to refund the outstanding debt to the great benefit of the Haitian taxpayer.

The Republic of Haiti owes, largely in France, some $14,000,000, part of which could have been paid when the franc was at a discount of seventeen to the dollar and which can now be paid while exchange stands at about ten francs to the dollar. The Haitian government has lost something over a million dollars by delaying the refunding of the debt. It is still to the patent advantage of the Haitian government to refund the debt by borrowing in dollars and paying in francs, when the francs are worth not five for a dollar, as formerly, but ten for a dollar. Apart from this, in the opinion of your committee, it is of primary importance that the proposed loan should be made without delay, partly because it will afford a sum of money necessary to finish certain public works including the highway to Jacmel and that from Las Cahobas to Hinche, but also because under the proposed terms of the loan, the debt will be a general charge upon the revenues of the country and those revenues which are now specifically and irrevocably hypothecated to the service of certain loans will be freed from such rigid hypothecation and the onerous and inequitable revenue system of the country can be revised. There is appended to this report a table showing the contractual charges upon revenues in Haiti. A student of the Haitian financial system will be struck first by the charges upon exports (indirect and direct) and especially by the fact that they bear very heavily upon the poorest element of the population. If the debt be refunded as proposed, the revenue system can be revised and at one and the same time the burden upon the poor can be lightened and the export trade can be freed of uneconomic taxes.

It may be added that the new refunding loan, if con-

summated, will be made upon better terms than those recently made in the American market by European and South American governments.

As the negotiations for the revision of the charter of the national bank are all but consummated, the committee thinks it unnecessary to dwell upon the matter further than to say that due to the insistence of the American State Department and of the vigilant financial advisor, the terms of the new charter are more advantageous to Haiti than those of the old and that already an end has been put to the fluctuation of the currency, in which foreign merchants and exporters speculated to their own advantage and to the injury of the Haitian peasant. It is because of this last that certain foreign financial interests, that is, interests neither American nor Haitian, have covertly, persistently, and perhaps corruptly, opposed the determination of the new bank charter and the stabilization of the currency.

As was indicated earlier in the report, when the American naval forces were landed in Haiti in 1915 the fine highway system left by the French had disappeared. In 1917 the commander of the occupation, in collaboration with the Haitian government, invoked the Haitian law requiring the inhabitants to work upon the highways. This was the forced labor or corvee upon the roads. The law requiring the inhabitants to maintain roads was in principle not unlike some of the highway statutes of our own states. It had not been enforced for decades when, at the instance of the American naval command in Haiti, the Haitian government invoked it in July, 1916. At first this step appears to have met with no opposition from the natives. On the contrary, under the tactful management of the gendarmerie command at that time, encouraged and stimulated by the enthusiasm of the American officers, they were eager to open a highway from the north to the south of the country. It is the almost unbelievable truth that with the

decay of the French roads it was impossible for a vehicle to traverse any section of the roadless republic. People worked with great good will upon those sections of the highway near which they dwelt. It was only after a year or more, when the gendarmerie command unwisely compelled natives to leave the neighborhoods in which they lived in order to complete the roads through the mountains, that discontent and dissatisfaction were first manifest. It is impossible to say in what measure the corvee contributed to the armed outbreak in the north. Almost all Haitian revolutions have had their beginning in the broken country lying between Cape Haitien and the Dominican border. Here the Cacos had lived for generations, and hence they marched to make their periodical attacks upon the capital as followers of one or another revolutionary chieftain. At all events, when the road law had been invoked for nearly two years, and when its enforcement had given rise to discontent, for the reasons indicated, Charlemagne Peralte, an escaped prisoner, raised a band of Cacos in the north, which for some fifteen or eighteen months carried on a formidable guerilla war against the native gendarmerie and the American marine corps.

It may be set down to the credit of the American occupation and the treaty officials that the Haitian cities, once foul and insanitary, are now clean, with well-kept and well-lighted streets. The greater part of an arterial highway system opening up the heart of the country has been built. The currency, which once violently fluctuated under the manipulations of European merchants, has been stabilized, to the great advantage of the Haitian peasant. Arrears of amortization as well as of interest on the public debt have been paid, as also are regularly paid the salaries of the smallest officials. The steamship communications between Haiti and the United States are greatly improved. Trade and revenues are increasing. The revision of the customs and internal taxes, so impor-

tant to the prosperity of Haiti and especially of its poorest classes, awaits the funding of the debt by a new loan. There is peace and security of property and person throughout the republic. The peasant in his hovel or on the road to market is safe from molestation by brigand or official authority. A force of 2,500 gendarmes, insufficiently trained to cope with the Caco outbreak in 1918, is now admirably disciplined. As its morale has improved, the force has become at once more considerate and more efficient in the discharge of its duties. It is noteworthy that an increasing proportion of the commissioned officers are native Haitians, those promoted from the ranks to be supplemented by others, graduates of the newly established cadet school. In brief, under the treaty, the peace of the republic, the solvency of its government, and the security of its people have been established for the first time in many years.

CONFISCATION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY IN MEXICO[5]

There are many people in this country who sincerely believe that because Mexico is small and weak and the United States is great and strong we are acting the part of the bully, making unjust demands upon Mexico, and interfering with its purely internal affairs.

After reading the constitution and laws of Mexico, the diplomatic correspondence between the two countries relating thereto, and informing myself as best I could of the action of the Mexican government taken thereunder and its acts outside of either its constitution or laws, I have no hesitation in saying that were the controversies with Great Britain instead of with Mexico the country would be aflame today with indignation against Great Britain and immediate suspension of diplomatic intercourse would be demanded. The fact is there is no strong

[5] By Irvine L. Lenroot. *Congressional Record.* 68:2203-8. January 25, 1927.

government in the world today that would violate the rights of American citizens as Mexico has done, and the fact is further that it is only because of the weakness of Mexico and the strength of the United States that our government has been so patient and forbearing.

That the United States has only kept clearly within its rights and duties, I shall attempt to establish by narrating the admitted facts in the principal controversies now existing.

It is generally assumed that oil constitutes the principal American interest in Mexico, but the fact is, as shown by the senator from Arkansas, that oil interests comprise less than 25 per cent of the American interests there.

I present a table of American investments in Mexico, which I have secured from the State Department.

American investments in Mexico, as reported by American consular officers, December 15, 1926

Rural property	$ 166,047,000
Urban property	35,771,000
Oil lands	318,638,000
Refineries	50,070,000
Mines	317,427,000
Smelters	25,180,000
Timber	10,935,000
Railways	248,158,000
Manufacturing enterprises	27,716,000
Merchandising enterprises	26,140,000
Public utilities	30,799,000
Concealed interests	6,938,000
Miscellaneous investments not included above	125,242,000
Total	$1,389,061,000

I repeat that from this table it appears that the oil interests comprise less than 25 per cent of the American interests in Mexico.

Perhaps the most distressing and certainly the most flagrant violation of the rights of American citizens concerns the expropriation of rural property, the American investment in which amounts to $166,047,000.

Article 27 of the Mexican constitution provides for the expropriation of private lands, but it is provided that such expropriation shall be only for means of public utility and by means of indemnification.

With the purpose of Mexico to provide lands for her people, we must all sympathize. It is a most laudable undertaking, and her right to make such expropriation of lands of American nationals upon proper indemnification has never been denied.

But article 27 of the constitution lays down rules for compensation and method of payment that are shocking to the American sense of justice. It is provided first that the assessed value of the lands must be the measure of damages, if such assessed value has been declared by the owner, but if not it is the value for taxation placed by the assessor, plus 10 per cent, it being provided that the payment of the tax by the owner is an implied acceptance of the correctness of the valuation. The American national is thus put in this position: If the assessment is made very low for the purpose of fixing a low value for purposes of expropriation, if he pays the tax he thereby accepts the value placed upon it and thus loses the major part of the value of his property, or if he does not pay the tax he loses it anyway for the nonpayment of taxes. This is a very good illustration, indeed, of the present Mexican idea of justice.

But this is not all. The constitution provides that the payment for certain of the lands will be made in twenty annual installments, not cash as international law requires, and the owner is further compelled to accept state bonds, not bonds of the federal government, but state bonds as his compensation. In other words, instead of compensation there is substituted a promise to pay of little or no value.

But quite apart from this, the Mexican government has not even followed these provisions of the constitution. I understand that up to this time there have been

121 agrarian expropriations and 662 property seizures, and not one dollar has been paid in compensation and not a single bond has been issued therefor, as the constitution provides.

Here we have, first, what amounts to partial confiscation by virtue of the provision of the Mexican constitution, and, second, complete confiscation regardless of the constitution.

This is one of the matters that cannot be arbitrated, for we cannot arbitrate a question of right to confiscate.

There are not only large estates involved, but many small ones. I have read a letter from a man in Kansas to a member of this body. He stated that about thirty years ago an American colony moved to Mexico and acquired a tract of land, which they divided among themselves. His son and daughter are now living there on eighty acres of land. He writes that the colony has been notified by officials that they propose to take 2,400 acres of their land and give it to the Mexicans.

I have seen a letter from a citizen of Oklahoma, wherein he states that he owned two city blocks in a small city in Mexico and 240 acres of land. The two city blocks have been confiscated and a part of the 240 acres without any offer of compensation.

In 1925 a decree was issued by President Calles appropriating 1,755 hectares of the property of an American, for which he has received no compensation.

I could give many instances of this character that have come to my attention, and I repeat that, so far as I can ascertain, no American has yet received any compensation for lands taken under Mexican agrarian laws.

Instead of bullying Mexico, the fact is that our government has been most lenient and in the desire of Mexico to provide land for her people has been most sympathetic and helpful. In fact, our representatives agreed that for the purpose of providing communal lands for villages our government would agree that for expropriations not

exceeding 1,755 hectares for each village bonds would be accepted in payment of the claims of American nationals, but that cash must be paid for all lands taken in excess of that amount. But so far as I can ascertain no American has received either cash or bonds for his lands taken. These are matters, Mr. President, that cannot be arbitrated, and I am frank to say that I do not see how we can continue any relations with Mexico unless she shall have some regard for her solemn promises and international obligations.

We want nothing of Mexico except friendship and good will and an observance of those fundamental obligations without which there can be no intercourse between nations. Is this unreasonable to insist upon?

I now come to the oil and mining questions which involve disputes which I believe are proper subjects for arbitration. However certain we may feel of the correctness of the American position—and I believe every member of the Senate indorses it if he has investigated it or will indorse it after investigation—yet the fact is that Mexico does make a claim in respect to these questions that, however shocking it may be to our American sense of justice, it would be proper to submit to an arbitral tribunal, provided that American rights shall be protected pending the outcome of the arbitration.

On January 31, 1917, Mexico adopted a new constitution to take the place of the constitution adopted in 1857. This constitution went into effect May 1, 1917. The avowed purpose of the new constitution was to secure for the great masses of Mexican people better social and economic conditions; and to insure against changes that might be made by the Mexican congress, the method by which this was to be brought about was placed in their organic law.

As I wish to confine myself strictly to the matter in controversy between the two countries, I will only say that this constitution of 1917 is of the most advanced

character, and time alone will tell whether it will accomplish the aims hoped for. If it does, we should look upon it with approbation, even though many of its provisions may not accord with our ideas of economic welfare or justice. At any rate, it is none of our business except as it and the laws enacted pursuant to it affect the rights of American citizens and nationals of other countries to whom we owe a duty in the premises.

From the time of the Spanish conquest of Mexico until 1884 the government held the title to all deposits of the subsoil in Mexico. In November, 1884, a new mining code was enacted. Article 10 provided:

> The following substances are the exclusive property of the owner of the land, who may therefore develop and enjoy them without the formality of entry or special adjudication.

Petroleum and gaseous substances are then specifically enumerated as belonging to the owner of the land. In 1892, and again in 1909, the mining code was revised, but in each of these revisions it was declared that the owner of the surface lands was the owner of the petroleum and mineral fuels beneath.

Between 1884 and 1917 American citizens acquired large tracts of land in Mexico, not by concessions from the government, as is often asserted, but through purchase from private owners.

Article 27 of the constitution of 1917 provides that:

> The ownership of lands and waters comprised within the limits of the national territory is vested originally in the nation, which has had and has the right to transmit the title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property. Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public utility and by means of indemnification.

Later on in the same section it is provided:

> In the nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or substances.

And among other substances petroleum and all hydrocarbons are enumerated.

Article 14 provides that no retroactive law shall be enacted.

The effect of these provisions, and laws enacted and decrees issued pursuant to them, has been the subject of a long diplomatic correspondence from 1917, under the administration of President Wilson, down to November 17 last. On December 31, 1925, the Mexican Congress passed a law carrying into full effect the provisions of article 27 of the constitution relating to petroleum.

Between 1917 and 1926 the regulation of petroleum rights was by executive acts. In 1921 five cases were decided by the Supreme Court of Mexico in favor of American nationals, the court holding that article 27 of the constitution was not retroactive and rights acquired before May 1, 1917, were not affected thereby. In 1923 President Harding appointed Charles Beecher Warren and John Barton Payne as commissioners to meet representatives of the Mexican government, it not having been recognized at that time. The commission held many meetings in the city of Mexico, beginning on May 14, 1923, and ending on August 15, 1923. As a result of these meetings a full understanding was had as to the protection of American property rights in Mexico, and it was upon the solemn promises there made that the present government of Mexico was recognized by the United States.

The law of December 31, 1925, obliges the owners of vested rights in petroleum lands secured prior to May 1, 1917, to surrender those rights for concessions of not more than 50 years, the date of the concession to date from the time of the first exploitation of the land for oil, or the date of the contract for the exploitation.

I think it is very plain that both sides made reservations. The reservation made by Mexico was, as to lands, as to the subsoil, where no positive acts were performed, that they did not recognize any rights in American nation-

als; but as to all others they do, and that includes every producing well in Mexico existing on May 1, 1917.

The law of December 31, 1925, obliges the owners of vested rights in petroleum lands secured prior to May 1, 1917, to surrender those rights for concessions of not more than fifty years, the date of the concession to date from the time of the first exploitation of the land for oil or the date of the contract for the exploitation. The applicant was required to apply for the concession before December 31, 1926; and, failing to do so, his property was declared forfeited to the government. In addition, an American owner, before he could secure a concession in exchange for his title, was required to enter into an agreement before the Mexican Department of Foreign Affairs that he will be considered Mexican in respect to his property, and not to invoke the protection of the United States government, under penalty, in case of breach, of forfeiture to the government of the concession acquired.

Here is the crux of the oil controversy: An American on May 1, 1917, had a fee title to land and all the oil in the soil under the surface. If he had performed a positive act with reference to that oil, that title is admitted by Mexico today. That was a vested right. It was his to do with as he chose, subject only to the payment of taxes and police regulations regarding the drilling of wells and production of oil. In exchange for this vested right the Mexican government proposes to give him a lease for not more than fifty years, the lease to be dated back to the time when he began work; but he can not even do this without first renouncing his American citizenship with respect to his property and agreeing not to invoke the protection of the United States, irrespective of any wrongs committed against his rights by the Mexican government.

I ask any American citizen if he regards a lease as

equivalent to a fee title here in our own country, and yet that is exactly Mexico's contention.

Remember these are fee titles granted in perpetuity and acquired by Americans prior to May 1, 1917, the date the new Mexican constitution went into effect.

I have no doubt but that many will say, if these are the facts, what is there to arbitrate? What possible claim can Mexico make to justify such a course? I admit that it is difficult to see how even an honest dispute can arise upon this question, and yet Mexico does set up a very novel theory. It is in effect that as the original grant of the subsoil was from the government, it can withdraw the grant at any time before any rights arising out of the grant have been exercised.

If that doctrine should apply in the United States, Congress could take over without compensation all the minerals in lands which have been patented since the beginning of the republic, except those which have been exploited for mineral or sold at a price which was based upon the possibility of minerals therein.

Then Mexico makes the novel claim that a lease is equivalent to a title, and that it has the right to require a renunciation of nationality with respect to property claimed as a condition to recognition of any rights whatever.

These claims of Mexico are novel, indeed, and yet they are of such a character that it would be desirable to arbitrate them, provided there be protection of American rights pending the outcome of the arbitration, and it is for that reason that I shall vote for the pending resolution.

I have tried to give an outline of the real nature of our controversies with Mexico. It is unfortunate that up to this time its government has not had a greater regard for its international obligations. As I stated at the outset, the United States has been patient and forbearing with Mexico, more so than we would have been with a strong

country under like circumstances. I suggest that anyone who ventures to criticize the administration of President Wilson, or of President Harding, or of President Coolidge, with regard to his Mexican policy, should point out the things they have done that constitute wrongs against Mexico.

We do not seek to control the internal affairs of Mexico. Their confiscation under their constitution of all churches and places of public worship may shock us, but that is their affair, and no concern of ours, except as American rights may be involved. We admit that they have the right to make such laws as they see fit for the future. They may deport every American in Mexico, and, so far as international law is concerned, we could not complain. We desire peace and friendship with Mexico. If they desire to exclude American capital in the future, they may do so. With their aspirations of Mexico for the Mexicans we find no fault. All that we ask is that in accomplishing their object they shall observe their international obligations, and where there is an honest dispute as to the extent or nature of those obligations, we should be willing to submit the matter to arbitration.

I do not anticipate war with Mexico. I know nothing of the course the administration proposes to pursue more than the general public knows, but I venture the opinion that unless Mexico shall evidence a willingness in good faith to settle pending questions upon the basis of justice and equity, governed by rules of international law, recognition of the existing government should be withdrawn, the embargo upon the shipment of arms raised, and all investment of American capital in Mexico discouraged in the future, until such time as Mexico shall be willing to assume and fulfill her international obligations.

In closing, the Senator from Arkansas said that this was no time for indecision or timidity. I want to repeat and emphasize that statement, but I propose to stand upon

and for the unquestioned rights and duties and obligations of the United States, rather than condone offenses of Mexico.

It is intimated by some that regardless of what Mexico might do or fail to do, there should be no withdrawal of recognition, there should be no raising of the embargo upon arms, and I wonder what their solution would be in case of Mexico's refusal to arbitrate and refusal to perform what are admitted to be her international obligations.

I think this is a time when, instead of encouraging Mexico to further violate her international obligations, it is the duty of every Senator to take the position that it is Mexico's duty to fulfill and perform her obligations. If she shall finally refuse to perform her clear duty under international law, I see nothing left except to take the course I have suggested, and we will not be without a distinguished precedent if such a course be taken.

In March, 1912, under the authority of the Congress, President Taft issued a proclamation creating an embargo upon the shipment of all arms to Mexico. That embargo remained in operation until the 3d day of February, 1914, when President Wilson, still acting under the authority of the original resolution, lifted the embargo, allowing free shipment of arms to Mexico. The proclamation is short, and reads as follows:

> Whereas by a proclamation of the President issued on March 14, 1912, under a joint resolution of Congress approved by the President on the same day, it was declared that there existed in Mexico conditions of domestic violence which were promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States; and
>
> Whereas by the joint resolution above mentioned it thereupon became unlawful to export arms or munitions of war to Mexico except under such limitations and exceptions as the President should prescribe:
>
> Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, hereby proclaim that, as the conditions on which the proclamation of March 14, 1912, was based have essentially changed, and as it is desirable to place the United States

with reference to the exportation of arms or munitions of war to Mexico in the same position as other powers, the said proclamation is hereby revoked.

Therefore, under proclamation issued by President Wilson in 1914, the shipment of arms to Mexico was freely allowed, until the 19th day of October, 1915, covering a period of a little over a year. On October 19, 1915, President Wilson, still acting under the authority of the resolution of March 14, 1912, again set up the embargo, but on the same day, and later in the day, he modified that proclamation, permitting the shipment of arms to Carranza and his followers, but to no one else.

Mr. President, there is no one of us who would not, for the reasons so well stated by the Senator from Arkansas, regret beyond words the necessity, if the necessity should arise, to withdraw recognition or raise the embargo upon the shipment of arms to Mexico. For that reason I favor this resolution. Every possible effort should be made by the government to secure an amicable adjustment of the difficulties, but if that shall fail, if Mexico shall refuse either to arbitrate such questions as are properly arbitrable, or shall continue, without any warrant whatever, to confiscate property of American nationals, then I see no remedy for the assertion of the rights and duties of the United States than to take the course I have indicated. I hope that will not be necessary.

[Extracts from the Mexican constitution of 1917, translated by H. N. Branch]

ART. 14. No law shall be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of any person whatsoever.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions or rights without due process of law instituted before a duly created court, in which the essential elements of procedure are observed and in accordance with previously existing laws.

In criminal cases no penalty shall be imposed by mere analogy or even by a priori evidence, but the penalty shall be decreed by a law in every respect applicable to the crime in question.

In civil suits the final judgment shall be according to the letter of the juridical interpretation of the law; in the absence of the latter, the general legal principles shall govern.

ART. 27. The ownership of lands and waters comprised within the limits of the national territory is vested originally in the nation, which has had, and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property.

Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public utility and by means of indemnification.

The nation shall have at all times the right to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest may demand as well as the right to regulate the development of natural resources, which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to conserve them and equitably to distribute the public wealth. For this purpose necessary measures shall be taken to divide large landed estates; to develop small landed holdings; to establish new centers of rural population with such lands and waters as may be indispensable to them; to encourage agriculture and to prevent the destruction of natural resources, and to protect property from damage detrimental to society. Settlements, hamlets situated on private property, and communes which lack lands or water or do not possess them in sufficient quantities for their needs shall have the right to be provided with them from the adjoining properties, always having due regard for small landed holdings. Wherefore, all grants of lands made up to the present time under the decree of January 6, 1915, are confirmed. Private property acquired for the said purposes shall be considered as taken for public utility.

In the nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or substances which in veins, layers, masses, or beds constitute deposits whose nature is different from the components of the land, such as minerals from which metals and metaloids used for industrial purposes are extracted; beds of precious stones, rock salt and salt lakes formed directly by marine waters; products derived from the decomposition of rocks when their exploitation requires underground work; phosphates which may be used for fertilizers; solid mineral fuels; petroleum and all hydrocarbons—solid, liquid or gaseous.

In the nation is likewise vested the ownership of the waters of territorial seas to the extent and in the terms fixed by the law of nations; those of lakes and inlets of bays; those of interior lakes of natural formation which are directly connected with flowing waters; those of principal rivers or tributaries from which the points at which there is a permanent current of water in their beds to their mouths, whether they flow to the sea or cross two or more states; those of intermittent streams which traverse two or more states in their main body; the waters of rivers, streams or ravines when they bound the national territory or that of the states; waters extracted from mines; and the beds and banks of the lakes and streams hereinbefore mentioned, to the extent fixed by law. Any other stream of water not comprised within the foregoing enumeration shall be considered as an integral part of the private property through which it flows; but the development of the waters when they pass from one landed

property to another shall be considered of public utility and shall be subject to the provisions prescribed by the states.

In the cases to which the two foregoing paragraphs refer the ownership of the nation is inalienable and may not be lost by prescription; concessions shall be granted by the Federal Government to private parties or civil or commercial corporations organized under the laws of Mexico only on condition that said resources be regularly developed, and on the further condition that the legal provisions be observed.

Legal capacity to acquire ownership of lands and waters of the nation shall be governed by the following provisions:

I. Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right to acquire ownership in lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines, waters, or mineral fuels in the Republic of Mexico. The nation may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree before the Department of Foreign Affairs to be considered Mexicans is respect to such property, and accordingly not to invoke the protection of their governments in respect to the same, under penalty, in case of breach, of forfeiture to the nation of property so acquired. Within a zone of one hundred kilometers from the frontiers, and of fifty kilometers from the seacoast, no foreigner shall under any conditions acquire direct ownership of lands and waters.

II. The religious institutions known as churches, irrespective of creed, shall in no case have legal capacity to acquire, hold or administer real property or loans made on such real property (compare second paragraph of Art. 27 of 1857); all such real property or loans as may be at present held by the said religious institutions, either on their own behalf or through third parties, shall vest in the nation, and anyone shall have the right to denounce property so held. Presumptive proof shall be sufficient to declare the denunciation well founded. Places of public worship are the property of the nation, as represented by the federal government, which shall determine which of them may continue to be devoted to their present purposes. Episcopal residences, rectories, seminaries, orphan asylums or collegiate establishments of religious institutions, convents or any other buildings built or designed for the administration, propaganda or teaching of the tenets of any religious creed shall forthwith vest, as of full right, directly in the nation, to be used exclusively for the public services of the federation or of the states, within their respective jurisdictions. All places of public worship which shall later be erected shall be the property of the nation.

III. Public and private charitable institutions for the sick and needy, for scientific research, or for the diffusion of knowledge, mutual-aid societies or organizations formed for any other lawful purpose, shall in no case acquire, hold, or administer loans made on real property, unless the mortgage terms do not exceed ten years. In no case shall institutions of this character be under the patronage, direction, administration, charge or supervision of

religious corporations or institutions, nor of ministers of any religious creed or of their dependents, even though either the former or the latter shall not be in active service. (The second paragraph of the 1857 constitution and clauses II and III of the 1917 text are largely drawn from the "Leyes de Reforma.")

IV. Commercial stock companies shall not acquire, hold or administer rural properties. Companies of this nature which may be organized to develop any manufacturing, mining, petroleum or other industry, excepting only agricultural industries, may acquire, hold or administer lands only in an area absolutely necessary for their establishments or adequate to serve the purposes indicated, which the executive of the union or of the respective state in each case shall determine.

V. Banks duly organized under the laws governing institutions of credit may make mortgage loans on rural and urban property in accordance with the provisions of the said laws, but they may not own nor administer more real property than that absolutely necessary for their direct purposes; and they may furthermore hold temporarily for the brief term fixed by law such real property as may be judicially adjudicated to them in execution proceedings.

VI. Properties held in common by co-owners, hamlets situated on private property, pueblos, tribal congregations, and other settlements which, as a matter of fact or law, conserve their communal character, shall have legal capacity to enjoy in common the waters, woods and lands belonging to them, or which may have been or shall be restored to them according to the law of January 6, 1915, until such time as the manner of making the division of the lands shall be determined by law.

VII. Excepting the corporations to which Clauses III, IV, V and VI hereof refer, no other civil corporation may hold or administer on its own behalf real estate or mortgage loans derived therefrom, with the single exception of buildings designed directly and immediately for the purposes of the institution. The states, the federal district and the territories, as well as the municipalities throughout the republic, shall enjoy full legal capacity to acquire and hold all real estate necessary for public services.

The federal and state laws shall determine within their respective jurisdictions those cases in which the occupation of private property shall be considered of public utility; and in accordance with the said laws the administrative authorities shall make the corresponding declaration. The amount fixed as compensation for the expropriated property shall be based on the sum at which the said property shall be valued for fiscal purposes in the catastral or revenue offices, whether this value be that manifested by the owner or merely impliedly accepted by reason of the payment of his taxes on such a basis, to which there shall be added ten per cent. The increased value which the property in question may have acquired through improvements made subsequent to the date of the fixing of the fiscal value shall be the

only matter subject to expert opinion and to judicial determination. The same procedure shall be observed in respect to objects whose value is not recorded in the revenue offices.

All proceedings, findings, decisions and all operations of demarcation, concession, composition, judgment, compromise, alienation or auction which may have deprived properties held in common by co-owners, hamlets situated on private property, settlements, congregations, tribes and other settlement organizations still existing since the law of June 25, 1856, of the whole or a part of their lands, woods and waters are declared null and void; all findings, resolutions and operations which may subsequently take place and produce the same effects shall likewise be null and void. Consequently all lands, forests and waters of which the above mentioned settlements may have been deprived shall be restored to them according to the decree of January 6, 1915, which shall remain in force as a constitutional law. In case the adjudication of lands, by way of restitution, be not legal in the terms of the said decree, which adjudication have been requested by any of the above entities, those lands shall nevertheless be given to them by way of grant, and they shall in no event fail to receive such as they may need. Only such lands, title to which may have been acquired in the division made by virtue of the said law of June 25, 1856, or such as may be held in undisputed ownership for more than ten years are excepted from the provision of nullity, provided their area does not exceed fifty hectares. (1 hectare=2.47 acres.) Any excess over this area shall be returned to the commune and the owner shall be indemnified. All laws of restitution enacted by virtue of this provision shall be immediately carried into effect by the administrative authorities. Only members of the commune shall have the right to the lands destined to be divided, and the rights to these lands shall be inalienable so long as they remain undivided; the same provision shall govern the right of ownership after the division has been made. The exercise of the rights pertaining to the nation by virtue of this article shall follow judicial process; but as a part of this process and by order of the proper tribunals, which order shall be issued within the maximum period of one month, the administrative authorities shall proceed without delay to the occupation, administration, auction or sale of the lands and waters in question, together with all their appurtenances, and in no case may the acts of the said authorities be set aside until final sentence is handed down.

During the next constitutional term the Congress and the state legislatures shall enact laws within their respective jurisdictions for the purpose of carrying out the division of large landed estates, subject to the following conditions:

(a) In each state and territory there shall be fixed the maximum area of land which any one individual or legally organized corporation may own.

(b) The excess of the area thus fixed shall be subdivided by

the owner within the period set by the laws of the respective locality; and these subdivisions shall be offered for sale on such conditions as the respective governments shall approve, in accordance with the said laws.

(c) If the owner shall refuse to make the subdivision, this shall be carried out by the local government by means of expropriation proceedings.

(d) The value of the subdivisions shall be paid in annual amounts sufficient to amortize the principal and interest within a period of not less than twenty years, during which the person acquiring them may not alienate them. The rate of interest shall not exceed 5 per cent per annum.

(e) The owner shall be bound to receive bonds of a special issue to guarantee the payment of the property expropriated. With this end in view the Congress shall issue a law authorizing the states to issue bonds to meet their agrarian obligations.

(f) The local laws shall govern the extent of the family patrimony and determine what property shall constitute the same on the basis of its inalienability; it shall not be subject to attachment nor to any charge whatever.

All contracts and concessions made by former governments from and after the year 1876 which shall have resulted in the monopoly of lands, waters, and natural resources of the nation by a single individual or corporation are declared subject to revision, and the executive is authorized to declare those null and void which seriously prejudice the public interest.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE POWER [6]

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the western hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require

6 By President Roosevelt. *Message to Congress.* December 6, 1904, p. 33-5.

intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean sea would show the progress in stable and just civilization which with the aid of the Platt amendment Cuba has shown since our troops left the island, and which so many of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliantly showing, all question of interference by this nation with their affairs would be at an end. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.

In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela and Panama, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. There are, however, cases in which, while our own interests are not greatly involved, strong appeal is made to our sympathies.

Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. We have plenty of sins of our own to war against, and under ordinary circumstances we can do more for the general uplifting of humanity by striving with heart and soul to put a stop to civic corruption, to brutal lawlessness and violent race prejudices here at home than by passing resolutions about wrongdoing elsewhere. Nevertheless there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it. The cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable. There must be no effort made to remove the mote from our brother's eye if we refuse to remove the beam from our own. But in extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we could interfere by force of arms as we interfered to put a stop to intolerable conditions in Cuba are necessarily very few. Yet it is not to be expected that a people like ours, which in spite of certain very obvious shortcomings, nevertheless as a whole shows by its consistent practice its belief in the principles of civil and religious liberty and of orderly freedom, a people among whom even the worst crime, like the crime of lynching, is never more than sporadic, so that individuals and not classes are molested in their fundamental rights—it is inevitable that such a nation should desire eagerly to give expression to its horror on an occasion like that of the massacre of the Jews in Kishenef, or when it witnesses such systematic and long-extended cruelty and oppression as the cruelty

and oppression of which the Armenians have been the victims, and which have won for them the indignant pity of the civilized world.

Even where it is not possible to secure in other nations the observance of the principles which we accept as axiomatic, it is necessary for us firmly to insist upon the rights of our own citizens without regard to their creed or race; without regard to whether they were born here or born abroad.

OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO[7]

The Background of Revolution and Financial Chaos

Few undertakings abroad under the auspices of our government have called forth a greater volume of adverse comment than the so-called Haiti-Dominican occupation. While part of this comment reeks with ignorance, it is not past belief that the larger part is colored by falsehood and bitter complaint thinly cloaking greedy and ulterior desires in connection with the ruling control of the two "black republics."

The statement, often repeated, that the United States has replaced a free and independent democracy in the Republic of Haiti by an autocratic and coercive tyranny of force is untrue from every angle. The Republic of Haiti, before the advent of the marine corps, had never known a period when a democracy, as such, could have possibly functioned. In fact, due to the savage brutality, cruel slavery and degrading rule of cupidity established by the Spaniards of early days, which has never changed except in name, none of the political characteristics, none of the tangible benefits, none of the individual safeguards of a democracy, despite recognized independence, were known

[7] By Clifford A. Tinker. *Review of Reviews.* 66: 46-60. July, 1922.

in Haiti until the United States took charge in 1915. The same is true of Santo Domingo.

What brand of democracy is this? In the Republic of Haiti, which was established January 1, 1804, never has there been a general legal election of a president, although there have been twenty-eight rulers of the nation since that time—one emperor, one king and twenty-six presidents. Only four of these rulers ever completed the statutory term of office. Brutal assassination, terror-induced suicide, enforced abdication and compulsory exile account for the rest. And, moreover, this distressing political record is more than matched by the ruinous economic downfall of Haiti commencing with its independence from France.

At the beginning of the revolution in 1791 the export records show that Haiti had sent abroad 163,500,000 pounds of cane sugar. From that date down to 1919, one hundred and eighteen years, not an ounce of sugar was exported. In 1919-20 an American firm which has reestablished the sugar industry in Haiti exported 8,798,877 pounds. Of 360,000 acres of cane fields under production by the French in 1791, only 15,000 acres are now cultivated. Productive cane land, richly remunerative and cultivated for centuries before the revolution, has been allowed to revert to a wilderness of tangled forest. This is a measure of the extent to which the ignorant blacks have been exploited by their so-called democratic government; there has been more money in organized graft than in organized industry.

So, too, the enormous French coffee plantations of pre-revolutionary days have gone by the board; all the coffee raised in Haiti today is a gift of Nature, the berries being picked by the natives from wild plants descended from the trees the French left. It is a well-known fact that the total revenue of the country at the time of American intervention was insufficient to pay the salaries of the governmental officials and the interest on the for-

eign debts incurred by the various revolutionary dictators. There was not enough for both, to say nothing of funds for other needed expenditures—schools, roads, and the necessary activities of a paternal government. The nation was bankrupt. Dependence on customs duties with agriculture, the real national wealth, in such a state was a financial farce. A great "to-do" has been made about the honorable conduct of Haiti in always paying the interest on its foreign obligations, but nothing has been said about the methods employed. Those methods consisted in borrowing more, thus adding to the principal and increasing the annual interest charges, a process which forced the nation deeper and deeper into the financial slough.

Social life in Haiti was even worse than its ruined political and economic condition would indicate. Only three or four persons in a hundred could read or write, the courts were debauched, epidemics were rampant—Haiti's 2,000,000 blacks were virtual slaves. The peasantry exchanging their crops for commodities in the trading centers found that a season's crops barely paid for the seed required for the next planting, and they were robbed en route by Cacos. Rates of exchange were always against the producer and in favor of the trader, thus the producer was clothed in rags, half-starved, and lived in a hovel. Life, even, was cheap, and it was held cheap.

Professor Carl Kelsey of the University of Pennsylvania, who last year made a sociological survey of Haiti and Santo Domingo, recently stated at a hearing before the select senatorial committee authorized by the congress to inquire into the occupation and administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo that: "Haiti traded a slave system under white slave-owners for a slave system under mulatto owners, and they have run a slave regime from the first up to the present time. . . If you want to see what the average Haitian official thinks of the welfare of the Haitian people make a careful analysis of the con-

tract-labor trade with Cuba since the war and during the war. . . It is nothing but a modified slave trade, with a great financial profit to those who are engaged in it."

Those who think to find something better, something more in keeping with the ideals of democracy in Santo Domingo—or that the Dominicans, being less black than the Haitians, are deserving of praise where the latter are to be censured—should hold their judgment in abeyance until they know the facts concerning democratic government in that republic.

During seventy years as an independent nation Santo Domingo has managed to promulgate no less than nineteen constitutions. Farcical elections have produced fifty-three presidents during those years. Of this number only three completed the prescribed term of office. From the beginning matters have been growing worse and worse, there having been thirty-five presidents between 1863 and 1916, thirteen of which held office during the period from 1899 to 1916, while the six-year period from 1911 to 1916 accounted for seven of the thirteen. The presidential term of office being six years, and three incumbents having served a full term, it will be seen that the others lasted about a year each. Their removal from office was accomplished by various means ranging from murder to terrorized flight. Such political unstability is nothing less than despotism of the worst kind, the general population having nothing whatever to say about the government or its methods of applying the principles of democracy to the land it governs.

Financially, at the time of American intervention, Santo Domingo was in the same plight as its sister republic, Haiti; the Dominican debt, foreign and domestic, had outgrown the ability of the government to control; plain grafting was a well-known and widely practiced art. With reference to mental condition, the Dominicans were on a par with the Haitians. To tell the truth, the whole

Island of Haiti was intellectually little in advance of "darkest Africa."

With American intervention came comparative order. After four centuries of murder, cruel torture, debauchery and slave-like exploitation, the inhabitants of the two island republics may now go to bed and sleep in safety on the darkest night of the year. They will not be robbed or murdered; their lives and possessions are at last safe.

Whatever has been claimed or may be claimed respecting our presence in Haiti and Santo Domingo, the fact remains that we are there because of the Monroe Doctrine.

Our interest in the affairs of the Island of Haiti has been constant, and has often been brought before Congress for one reason or another. In 1871 Congress passed a resolution, January 12, to send a commission to Santo Domingo to investigate conditions, the Dominicans having voted almost unanimously for annexation. The report of the commission was favorable, a treaty was signed, and approved by President Grant, but on being submitted to the Senate was objected to by one senator, Sumner of Massachusetts, and no action was taken. Again, on January 10, 1873, the Bay and Peninsula of Samana, Santo Domingo, was ceded to an American company in the expectation of establishing a naval coaling station, but as the contract was withdrawn in March, 1874, because of congressional inaction, we lost that valuable concession. The failure of these negotiations caused much concern in the United States lest some foreign power gain a naval base at Samana, a fact substantiated by the archives of the State Department.

If the Island of Haiti was considered of such importance and was given so much consideration by this country in years gone by, what shall we say of its importance now that our great coastline sweeps south to include the Panama Canal? If the island meant anything in terms of the Monroe Doctrine before the completion of the huge

waterway, it means everything now. Samana Bay is the one great port between the canal and Europe. Its waters are deep enough and extensive enough to afford anchorage for a huge fleet, its docking space can be readily increased to supply fuel for an enormous trans-Atlantic-canal trade, it is mighty in naval potentiality, and it is a *safe* harbor at all seasons of the year.

Moreover, the trade of the world passes through the Windward Passage, which separates the west end of Haiti from Cuba, and through the Jamaica Channel separating Haiti from the Island of Jamaica, and other ocean trade sails through the Mona Passage separating Santo Domingo and Porto Rico.

Keeping the Peace in Haiti, with American Marines

As a result of nearly three years of intensive and bitter publicity concerning American intervention in Haitian affairs, the general public of this nation—and perhaps most of the civilized world—undoubtedly believes that the United States government has debauched the very sovereignty of Haiti, has conducted there a loose-jointed régime of military exploitation well splashed with blood by a thieving gang of medal-hunting Marines, and has by force built up a huge and remunerative banking business for Wall Street at the expense of the poor blacks.

Congressmen have said so. Senators have said so. Ex-governmental officials have said so. Presidential candidates have said so. And I have read article after article, published in reputed authoritative American magazines and newspapers, signed by individuals who claimed to have first-hand facts, in which the most inhuman acts imaginable were imputed to Americans when dealing with Haitians, in which the United States government was accused of glaring breaches of treaty rights, international law, and good faith in Haitian affairs, and in which our officials in Haiti have been set forth as agents of moneyed

interests intent on "hogging" the best land and most lucrative industries in that republic. Scarce have I read an article dealing with Haitian affairs which has contained one word of commendation or praise for America or Americans.

There is another side, however, and I propose to tell it. Every statement that I shall make is a matter of official record, available to any magazine or newspaper editor in America. Too much stress has been laid on the details of our administration of Haitian affairs, and not enough has been told concerning the real accomplishments of our forces in that troubled country.

If disgusting details are necessary, why not bring out such facts as these: That the Cacos, who are called patriotic heroes by simpering Americans, were never more than organized bands of robbers perched at the gates of every town in Haiti, who exacted toll from the poor blacks trudging along the road toward the market with a basket of fruit or a handkerchief full of coffee berries, the sale of which was expected to keep their soul and body together; that these Cacos were controlled by leaders who maintained their position through an appeal to superstitious fears. And why should we not tell of rubbing the brains of heroic marines upon the gun barrels of these Cacos, in expectation that the savage band might be sure of better aim in future fights, and of the blood of murdered marines that was sprinkled on machetes and guns, to make the weapons more deadly? Even the hearts of butchered marines were eaten, in order that the Cacos might be filled with the courage of the massacred white.

We might also tell of the debauched courts of justice in Haiti, wherein there was no justice, only exploitation. So little faith had the citizenry in their courts that summary justice was meted to the wrongdoers immediately, wherever caught. Before our marines took control of affairs, one could not walk along the trails and muddy roads in Haiti without finding a cross erected every

hundred yards or so, and hanging thereon a bunch of rotten bananas, or a pair of old shoes, or a little bag of coffee—indicating that some thief had been caught, hacked to death, buried on the spot, and his spoils hung above him as a warning to others.

This is pitiful reading, but it is true. One could keep on indefinitely citing instances of degenerate semi-civilization—but what is the use? The main feature of the story will suffice for thinking Americans to understand that the navy and marine corps in Haiti have brought about a governmental miracle.

Safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine

In the first place our navy and marine corps are not in Haiti on a casual glory-seeking junket, undertaken at their own volition. They are there at the request of our State Department. The policies controlling all their actions in Haiti have originated with or have been approved by the State Department. Consequently we must look to that department for the reason why our forces were ordered on Haitian soil and why they have been maintained there.

Those reasons have found a belated avowal by the recent announcements of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State when our forces landed in Haiti, and of Secretary Hughes. Both men stated that the apprehended violation of the Monroe Doctrine caused our government to take action—not alone, perhaps, because of our zeal to maintain the principles of that doctrine, but also because Haiti needed our assistance in accordance with a treaty under negotiation at the time.

That there was need of our assistance, and that the Monroe Doctrine was in danger, is readily apparent when the conditions in Haiti at the time of intervention are reviewed. Continued revolutionary turmoil had brought increases in the foreign debt until large sums in the form of bonds bearing stiff interest were in the hands of Ger-

man and French bondholders, and English investors were fast acquiring the later issues bearing interest as high as 18 per cent. The financial troubles of Haiti multiplied after 1900 at an alarming rate, and, despite claims to the contrary, interest was defaulted.

Foreign governments began to press Haiti for a change in methods of finance. Some interest payments were collected by force; and, finally, Germany made overtures in 1912 to the then existing Haitian régime for a cession of Saint Nicholas Mole as a German coaling station, for German control of Haitian customs, and for preferred port rights, all to be based on a German loan of $2,000,000. When this negotiation became known at Washington, Germany was called upon for an explanation. The charge was denied in 1914, but at that time Germany stated that no scheme of reorganization or control in Haiti could be thought of unless European nations were permitted to exercise the same rights as the United States.

This German statement constituted nothing less than a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. Accordingly, our government made plans looking to the preservation of its rights in Haiti and seeking methods of cooperating with the Haitian government in readjustment of its finances, protection against foreign attack, and suppression of insurrection through armed assistance by the United States. On the other hand, Haiti was asked not to sell or lease Saint Nicholas Mole to any foreign power or the citizens of such power, and was also asked to enter into arbitration for the settlement of foreign claims.

These proposals were submitted to the Haitian government on May 22, 1915, and a reply was received on June 4, all the the foregoing provisions being accepted, but with the following changes: A fifth provision was suggested, which would take any disagreements to The Hague for adjustment, and the provision wherein the United States would render armed aid in suppressing

insurrection was amended to include facilitation by the United States in the entrance of capital into Haiti for business purposes, aid in unifying the debt, in modifying customs guarantees, in establishing monetary reforms, and an agreement that if American troops were necessary to suppress insurrection they should be landed in Haiti by joint agreement but should be retired by request of Haitian constitutional authority.

Our Marines Land, After Revolution and Assassination

Before a complete agreement could be ratified, the whole matter was upset by another revolution in Haiti. On June 15 our hands were forced by the landing of French marines at Cape Haitien, which was threatened by a revolutionary army. This action by the French brought up the Monroe Doctrine, and our government decided to act. The warships *Washington* and *Eagle* were ordered to Cape Haitien with marines. The revolution reached such alarming proportions that the *Washington* was sent to Port-au-Prince on July 26. The next day, at Port-au-Prince, the Haitian president, Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, from his refuge in the French legation, ordered the execution of 160 prisoners and members of prominent families. The officer who carried out the orders was later hacked to pieces. On the 28th, the president himself was taken from the French legation and cut to mince-meat.

Following these terrible deeds the English and French consuls requested warships and American marines were landed. Two days after the Americans had taken possession of the city, a French guard was landed at the legation, but they were not needed—the marines having the situation well in hand. On August 12, 1915, fifteen days after the murder of Sam, Dartiguenave was elected president. On August 16 our State Department requested the Navy to take charge of all Haitian customhouses, to

collect customs and expend them for the support of Dartiguenave's government, for the relief of the half-starved inhabitants, for the aid of discharged soldiers, for public works, and, last but not least, for the establishment of a gendarmerie. This was done before the convention treaty with Haiti had been made and against the wishes of the temporary revolutionary Haitian government. Up to this time, without doubt, our main thought was the Monroe Doctrine.

Herein lies the claim of those who state that we debauched the sovereignty of Haiti, that we destroyed democracy in that country, and that we should get out at once and let the Haitians run things to suit themselves. Such talk was and still is silly. The Haitians had no stable government; a state of anarchy existed. The United States, not desiring any foreign intervention, had to intervene itself. No other course was thinkable. This was especially so when the status of the Germans was considered. The Germans had emigrated to Haiti in large numbers, and they had begun the system of intermarriage with the blacks which gave the French in the seventeenth century such a hold on the country. The law did not permit foreigners to hold property, but by marriage with black women Germans circumvented the law. They also supplied funds for revolutionists. Thus, by subsidizing anarchy and gaining landholds by marriage, they were fast becoming the masters of Haiti. To avoid further European complications, especially with Germany, our government assumed control.

Is American Control Still Necessary?

Negotiations with the new Haitian government went on, and a convention treaty was made law by both countries on September 16, 1915. In this treaty the United States promises "to aid the Haitian government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources, and in the establishment

of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis"—and, "should the necessity occur, the United States will lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and industrial liberty."

The provisions of this treaty are responsible for our continued occupation of Haiti. The necessity still exists for our aid in the "maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and industrial liberty." Without the marines and the gendarmerie the government of Haiti would not last a single day. The Haitians admit it. Haitians themselves have no confidence in their government, their courts, and their leaders.

It is claimed that the people of Haiti are chafing at our occupancy, and it is certain that the former revolutionists and deposed bandit leaders are doing so; and it may be that some of the governmental officials and wealthy merchants of Haiti, now that our occupation is beginning to bear fruit and external aggression and internal strife are beginning to fade into order and prosperity, can find reasons why they should take up the reins.

When one is sick, a doctor is wanted; when one is well, the doctor is forgotten. The measure of order, due to the brilliant work of the marines, is bringing back a show of nerve among the Haitian population; and those formerly clothed with political and social importance possibly cannot wait for the period of final adjustment, and perhaps are allowing their desire to get rid of the doctor to outstrip their convalescence. But when the two million blacks are questioned, one finds no desire that the Americans leave. It will require the presence of our forces in Haiti until another generation has come to maturity, a generation accustomed to the benefits and self-discipline of paternal government which functions for the benefit of all rather than the few.

It is stated that the election of Dartiguenave and all conduct of the polls, particularly the adoption of the new

constitution of May 12, 1918, has been brought about by the occupation at the point of the bayonet, particularly in the case of the new constitution, which contains a clause giving to resident foreigners the right to own real estate in Haiti, a provision made necessary if the United States is to assist in bringing outside capital into Haiti for the development of its natural resources. These claims are untrue. The elections were carried out at the polls in the presence of the gendarmerie and a few American marines and sailors. The presence of these armed men made it possible, for the first time, for the people to vote in accordance with their desires and without fear.

The civil officials in the forces of occupation are accused of holding up the salaries of Haitian officials in order to force them to sign documents and issue proclamations against their best judgment and the interests of Haiti. This is not so; but it was necessary to coerce certain Haitian officials who hesitated because they saw their best brand of graft disappearing into the discard, and in order to make them carry out the provisions of the treaty between the two governments and thus assure to the general populace the benefits which the treaty guaranteed.

Marine versus Bandit

Probably the conduct of the marines has called forth the most stinging criticisms in connection with our occupation. Military excesses have been charged against both the marines and gendarmerie, and it cannot be denied that certain excesses did take place. The wonder is that the little band of marines and gendarmerie, overwhelmingly outnumbered by banditry, did not go farther in this respect. The outstanding object of the occupation was the eradication of the century-old banditry existing throughout the entire country, and no operation by the Marine Corps has called for greater exercise of judgment, persistency, and rigid military justice than this Haitian

occupation; and never has the humane and sympathetic side of a military force been exhibited in greater measure than by the American marines in Haiti.

The usual policy of our government in sending the marines into action outnumbered by tens and hundreds was not changed in this instance. How it has been possible for a small force of about 1500 marines and 2500 gendarmerie to disband and disarm 30,000 Cacos is one of the wonders of military history. Under the circumstances there were casualties, but the most generous estimates place those casualties, running over a period of seven years, at about 1750. It is almost a miracle.

Practically all the testimony concerning the alleged depredations of the Marine Corps has been shown to be fallacious. Take one instance only, that of Lieutenant Louis Cekula, accused of having burned and destroyed the houses of various Haitians and confiscating the horses of others. What happened is this: While in command of troops in the district of Mirebalais, Cekula burned two houses in which he found large quantities of ammunition, a justifiable act. It was his duty as commander of troops in the field to destroy all enemy ammunition dumps wherever found. He also found in the field a number of horses abandoned by the Cacos, the animals having been stolen from peaceful Haitians by the bandits in the vicinity. These animals were turned over to marine quartermasters in order that the real owners might appear and identify their property.

In the case of Cekula the accusations were not only baseless, but absolutely vicious, because this particular officer is the most distinguished junior officer in the Marine Corps, and during the Great war he received from our government a Medal of Honor by action of Congress, another from the Navy Department, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Legion of Honor from France, and in addition to the Croix de Guerre, the supreme honor for

the soldier which the French people can bestow, the Medaille Militaire.

Such an individual could never descend to murder, robbery, and the burning of defenseless homes. One is glad to know that Cekula is now chief of police of the city of Santo Domingo, where his sense of justice and his ability as an organizer have been of immense benefit to the Dominicians.

The New Reign of Law and Order

The real work of the Marine Corps in Haiti has been the restoration of law and order throughout the country. Where, before their arrival, Haitians themselves could not traverse the country except under a military escort or heavily armed, it is now possible for anyone—Haitians, Americans, foreigners, and the poorest of the poor blacks —to go anywhere about Haiti unarmed without fear of molestation, and this for the first time in one hundred and eighteen years.

In striking the balance of accomplishment by American occupation, we find, first in importance, the maintenance of order, without which nothing can be done to alleviate the financial and other troubles which have brought Haiti to a state of governmental helplessness. Second in importance is the organization of the gendarmerie, which is patterned after that of France. In other words, cities and towns have no local police force, but depend upon the national gendarmerie for police duty. With a body of trained Haitian officers in the gendarmerie, our marines may be withdrawn from Haiti, with the possible exception of consular and legation guards.

Another great factor to our credit is the honest handling of revenues. External customs are collected by an American financial adviser and allocated to the payment of debts of the government. There is left in the hands of the Haitians the collection of certain internal

customs and other minor civil financial duties. Graft is still manifest in this connection, particularly with the exploitations of laborers sent to Cuba for work on the sugar plantations.

An accomplishment which means the solving of communication throughout the country is the establishment of a series of roads, some of which are now built between important centers and are suitable for automobile and truck travel. Work is progressing on other needed highways.

A measure which has had great bearing on the functioning of the government is the regular payment of government employees, who receive their pay direct, without being obliged to share it with political rulers and their henchmen.

Then comes the cleaning up of towns and the beginning of a sanitation program. This needed work has begun to bear fruit already in the elimination of epidemics and the betterment of the general health of the population, reducing infant mortality to a great degree. The sanitation and humane administration of the prison system is another accomplishment. The gendarmerie have charge of prisons and jails. Cruelty, starvation, and minor prison abuses have been eradicated.

The financial officers of the occupation have stabilized the exchange rates of the gourde and the dollar, which stops fluctuation and permits trading on an equitable basis for the poorer elements.

While these accomplishments may appear to be a weak list to those who criticize our occupation, they really constitute the difference between chaos and order.

The Work That Remains

Several important measures still remain, however, which must be put into effect if the Haitian riddle is to be solved quickly. First of these is the reorganization of the judiciary; honesty must be injected into the courts,

a thing which does not reign at the present time. Adequate schools must be provided. Only a small percentage of Haitians are educated, and they are well educated; while there are two million ignorant blacks who speak Creole, a patois which has no written characters. Until general education is brought about in the island, the maintenance of law and order and the transaction of business will be difficult.

The United States government should go the whole way in rendering assistance to the Haitians. Criticism of the official policy now existing would be removed if the United States government would make direct loans to the Haitians to cancel their foreign debts and bring about further reforms, thus doing away with transactions which involve international money-lenders. Preferential tariff on sugar importation into the United States should be extended to Haiti, which is now obliged to pay full ad valorem duty, whereas Cuba is given a 20 per cent reduction and Porto Rico ships sugar free into the United States. Jamaica is given a 50 per cent reduction by Canada and other British possessions. This places Haiti at a great disadvantage, and probably has something to do with the abandonment of the sugar industry in that country.

We have, of course, made mistakes in handling the Haitian situation. The greatest mistake is the lack of a consistent, definite policy by the State Department, while silly secrecy on the part of that department has caused the spreading of insidious propaganda, without contradiction, which has been hurtful to our régime in Haiti. There can be no harm done and much good may arise from giving to the public the facts concerning our occupation, and what we intend to do in the future. The record would be a matter of pride to the citizens of this country. Recent official statements make it evident that the intention of our government from now on is to render every possible aid to Haiti and to correct any evils which

now exist in our methods of carrying out the treaty between the two countries.

Constructive Work in Santo Domingo

In general details the problems of the United States in the occupation of Santo Domingo are similar to those in connection with Haiti, but there is this essential difference: the big problem in Haiti was the eradication of anarchy, while in Santo Domingo our forces have been engaged in putting down rebellion and carrying out a program of public works including the construction of roads, docks, customhouses, schools, and the establishment of national finances on a sound and economic basis.

The immediate cause of our occupancy and military control of Santo Domingo was the violation by that country of article 3 of its treaty with the United States, which provides that: "Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican government and the United States." But the real underlying reason for our intervention is the Monroe Doctrine, just as in the case of Haiti.

Our state department has not issued a statement which shall set at rest for all time the question of why we went into Santo Domingo. It is believed, however, by the Navy Department and the officials in charge of Santo Domingo that the foregoing reasons are true, and that they have acted in accordance therewith. Just why the State Department does not give out the facts in connection with this project is not known; and its silence has permitted the same class, and often the same persons, who are belaboring this country because of Haitian occupation to decry our efforts in Santo Domingo.

The successive issue of bonds and the arrangement for foreign loans by temporary revolutionary governments in Santo Domingo resulted in the piling of debt

upon debt until, in 1904, foreign nations—particularly England and France—exerted pressure for payment of debts due their citizens. The Dominican debt was out of all proportion to the size and wealth of the country, and the interest thereon had been continually defaulted.

Under pressure, the Dominicans appealed to the United States for relief, and arrangements were made to liquidate the debts by pledging the customs receipts of the large ports. On October 20, 1904, an American agent took charge of the Puerto Plata customhouse, and thus began our operations in Santo Domingo.

Reducing the Dominican Debt

The arrival of this American agent proved a signal for foreign nations with claims against the Dominican treasury to clamor for prompt payment and for control of certain customhouses pledged to them. Under threat of intervention by Spain and Germany, the Dominicans again appealed to the United States for assistance; and in 1905 a protocol between the two countries was approved and put into effect, providing for the collection of Dominican customs by direction of the United States, and for the allocation of certain revenue toward the ultimate cancellation of the debt. This scheme was successful. A new bond issue of $20,000,000 was made for converting the old debt, and arrangements were made with the foreign creditors by which the amounts of the debts were reduced about one-half.

In 1907 a new treaty was made between the United States and the Dominican Republic, features of the 1905 convention being retained, but with provision for complete control of finances. The customs were to be collected by a general receiver of Dominican customs, appointed by the United States; and in this treaty is the celebrated article 3.

Notwithstanding the treaty and the presence of American officials to carry it out, revolutions continued.

A boundary dispute with Haiti took place during a revolution in May, 1912, and marines were landed in October to guard the customhouses along the border. In September, 1913, another revolution took place, in which it was necessary for the United States to act as arbitrator. During the next two years there were successive rebellions, with a vast increase in the Dominican public debt in defiance of article 3.

Then occurred further revolutions beginning in May, 1916, which again called for the landing of United States marines to guarantee the free election of another president. The president was elected, but the United States refused to recognize him until assured of the maintenance of law and order and the honest control of finances under the terms of the treaty of 1907. This the new president refused to do. The United States requested a new treaty calling for the collection of customs under American auspices, the appointment of a financial adviser, and the establishment of a constabulary force officered by Americans. Carvajal, the new president, refused. The American authorities thereupon declined to pay over any of the republic's revenues to a government it did not recognize. A deadlock ensued. On June 5, 1916, American marines were landed, and after desultory skirmishing the revolutionary forces were induced to lay down their arms.

Following this, endeavors were made to induce the Dominican authorities to conduct the government in a manner satisfactory to the United States. Failing to do so, on November 29, 1916, a proclamation of military occupation was promulgated and a military governor was appointed by the United States. Since then the government of Santo Domingo has been conducted by armed forces of this country. Irritating regulations have been put in force by the military governor from time to time, but they were necessary to the conduct of a stable government and for the welfare of the public.

What American Occupation Has Achieved

Whatever criticisms may be aimed at this country for its conduct of Dominican affairs can best be answered by referring to the record since the beginning of our occupation, late in 1916.

The military government has set the country an unassailable example of good government, free from graft, giving a square deal to all, an administration absolutely above reproach. It has issued comprehensive sanitary and drug laws; it has sanitary officials in every section, and is establishing hospitals and dispensaries.

It has organized the collection of internal revenue, and these collections have now assumed great importance—increasing under honest, efficient management from an average of $700,000 prior to the occupation to receipts for nine months of 1920 of $5,063,300. Certain taxes bearing unfairly upon the poor and acting as a drag to business in general have been eliminated, and in their place the government has established the tax on property—the first attempt at direct taxation in the Dominican Republic.

The government has revised the customs tariff of 1910 and placed upon the free list transportation media, agricultural machinery and tools, industrial machinery, building material, and in general all articles necessary to the development of the republic. The rates of duty have been greatly reduced on articles of necessity, where the reductions would assist in lowering the cost of living.

The methods of the treasury department have been revolutionized; graft, dishonesty, and inefficiency have been eliminated. The settlement of the floating debt of the republic in an equitable and just manner has been completed. Inasmuch as there were approximately 9000 claims filed, and as the records of the treasury were inadequate, involved, and in some cases falsified, it is

easy to imagine the work involved. The debt was reduced from $15,000,000 to about $4,000,000.

The payments on the bonded indebtedness of the republic have been regularly made and in such amounts that it is evident that the $20,000,000 customs administration loan made in 1908 will be paid off long before it comes due. This progress has been assisted materially by the encouragement given to commerce by the government. As a means to improve the condition of Dominican products exported, the export duty has been conditionally removed when the products are properly prepared and packed for shipment. A standard label has been adopted for the important product, cacao, and the improvement in its condition has received favorable comment in the New York market. Every effort has been made to improve transportation facilities for commerce both ocean and inland.

The careful conserving of the public funds has permitted many millions to be assigned from the surplus, for roads, schools, public buildings, and port improvements. Every effort is being bent to the prompt completion of the roads, which will open much-needed communication between all parts of the republic and permit development of the interior. The properties of the state are gradually being placed in good condition, and warehouse facilities at all ports are being gradually increased.

A great advance has been made in the education of young people and in following comprehensive plans for providing schools and teachers so that every child of school age shall have instruction. There are 200,000 of these children, of whom 130,000 have now been provided with schools; and each year provision will be made for new schools and additional teachers.

Then the intermediate grades between the primary schools and the university will be supplied in as many places as they may be needed. At present those grades which constitute secondary education are provided for by

means of two large official high schools of the composite type, and six private secondary schools. Along with the high schools, provision has been made for training prospective teachers, and as a result the military government has been able to supply the more recently established schools with trained teachers. Special schools for professional training have been established with success in the leading towns, and as soon as funds are available art and craft schools for boys will be established. It is also expected that wherever a new school building is erected provision will be made for manual training, in order to make that aspect of education really universal.

A college of agriculture is being organized in connection with the agricultural experiment station at Jaina, near the city of Santo Domingo. Instruction in agriculture is furnished in all rural schools, where gardens are created for practical teaching. Vocational instruction is offered in both primary and secondary schools. The university has been completely reorganized, with laboratories provided and a good library under way.

Eighteen modern school buildings, costing approximately $800,000, are under construction or have been completed. The total enrollment of pupils in the republic in 1917 was about 12,000, while in 1920 it was approximately 110,000. It is most vital to future good government that the people should be taught to understand their civil duties and the value and power of the vote. At present the percentage of illiteracy is large, and it will take some years to educate the masses up to the point of understanding proper ideals.

The military government has provided for the construction of trunk highways across the republic, and these projects are being rapidly carried to completion. It is dredging and improving harbors and providing better facilities for commerce, as well as establishing regulations governing commerce. It has improved the postal system, reducing the time required for transmission of mail

and providing for its safe delivery. Arrangements are completed for installing a money-order system between eighteen offices in various parts of the republic, and a 24-hour service has been established at all telephone stations. Customhouses have been improved in various ports and new ones constructed in Santo Domingo City and Puerto Plata. The government-owned railroad has been repaired, new equipment purchased, and freight is now handled expeditiously.

The military government has enormously developed agriculture through the use of agricultural instructors and the distribution of modern machinery. Buildings are practically completed for an agricultural college to educate Dominicans for positions in charge of agricultural projects. Pure-bred animals have been imported to raise the quality of stock.

There has been developed a general land law which will restore order out of chaos in the matter of registration of land and the fixing of land titles. At present the mass of property holders, including the government, do not know what property, if any, they really own; the original grants had been greatly involved and inheritance has further complicated matters; titles have been lost or destroyed by accident, fraudulent titles in great quantity have been manufactured, and it will require the new land courts at least five years to put this essential matter upon a sure basis.

What Remains to Be Done

One might ask: "What fundamental things are necessary to complete the work of the present occupation, before the military government can be terminated?" And the answer is:

(a) To complete and perfect the projects above outlined;

(b) To promulgate certain basic laws essential to a

peaceful transfer of authority from the military government to a government by the people;

(c) To study and substitute for the present Napoleonic code the United States code of laws, as has been done in Porto Rico;

(d) To fix by arbitration the boundary line between Santo Domingo and Haiti;

(e) To complete the organization of the "Policia Nacional," to take over all military and police duties.

The question then arises: "When will the United States withdraw from Santo Domingo?" Complete withdrawal of our military forces is a matter of agreement between the two nations which should present no difficulties. It will be understood that the United States cannot forthwith abandon the Dominicans to the machinations of those who seek to regain their lost political prestige, these Dominicans who formerly conducted the financial exploitation of the country and who were the principals in revolutions just prior to American occupation. A stable government must be established and the *policia* must be trained and officered by the most intelligent military leaders of the republic.

The United States is committed to withdrawal, but only upon conditions prescribed by the State Department. As an apparent political expedient the military governor under President Wilson's administration issued a proclamation on December 23, 1920, outlining a plan of withdrawal; but little attention was paid to it. Again on June 14, 1921, the Harding government, by proclamation, proposed withdrawal based on what is known as the "Harding Plan." This involved ratification of all the acts of the military government, validation of the last loan of $2,500,000, and extension of the duties of the general receiver of customs to handle that loan, and to handle in addition part of the internal revenues upon failure of the customs revenue at any time to meet requirements;

and the Dominican government was required to ask the United States to organize the national police.

Again on July 27, 1921, the United States declared its intention of adhering to the terms of the proposed convention of evacuation as outlined in the proclamation of June 14, and also announced its intention to postpone the meeting of the primary assemblies summoned by order of the convention, until such time as the success of an election might be assured.

As before, the Dominicans did nothing to fulfill the provisions of these proclamations, and on March 6, in the present year, the military governor of Santo Domingo annulled them, at the same time announcing the determination of the United States to continue to operate the military government in accordance with the original proclamation of November 29, 1916, and stating that the military forces of the United States will continue their program of public works, public education, and the organization and training of the *policia,* and for these purposes will negotiate a new loan secured by Dominican customs revenues in such manner as not to increase present annual charges.

The proclamation also announced that upon the conclusion of the present program of public work, and when an adequate *policia* has been recruited and trained, the United States will consider complete withdrawal of its military forces—subject, however, to the election of a properly constituted Dominican government and the prior negotiation and ratification of a treaty providing for an extension of the duties of the general receiver of Dominican customs as appointed under the convention of 1907 until this proposed loan is paid off, and making such other provisions as may appear to be to the mutual advantage of the United States and the Dominican Republic. The whole matter of withdrawal from Santo Domingo hinges upon the foregoing proclamation.

BRIEF EXCERPTS

The evils of colonial exploitation will not disappear because the United States washes its hands of them.—*Editorial. New Republic.* 7:162. *June* 17, 1916.

Certain of the European powers have shown a disposition in recent years to intervene in Latin America on very slight grounds of provocation.—*John H. Latané. Atlantic Monthly.* 98:542. *October,* 1906.

Intervention in Mexican affairs is something we could not have avoided [in 1916]. We have never had an administration more adverse to intervention than that of Mr. Wilson.—*New Republic.* 8:207. *September* 30, 1916.

By all our standards and tests of prosperity Nicaragua and her people were far better off when we withdrew our marines in 1924 than they were when we went in.—*Frederick H. Gillett. Congressional Record.* 68:1706. *January* 15, 1927.

During the next four years [following 1911] Haiti had no less than six presidents. The first was blown up in the presidential palace, the second was probably poisoned, and the succeeding presidents were deposed by revolutions.—*Paul H. Douglas. Political Science Quarterly.* 42:232. *June,* 1927.

The conduct of the Mexican government toward American citizens and their property has been outrageous, confiscatory, and indefensible, part of it so unjust that we could hardly, with self-respect, submit the questions to arbitration.—*Frederick H. Gillett. Congressional Record.* 68:2232. *January* 25, 1927.

In Santo Domingo during the forty years prior to 1907 there had been sixteen revolutionary movements,

and complete political and economic demoralization had resulted.—*Charles E. Hughes. Report of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association.* 1923. *p.* 256.

The duty [to intervene in Haiti] devolved upon our government because European nations called upon the United States to bring order out of chaos and make Haiti solvent, or to waive the Monroe Doctrine and let them intervene to collect their debts and protect their nationals. —*Editorial. New York Times. July* 2, 1924.

It is subversive of justice among nations that any state should, in the exercise of its own freedom of action, directly endanger the peace and safety of any other which has done no wrong. Upon such an occurrence the state which is menaced is free to act. For the moment it is justified in disregarding the political independence of the aggressor and in so doing it may be guided by the requirements of its own defense.—*Charles C. Hyde. International Law.*

So long as revolution [in Mexico] succeeds to revolution in endless vista, we shall be compelled to keep an army mobilized along the border. We shall be exposed to serious complications with foreign powers, under the Monroe Doctrine. For, granted that we may look on calmly while our citizens are despoiled of their property, no other great power will do this.—*Editorial. New Republic.* 6:332. *April* 29, 1916.

I utterly disclaim, as unwarranted, the observations which occasionally have been made implying a claim on our part to superintend the affairs of our sister republics, to assert an overlordship, to consider the spread of our authority beyond our own domain as the aim of our policy, and to make our power the test of right in this hemisphere.—*Charles E. Hughes. Report of the*

Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association. 1923. *p.* 254.

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in the general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.—*Theodore Roosevelt. Foreign Relations.* 1905. *p.* xxxiv.

In a world as unified economically, public disorder anywhere is hateful, for it throws international industry out of gear. And since Mexico has been in turmoil since Diaz fell in 1910, the manufacturing nations of Europe and America demand that their supply of raw materials from Mexico—oil, hemp and lumber, besides coffee and tobacco—shall no longer be cut off through the failure of sucessive weak governments to maintain public order.—*William L. Rodgers. Forum.* 77:887. *June,* 1927.

The opinion of the world will permit the downtrodden classes anywhere a chance to right their wrongs by armed insurrection; but after reasonable opportunity, if they fail to make good, the world loses sympathy and expects them to take up their fetters and get to work again. Mexico has had fifteen years of disorder in the name of liberty, but has not yet developed a government strong enough to guarantee that security which international business demands.—*William L. Rodgers. Forum.* 77:887. *June,* 1927.

We must either abandon all attempt to secure peace, order, and good government in Mexico, or we must forcibly intervene for that purpose. Abandoning the attempt would necessitate notifying the European powers that

we no longer hold ourselves responsible for the protection of the persons and property of their citizens in Mexico, and it would inevitably follow that we must consent that they should themselves furnish protection by such methods as they deem expedient.—*Outlook.* 105:687. *November* 29, 1913.

The marines were sent into Nicaragua in 1910 in the administration of Mr. Taft. They were retained there until 1925, throughout the administration of Mr. Wilson, the administration of Mr. Harding, and into the administration of Mr. Coolidge. If here was any mistake at all, and I think it was a mistake, it was when the marines were brought away. The safety of foreign property in Nicaragua has depended for the last sixteen years on the presence of American marines in that country.—*Henry W. Temple. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January* 28, 1927. *p.* 66.

When European powers thus entrusted to us the performance of their own duty toward their own citizens [in Nicaragua], they showed in the clearest and most gratifying manner their respect for the validity of the Monroe Doctrine. Certainly it was incumbent upon us to show equal respect for it. We could not play the dog in the manger, by refusing either to grant such protection ourselves or to let the European powers do it. There is no exaggeration in saying that the moral integrity of the doctrine was at stake.—*North American Review.* 224:5 *March,* 1927.

No independent nation in America need have the slightest fear of aggression from the United States. It behooves each one to maintain order within its own borders and to discharge its just obligations to foreigners. When that is done, they can rest assured that, be they strong or weak, they have nothing to dread from outside interference. More and more the increasing inter-

dependence and complexity of international, political and economic relations render it incumbent on all civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world.—*Theodore Roosevelt. Message to Congress. December 2,* 1902. *p.* 11-12.

The United States, sincerely desirous of preserving relations of good understanding with all nations, cannot in silence permit any European interference on the North American continent, and should any such interference be attempted will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards. . . The nations of America are equally sovereign and independent with those of Europe. They possess the same rights, independent of all foreign interposition, to make war, to conclude peace, and to regulate their internal affairs. The people of the United States can not, therefore, view with indifference attempts of European powers to interfere with the independnt action of the nations on this continent.—*James K. Polk. Message ton Congress. December 2,* 1845.—*Richardson. Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Vol.* 4, *p.* 398.

The President's course [in intervening in Nicaragua] was justifiable on three major grounds, any one of which would have been sufficient alone. One was the necessity of protecting the lives and property of American citizens and the treaty rights of this country. Another ground was the need of vindicating the Monroe Doctrine by affording to the citizens of other countries the protection which their governments had requested. Finally, there was our moral obligation to regard a treaty, even one to which we were not ourselves technically but only morally a part, as something more than a scrap of paper. We shall not admit that it is wrong for America to pursue a course which those who affect to condemn would piously praise if it were done by the League of Nations.—*North American Review.* 224:4-5. *March,* 1927.

With regard to all Latin America there are but two courses open to us. The first would be to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and to cease to exercise the moral influence over the countries south of us which we undertook when the Monroe Doctrine was first pronounced. The second would be to adhere to the position then undertaken. It involves not only the announcement to European powers that we deprecate their acquirement of territory in the western hemisphere; it involves on our own part practically a moral protectorate for the western hemisphere. When we said to the foreign powers, "Hands off," we took upon ourselves the responsibility of seeing that the Latin nations of the south behave themselves so that the European nations could take their hands off—in other words, that the Central and South American states should act according to the laws of civilization.—*Editorial. Outlook.* 102:325-6. *October* 19, 1912.

We must conclude, from the manifest mission of the Teutonic nations, that interference in the affairs of not wholly barbaric, which have made some progress in state organization, but which manifest incapacity to solve the problem of political civilization with any degree of completeness, is a justifiable policy. No one can question that it is in the interest of the world's civilization that law and order and the true liberty consistent therewith shall reign everywhere upon the globe. A permanent inability on the part of state or semi-state to secure this status is a threat to civilization everywhere. Both for the sake of the half-barbarous state and in the interest of the rest of the world, a state or states, endowed with the capacity for political organization, may righteously assume sovereignty over, and undertake to create state order for, such a politically incompetent population. —*John W. Burgess. Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law. Vol.* 1, *p.* 47.

Since the Republic of Haiti gained its independence it has been the scene of almost continuous revolution. This is true of its recent history as well as of the earlier years. From 1886, when General Salomon completed his full presidential term, until 1915 every president except one has been overthrown by revolution, some escaping to nearby islands, others being assassinated. As the result of these successive revolutions the republic, by the summer of 1915, had reached a stage of exhaustion and devastation more complete than at any prior period of its existence. In 1914 and 1915 there were continuous disturbances, which culminated in the latter year in the murder by armed mobs of ex-President Oreste Zamor and President Sam, the latter having been dragged by a mob from the French legation, where he had taken refuge, and torn to pieces in the street.—*Charles E. Hughes. Report of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association.* 1923. *p.* 258.

During the past forty years revolutions and attempts at revolution have succeeded one another with monotonous regularity on the Isthmus, and again and again United States sailors and marines have been landed as they were landed in this instance and under similar instructions to protect the transit. One of these revolutions resulted in three years of warfare; and the aggregate of bloodshed and misery caused by them has been incalculable. The fact that in this last revolution not a life was lost, save that of the man killed by the shells of the Colombian gunboat, and no property destroyed, was due to the action which I have described. We, in effect, policed the Isthmus in the interests of its inhabitants and of our own national needs, and for the good of the entire civilized world. Failure to act as the administration acted would have meant great waste of life, great suffering, great destruction of property. — *Theodore*

Roosevelt. Message to Congress. January 4, 1904. *p.* 19-20.

The events of the last ten years [1908-1918] have made it clear that the relations between the United States and Central America must inevitably be closer than our relations with countries whose well-being is of less vital importance to us. However much we may dislike interfering in the internal affairs of our neighbors, we cannot remain indifferent when discord and misrule paralyze agriculture and commerce and threaten to provoke European intervention in a region where our political and economic interests are so great as they are in the republics bordering on the Caribbean sea. Both for our own security and for the sake of helping neighbors with whom we are united by powerful ties of proximity and common interests, we must inevitably use our influence more and more to aid the Central American republics in developing stable political institutions which will insure their prosperity and their continued independence.—*Dana G. Munro. The Five Republics of Central America. p.* 303.

It cannot in the long run prove possible for the United States to protect delinquent American nations from punishment for the non-performance of their duties unless she undertakes to make them perform their duties. People may theorize about this as much as they wish, but whenever a sufficiently strong outside nation becomes sufficiently aggrieved, then either that nation will act or the United States government itself will have to act. We were face to face at one period of my administration with this condition of affairs in Venezuela, when Germany, rather feebly backed by England, undertook a blockade against Venezuela to make Venezuela adopt the German and English view about certain agreements. There was real danger that the blockade would finally result in Germany's taking possession of certain cities

or customhouses. I succeeded, however, in getting all the parties in interest to submit their cases to The Hague Tribunal.—*Theodore Roosevelt. Autobiography. p.* 511-12.

Beginning with Dessalines in 1804, and surveying the political history of Haiti for a century, we find some twenty different presidents, of whom two were shot, one committed suicide, six were exiled, and several others were overthrown or forced to resign. The Dominican Republic can hardly boast of a better record than its unstable neighbor. In fact, in its checkered history of revolution and counter revolution, in its unending procession of presidents *de jure* and *de facto,* the Spanish end of the island stands well towards the top in any list of revolution-tossed republics. From 1844 to 1904 we find more than twenty different presidents, in spite of the fact that Heureaux served as president for fourteen years and Baez held office on five different occasions. No nation can maintain its credit under such conditions, and when Carlos Morales was inaugurated president of the Dominican Republic in 1904 the government was hopelessly bankrupt.—*Graham H. Stuart. Latin America and the United States. p.* 219.

It seems impossible to talk the great powers out of their fear of one another or to "Hague" them out of it. They'll never be persuaded to disarm. The only way left seems to be to find some common and useful work for these great armies to do. Something new must be found for them to do, some great unselfish task that they can do together. Nobody can lead in such a new era but the United States. May there not come such a chance in Mexico—to clean out bandits, yellow fever, malaria, hookworm—all to make the country healthful, safe for life and investment, and for orderly self-government at last? What we did in Cuba might thus be made the beginning of a new epoch in history—conquest for

the sole benefit of the conquered, worked out by a sanitary reformation. The new sanitation will reclaim all tropical lands; but the work must be first done by military power—probably from the outside. And the tropics cry out for sanitation, which is at first an essentially military task.—*Walter H. Page. Life and Letters of Walter H. Page. Vol.* 1, *p.* 272-3.

An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States and between the United States and the rest of the world. It would be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is greater than that of all other countries, while its relations to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defense, our unity, peace and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States. No other great power would under similar circumstances fail to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interest and welfare. It is the right and the duty of the United States to assert and maintain such supervision and authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus that connects North and South America as will protect our national interests. *Rutherford B. Hayes. Message to the Senate, March* 8, 1880.—*Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Vol.* 7, *p.* 586.

We warn other powers off. Under the Monroe Doctrine, any attempt by one of the European powers to interfere in the course of events in a Latin-American country would be regarded by us as an unfriendly act. The logical conclusion of the argument of our non-interventionists would be the renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. But none of them propose [sic] that. On the

contrary they are often as vociferous in contending that we should keep others from intervening as that we should not intervene ourselves. But we cannot say that other nations shall do nothing to protect their interests, and then do nothing ourselves. We have made ourselves sponsors for the maintenance of reasonable order and security for international interests in Latin America, and especially in the weaker republics of Central America. That area is one of turbulent politics and frequent conflicts between rival factions for power over countries inhabited largely by uneducated Indian and mixed populations. At the same time its resources make it important to the modern industrial world. It cannot be abandoned to the disorders of partisan feuds.—*Editorial. Outlook.* 145:72. *January* 19, 1927.

It is the literal truth that Nicaragua has never known a free election in our sense of the term. It remains literally true that no Nicaragua election has ever produced a result which was contrary to the wishes of the man or party which was in control of the government. Under such conditions the only way left to these people to dispossess from the government a man or a party which was in control of it was by force. In default of a violent revolt on the part of the people against their government, that government remained indefinitely in power. Revolution thus became and for nearly a century has constituted a regular part of their political system. The situation produced a vicious circle. The people, having been driven to violence in order to relieve themselves from the oppression of a dictator, have never cultivated the habit of peacefully abiding by the result of an election. They have come to realize that an election meant nothing. On the other hand, the revolutionary habit, once acquired, easily becomes habitual and inveterate, and the evils of continual revolution inevitably tended to concentrate into the hands of the gov-

ernment more and more arbitrary power.—*Henry L. Stimson. Saturday Evening Post.* 200:9. *October* 1, 1927.

During the early years of my administration Santo Domingo was in its usual condition of chronic revolution. There was always fighting, always plundering; and the succesful graspers for governmental power were always pawning ports and customhouses, or trying to put them up as guarantees for loans. Of course the foreigners who made loans under such conditions demanded exorbitant interest, and if they were Europeans expected their governments to stand by them. So utter was the disorder that on one occasion when Admiral Dewey landed to pay a call of ceremony on the president, he and his party were shot at by revolutionists in crossing the square, and had to return to the ships, leaving the call unpaid. There was default on the interest due to the creditors; and finally the latter insisted upon their governments intervening. Two or three of the European powers were endeavoring to arrange for concerted action, and I was finally notified that these powers intended to take and hold several of the seaports which held customhouses. This meant that unless I acted at once I would find foreign powers in partial possession of Santo Domingo; in which event the very individuals who, in the actual event deprecated the precaution taken to prevent such action, would have advocated extreme and violent measures to undo the effect of their own supineness.—*Theodore Roosevelt. Autobiography. p.* 507-8.

A syndicate headed by an American adventurer by the name of James P. McDonald, who came to Haiti as a free lance and not as an agent of any large American interest, secured a concession to build a railroad from Port-au-Prince to Cape Haitien. By the terms of the contract Haiti agreed to guarantee six per cent inter-

est on the cost of constructing the railroad, up to a maximum of $33,000 a mile. This pledged the Haitians to guarantee an annual payment of approximately $2,000 a mile. At the same time McDonald secured another contract which gave him fifteen miles of land on each side of the railroad for the cultivation of bananas. This would have amounted to over a third of the area of the country. He was also given an export monopoly of bananas. McDonald is believed to have secured the passage of this concession by bribing both houses of congress. He is also said to have bribed Antoine Simon [the president], but the latter for some reason delayed signing of the concession. McDonald is then said to have gone to the president's daughter, Celestine Simon, who had a great deal of influence over her father. Mr. McDonald is said to have told Celestine Simon that all the crown princesses of Europe had collections of jewels and to have inquired, "Where are yours?" Upon Mlle. Simon's replying that she had none, McDonald is supposed to have reached into his pocket, to have taken out a box and, opening it, to have held up a string of pearls for Mlle. Celestine to admire. The story runs that he then told her that the pearls were hers if and when her father signed the act granting the concessions. Antoine Simon signed the act that afternoon and the pearls were said to have been delivered to his daughter that evening. The cost of the pearls was five dollars. Thus a string of paste baubles is said to have precipitated Haiti into a financial venture which will in the end cost her people over eight millions of dollars.—*Paul H. Douglas. Political Science Quarterly.* 42:230. *June,* 1927.

The Monroe Doctrine must always be a paramount principle of our foreign policy, at least in so far as it deals with the countries of the Caribbean, because the exercise of political influence in that region by a foreign power could not but be a constant menace to our peace

and security. Several European nations, however, have extensive and legitimate interests in Central America, for many of their citizens reside and own property there and most of the foreign debt of each of the five republics is held in London or Paris. It is impossible to expect that they should remain inactive when these investments are made worthless by internal disorders or by the arbitrary action of irresponsible native rulers. Whatever one may think of the morality of the protection of foreign investments by intervention and the collection of public debts by force, this is the established practice of most civilized nations, and it is a practice which finds much justification in the conditions which exist in certain Central American countries. The landing of troops and the seizure of ports by a foreign power so near our shores and in the immediate vicinity of the Panama canal, can hardly fail to endanger the most vital interests of the United States, because of the manifold opportunities which such measures afford for exerting an influence over internal politics. The control of the policy of one of the Central American governments by a European chancellory or the grant of special economic privileges would of course be intolerable to the United States. That such consequences might follow even a simple intervention to enforce the payment of debts, is all too evident from events which have occurred in other parts of the world. The American government cannot, however, oppose measures adopted by European powers for the protection of the legitimate interests of their nationals without itself assuming a certain responsibility for the safeguarding of foreign life and property. Even supposing that it were sufficiently powerful to prevent other governments from intervening, it could hardly allow its protection to be made a cloak for the confiscation of foreign property and the repudiation of bonded debts by unscrupulous professional revolutionists like those who have at one time or another been in power in each of

the Central American countries.—*Dana G. Munro. The Five Republics of Central America. p.* 304-5.

Nicaragua has a population of 500,000 or 600,000 people, about the same as the city of Washington, mostly Indians, negroes, and mixed blood, with a small percentage of Spaniards who are generally the leaders. They are largely farmers and workers on banana plantations or in mines and lumber camps.

Our marines at the time of the election of 1924 had been there for many years, and, although the guard was slight—only about 100—yet I presume that the long peace was in some measure due to their presence. At any rate, during that time conditions in Nicaragua had enormously improved. When we went in there was political turbulence and the financial condition was desperate. There was a very large external debt and the revenues were precarious. By 1924 the currency, which had been almost worthless, had been reestablished and was at par. Their debt had been greatly reduced. The bank and the railroad had come into the hands of Nicaraguans, and there had been an era of quiet and order and prosperity. During that time—I think it generally will be admitted—there was no favoritism exercised by the United States toward our citizens there. There is no claim, I think, of any concessions or exploitation or monopolies by United States citizens, but while there were many of them there in business they simply shared the prosperity of the whole country.

In 1924, as I said, there was an election, and on the 1st of January, 1925, the new officers took control. At their request the marines, instead of being immediately withdrawn as had been expected, stayed on some months. But at last, in August, they were withdrawn. Within two months of their withdrawal a successful revolution broke out. We had hoped that this long period of peace and prosperity would in some measure have overcome

the tendency of Nicaragua toward revolution. And there was another influence which we had hoped would work toward the same end. In 1923, in Washington, under the auspices of the United States, a treaty was entered into between the five Central American nations which provided that in case of a successful revolution in any of those countries, none of the other nations would recognize the chiefs or leaders of the revolution as president. It was hoped that with the prospect of recognition taken away the inducement to revolution would be lessened. But neither expectation was realized. General Chamorro, an able stubborn soldier, who had long been active in Nicaraguan affairs, organized a revolution, captured the citadel with ease, and the whole government was soon under his control.—*Frederick H. Gillett. Congressional Record.* 68:1705. *January* 15, 1927.

NEGATIVE DISCUSSION

"DOLLAR DIPLOMACY" IN LATIN AMERICA[1]

The Monroe Doctrine is dead, and has been dead for many years. It lived only as long as its original spirit was followed. That spirit was the protection of human liberty. It was departed from by the United States in her policy toward Latin America fully twenty-five years ago. Today the Monroe Doctrine remains only as a diplomatic subterfuge. Its ideals are being used as a cloak to cover acts subversive of human liberty and contrary to the institutions and traditions of our nation.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century new political principles were challenging the existing order of society. The thirteen American colonies had revolted against the European monarchical system; the French Revolution had thrown down a firebrand into the heart of Europe itself; and in Central and South America republicanism was advancing by leaps and bounds. This new confession of political faith which was overturning the world was best expressed in our great Declaration of Independence, wherein it is stated that we dedicate ourselves and the soil of America to the principle that governments receive their powers "only from the consent of the governed."

The treaty of the Holy Alliance had been signed by the leading monarchs of Europe with the main objective of building a barricade against the spread of this new theory of government. President Monroe and other American statesmen of the time looked upon this alliance, with its determination to maintain and extend the Euro-

[1] By Senator Henrik Shipstead. *Current History.* 26: 882-7. September, 1927.

pean colonial system, as a threat against the freedom of the whole western continent.

Accordingly there was enunciated a policy on behalf of the United States government to the effect that any attempt on the part of European powers to interfere with the government of our sister republics in the western continent would be met with the armed resistance of the United States. In the same message President Monroe stated clearly what was to be the relation of the United States toward these republics. "It is still the true policy of the United States," he said, "to leave the parties [the sister republics] to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."

This was the famous Monroe Doctrine. No statement of public policy has ever at its inception been more purely and unselfishly dedicated to a political ideal. It has been restated again and again, by successive Presidents and Secretaries of State. For instance, John W. Foster, Secretary of State in Harrison's cabinet, in an address entitled "Misconceptions and Limitations of the Monroe Doctrine" before the American Society of International Law, said: "If the Monroe Doctrine did not contain a high moral principle of ethics and government which commanded the respect of all civilized nations we could not build a navy vast enough nor create an army large enough to enforce it against the hostile sentiment of the great powers of Europe."

During the past twenty-five years, however, much confusion has arisen regarding this historic policy, even in the minds of the statesmen who were conducting it. President Wilson, addressing the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile on October 27, 1913, said, in speaking of the Latin-American republics:

> They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other people in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater; and then securities were taken that destroyed the risk. An admirable arrangement for

those who were forcing the terms. I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation. . . We must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor. . . Human rights, national integrity and opportunity as against material interests—that is the issue which we now have to face. . . We must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity.

On August 30, 1923, Charles Evans Hughes, then Secretary of State in the Harding cabinet, in an address before the American Bar Association assembled in convention in Minneapolis, made these high professions:

The Monroe Doctrine does not attempt to establish a protectorate over Latin American States. . . I utterly disclaim, as unwarranted, the observations which occasionally have been made implying a claim on our part to superintend the affairs of our sister republics, to assert an overlordship, to consider the spread of our authority beyond our own domain as the aim of our policy and to make our power the test of right in this hemisphere. I oppose all such misconceived and unsound assertions and intimations. They do not express our national purpose; they belie our sincere friendship; they are false to the fundamental principles of our institutions and of our foreign policy which has sought to reflect, with rare exceptions, the ideals of liberty; they menace us by stimulating a distrust which has no real foundation. They find no sanction whatever in the Monroe Doctrine. There is room in this hemisphere without danger of collision, for complete recognition of that doctrine and the independent sovereignty of the Latin American republics.

What was the cause of the last two rather heated restatements of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine? What had been done since the lofty expressions of John W. Foster to call forth the above indictment from President Wilson or the violent protest of Mr. Hughes?

President Taft's View

Viallate, in his *Economic Imperialism* (page 62) quotes William Howard Taft, who in the meantime had also been President, as stating our Latin-American policy as follows: "While our policy should not be turned a hair's breadth from the straight path of justice, it may

well be made to include *intervention to secure for our merchants and our capitalists opportunity for profitable investments* which shall inure to the benefit of both countries." (Senate Hearings on "Foreign Loans," page 86. The italics are mine.)

It is to Theodore Roosevelt that we must look for a solution of this apparent contradiction of aims and policies. Under President Roosevelt the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine suffered a fundamental change. Until his administration the European powers had been left free to collect their own loans and protect their own nationals and property in the Latin-American countries. For over eighty years European governments had from time to time bombarded Latin-American ports and landed troops on Latin-American territory to enforce settlement of disputes; and our diplomacy had always allowed a reasonable time to elapse before the Monroe Doctrine was strictly applied. One of the chief results of this was that the enmity of the Latin-American republics rested on the direct aggressors.

But President Roosevelt initiated the policy of making the United States the "policeman of the western continent." The assumption which he raised was that it was our duty to use the military forces of the United States to insure the settlement of all disputes in Latin America and to protect European as well as American life and property there if they were endangered; that if we did not do so the European powers would come in, would stay permanently on the western continent, and so would threaten our national safety. The Monroe Doctrine was stretched to cover this new policy. At once Latin-American enmity began to rest on the United States alone, since we were the policeman in all difficulties.

Obviously, the Roosevelt policy itself was nothing but an indication of a fundamental change in our own attitude toward Latin America. From this, it was only a logical step to the policy of President Taft, Roosevelt's

successor—"intervention to secure for our merchants and our capitalists opportunity for profitable investments."

At the beginning of President Wilson's first administration we had made such progress in this direction and the Monroe Doctrine had been stretched so far that John Callan O'Laughlin, First Assistant Secretary of State under President Roosevelt, and at present editor of the *Army and Navy Journal,* could say in his *Imperilled America:* "We are seeking to make and we proudly call the Caribbean sea an American lake. . . We are maintaining a financial protectorate over Santo Domingo. We are applying the same system to Haiti and Nicaragua and have arranged for the purchase of the Danish West Indies. We kept a dictator out of Venezuela and drove another out of Nicaragua."

It is interesting to compare these various interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine with what our Latin-American policy actually has been at the times they were uttered and under the men who were uttering them. Mr. O'Laughlin states the case correctly for the day in which he was speaking. President Wilson, in spite of his fair words at Mobile, did nothing to arrest and everything to sustain the very policy in Latin America against which he was protesting. Mr. Hughes's policy will be referred to later. In terms of deeds, not words, our course in Latin America has advanced without a single deviation along the channel laid down for it by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft.

At the present time, instead of maintaining "financial protectorates" over our sister republics in Latin America, it would be more correct to say that we are holding them under a form of military and financial dictatorship. These various military and financial dictatorships have been imposed upon the Latin-American countries under successive administrations and by the force of American arms since 1909 up to and including the present day.

In the case of the Dominican Republic, we began by placing over her a military government under United States auspices, supported by the United States marines, with a lieutenant commander of the navy as the "officer administering the affairs of finance and commerce for the military government." To secure payment of six different American loans, the first in 1907 and the last in 1922, and a seventh loan in 1924, "a specific charge on the customs revenues" was made—these revenues to be "collected during the life of the bonds by an official appointed by the President of the United States." The "agreement" by which the revenues of the Dominican Republic were thus laid under mortgage was made between the United States and the United States-controlled military government in Santo Domingo—the bond issue bearing the guarantees of the military government as an "irrevocable obligation of the Dominican Republic." [Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, hearing before Subcommittee on "Foreign Loans," exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 et seq.].

Military Rule in Santo Domingo

A provisional government was established in Santo Domingo by the military governor, U. S. Admiral Robison, on October 21, 1922, to provide for holding elections and reorganizing the government. On July 12, 1924, General Horacio Vasquez, elected president for four years, was inaugurated. The convention between the United States and the new Vasquez government stipulated that all acts of the United States military for the past seventeen years be ratified, all American loans be assumed as public debt, including a sinking fund issue bearing 9 to 18 per cent interest, and a new refunding loan be accepted running up to $25,000,000. The customs receivership was extended until all loans were paid. Thus liberty in our sister republic of Santo Domingo has a new birth under a fresh mortgage of her public

revenues to American bankers, subject to foreclosure by intervention of the United States marines at any time when the public revenues fall short of bond and interest requirements.

We entered Haiti with our marines in 1915 during a revolution, under Wilson's first administration. The excuse under which we acted was that of restoring order in the country. By 1916 we had advanced so far with this program that the legislative body of the Haitian government was dissolved and deputies and senators were forcibly expelled by American marines, after which the legislative palace was padlocked. Shortly afterward an election was held under American auspices and a senate and chamber of deputies more to our liking were elected. The first duty of this new congress was to adopt a new constitution. The American legation made specific recommendations as to the clauses in this new constitution, and these were duly handed to the members of the new congress by the new Haitian government.

These "suggestions," however, were not universally adopted by the new congress; and again, in June of 1917, gendarmes under the command of a United States officer of marines invaded the legislative palace. The files were looted and all records pertaining to the work already done by the congress were taken away. Deputies and senators were expelled; the legislative palace was once more padlocked, and a military guard was sent to prevent the reassembling of the legislators.

Then, in 1918, a constitution for Haiti was drafted in Washington and forwarded to Haiti to be submitted to a vote of the people. A farcical "plebiscite" was held, with United States marine officers in command of gendarmes running the polling; blue ballots were for and red ballots were against, and the Haitian people, now thoroughly intimidated, were told to cast blue ballots. The American-written constitution was adopted by a vote of 99,000 to some scattering few hundreds in opposition.

This constitution, now in force, provides for the election of the president and of the members of congress by the people. It states that the election shall be called by the president on an even numbered year, but does not specify what year. The constitution also provides that until an election is called, the legislative authority shall be vested in a council of state composed of twenty-one members, all of whom are appointed by the president. This council of state is given authority to choose a president in case no popular election is held. Up to date no even numbered year has been found in which to hold an election, although nearly ten years have elapsed since the constitution went into force. All efforts on the part of patriotic Haitians to obtain a popular election have failed. The same president, Borno, is elected by the council of state year after year, he having himself appointed the council of state which elects him.

This Haitian incident gives an excellent cross-section of what our Latin-American policy has actually become, Under President Wilson, who said "we must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor," we entered Haiti by force, twice dissolved her legislative assembly at the point of the gun, wrote a constitution and forced it upon the Haitian people, and set up on Haitian soil a government contrary to all the principles of political freedom. This policy was in turn denounced by President Harding, but was carried on by him without change. It was being actively carried on by the State Department at the moment that Secretary of State Hughes was saying: *"I utterly disclaim, as unwarranted, the observations which occasionally have been made implying a claim on our part to superintend the affairs of our sister republics, to assert an overlordship, to consider the spread of our authority beyond our own domains as the aim of our policy, and to make our power the test of right in this hemisphere."*

Financial Dictatorship

South American republics have not escaped the net of American financial dictatorship. In Bolivia, on May 31, 1923, an issue of $33,000,000 of 25-year 8 per cent bonds were contracted to New York bankers, secured by a mortgage on all public revenues, as well as by stock of the Bolivia National Bank, with this unique redemption feature: "This bond is redeemable. . . on or after May 1, 1937, and not before, at the rate of 105 per cent of its par value and accrued interest." Bolivia's public revenues were, under the contract, placed in the control of a commission of three men, two of whom, including the chairman, were American bankers. A telegram from the United States Secretary of State certified to the execution of the instrument. (Exhibits 4, 5, 6, "Foreign Loans" Subcommittee, 1925-26.)

The case of the Salvador 1923 loan is only another illustration. The details are reported by the *New York Commercial and Financial Chronicle* (October 13 and 16, 1923), the *Diario Official* of El Salvador (February 20, 1923) and in the Senate Committee hearings on "Foreign Loans" (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, "Foreign Loans" Subcommittee, 1925-26). In that year Salvador contracted for new bond issues aggregating $18,500,000, at 8 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively, for American loans, and 6 per cent for a smaller British sterling loan. Secretary Hughes on October 16, 1923, issued the following statement defining the official relations of the State Department to the loan contract in question:

> The Department of State has no relation to the matter except with respect to facilitating the arbitration and determination of disputes that may arise between the parties, and the appointment of a collector of customs in case of default. . . The Secretary of State has consented to use his good offices in referring such disputes to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. . . Also at the request of the government of Salvador and the interested bankers, the Secretary of State has consented to assist in the selection of the collector of customs. . . The contract also provides that the collector of customs,

if appointed, will communicate to the Department of State for its records such regulations relating to the customs administration as may be prescribed, also as a monthly and annual report.

This means in plain terms that the Secretary of State, sixty days after his Minneapolis speech denying any "claim on our part to superintend the affairs of our sister republics," himself takes over the superintendence of the customs revenues of the Republic of Salvador. Six millions of the above mentioned bonds were sold to the president of the United Fruit Company at 88 per cent of par value, according to the contract approved by the State Department. Commenting on the whole transaction, the *Diario Official* of El Salvador states that President Molina at first withheld his approval "because of the clauses robbing Salvador of her financial autonomy." But at length, through public need in Salvador and pressure on the part of the United States, the contract was signed—on the centenary of the signing of the Monroe Doctrine.

The situation in Nicaragua, lately much in the public eye, is the same as elsewhere in Latin America, with several flagrant features of its own. The excuse of protecting our canal route concessions in Nicaragua is made the justification for controlling by force the internal affairs of that country, although no party or individual in Nicaragua has ever proposed to violate those concessions, and no sane man supposes that they could be violated by any Nicaraguan government. Behind all this is a shadow of financial intrigue and imposition so shameful that American public opinion would instinctively repudiate our Nicaraguan policy if the facts were widely known. These facts are a matter of record in the Senate hearings on Nicaragua, 1914, and on foreign loans, 1927.

Instances could be multiplied indefinitely; any well-informed American citizen is now aware that our present Latin-American policy is frankly one of economic aggression involving political dictatorship. It is still covered by the name of the Monroe Doctrine, but it has nothing in

common with that doctrine as originally enunciated. In Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala, as well as in the countries already mentioned, the American financial protectorate is based on the same general methods. American banking and bonding interests, trading corporations, public utilities, hemp and timber concessions, represent the principal enterprises for which our federal government practices "dollar diplomacy" in Latin America. The State Department acts as commercial agency and diplomatic referee. The Navy Department furnishes and directs the United States marines to enforce the terms of the contract. The customs revenues of the various republics are the principal securities for American loans and investments, and the levying and collection of these funds are placed in the hands of agents either directly or indirectly responsible to the United States government.

Benefits to Latin America

I am well aware of certain material advantages which we have brought about in Latin America during the past twenty-five years; I can from personal observation testify to the good roads, the harbor improvements, the sanitary betterment and the great work we have done in the elimination of preventable disease. But this is not the real question. If such things have not been achieved by the Latin-American countries themselves, and if they have been bought at the price of liberty and freedom, they are not worth while and will not endure.

The danger exists not only for Latin America, but quite as clearly for our own institutions at home. Since when have we entertained the pernicious theory that we must lift all neighboring countries to our own standards of life by military force and political control if need be? The moment that theory is actually accepted by the United States we shall have lost the cause for which the American Revolution was fought and in whose name our republic came into being as a nation. The country

that denies freedom abroad has lost freedom at home.

Old-fashioned as it may seem, I still believe in the principles of human liberty. I still believe that the only way for humanity to advance is for the different unit-peoples all over the world to be left to govern themselves. I still believe that right and justice as between nations can not only be professed, but can actually be practiced. I still believe in honest diplomacy, in doing what you promise, in calling a spade a spade.

In the case of the Monroe Doctrine we must do one of two things. Either we must abandon the idealism of the Monroe Doctrine altogether, acknowledging frankly what our acts are in Latin America and accepting the consequences both at home and abroad; or we must revive the idealism of the Monroe Doctrine, cleave to it in deeds as in words, and make our acts square with our professions.

It is a moral issue of first proportions. But moral issues work themselves out in practical results. The question before us is: Can we afford, in dollars and cents, to pursue our present policy in Latin America much longer? Has "dollar diplomacy" really paid, in terms of national gain? It undoubtedly has paid well for a few interests and individuals. But does all this actually pay to the general commercial enterprise of the nation? The following statistics for 1925 and 1926 are taken from the monthly summary of the Department of Commerce for the year ended December, 1926:

United States Exports To—	Calendar Year 1925.	1926.	Change (P. C.)
Mexico	$144,720,323	$134,994,164	— 7
Costa Rica	6,800,819	6,312,416	— 7
Honduras	9,569,937	7,540,286	—21
Nicaragua	7,434,539	6,264,272	—15
Salvador	9,193,916	9,556,521	+ 4
Cuba	198,655,032	160,487,680	—19
Dominican Rep.	17,763,577	14,572,376	—18
Haitian Rep.	13,711,585	10,857,427	—22
Total	$407,849,726	$350,585,142	—14

Thus, granting that the activities of the State Department and the employment of the United States marines have brought profits to perhaps a score of our leading industrial and financial interests, what is the gain to the general business of the country, to the merchants, manufacturers and farmers who have to work without the special services of the federal government in their behalf? Their lot seems to be to bear in taxation a share of the expense of a policy which benefits only a privileged few, a policy which netted a loss in trade of $57,200,000 to the nation, or 14 per cent of our total exports to eight of our sister Latin-American republics, in the calendar year just closed. These are serious figures. When an export trade shrinks at the rate of 14 per cent a year, something is radically wrong with the policy which controls it. It is time to face the question in all candor. Are we not "killing the goose that lays the golden egg" in Latin America?

The moral issue cannot be evaded. An unconscious boycott of American goods, based on growing enmity, is obviously beginning to operate in Latin America. And every day that our present hypocritical Latin-American policy goes on, we are losing prestige in the field of international relations; every day we are gaining the increased enmity of all the American continent outside our own borders.

The time may come when we shall need friends in the western continent, and elsewhere in the world. Before we discovered "dollar diplomacy" we had grown from a wilderness and a strip of seaboard to be the greatest and most respected nation in the world; we traded with all countries; our flag was welcomed wherever it went; and our trade followed the flag, because it was universally understood that behind our policy lay "a high moral principle of ethics and government." But today in Latin America we are rapidly dissipating the proud heritage of our traditions and history.

I said that both the spirit and the letter of the Monroe Doctrine were dead. No European power is likely ever again to attempt to colonize the American continent. If such a move were made, it would immediately call forth the armed opposition of the United States, regardless of the Monroe Doctrine or any other policy. Thus to keep the bare name of the Monroe Doctrine alive, when its only excuse is as a cover for ulterior acts and motives, is a constant source of irritation on the American continent. The most statesmanlike policy which the United States could pursue in Latin America today would be officially to revive in all their force and integrity, in terms of present-day conditions, the ideals which the Monroe Doctrine originally espoused.

CONQUEST OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO[2]

A documented narrative of the United States government's seizure of political and military control in the two island republics—Ruthless destruction of Dominican self-government—"The gravest breach of fundamental American traditions in our history."

Hispaniola, or Haiti, is the second largest island in the Antilles. It lies between Cuba and Porto Rico. It was discovered by Columbus, and the earliest Caucasian civilization in this hemisphere took root there. The tomb supposed to hold Columbus's ashes is in the Cathedral of Santo Domingo. The eastern two-thirds of the island is occupied by the Dominican Republic, the western one-third by the Republic of Haiti. The island was a French colony till 1804, although the French claims were frequently disputed by the Spaniards, who at various times established themselves in the eastern part, where language and culture remain Spanish. Following nearly fifteen years of struggle, which began when the Bastile fell, the natives achieved their independence. The revolution was unique in that the revolutionaries, who had formerly been

[2] By Enrest H. Gruening. *Current History.* 15: 885-96. March, 1922.

slaves, secured the political independence of their country and their personal freedom as well. The Republic of Haiti was established on January 1, 1804, the second republic in this hemisphere. In 1844 the eastern two-thirds of the island seceded and set up the Dominican Republic.

The Republic of Haiti continued free and independent until 1915. During that 111 years it had troublous history. For many years recognition of this little state was refused by other world powers, who feared the effect on their own slaves. The French, under the constant threat of reinvasion, succeeded in exacting a 90,000,000-franc indemnity for the property of Frenchmen ousted in Haiti's war of independence. Charles X of France then recognized the republic. American recognition did not come until the presidency of Abraham Lincoln. The relations with the United States from then on until 1915 amounted chiefly to negotiations and efforts to secure the cession of Mole St. Nicholas, a harbor at the northwestern extremity of the island. It controls the Windward Passage, and the United States desired it for a naval base. All these efforts failed. The Haitians adhered firmly to the constitutional provision, which forbade the cession of territory. During 1914 and 1915 the United States began overtures to Haiti of a different character. A treaty giving Americans control of the customs and finances was proposed. The cession of Mole St. Nicholas appears also in the earlier exchanges. In October, 1914, Mr. Bryan, Secretary of State, wrote to President Wilson, urging the immediate increase of our naval forces in Haitian waters, "not only for the purpose of protecting foreign interests, but also as an evidence of the earnest intention of this government to settle the unsatisfactory state of affairs which exists." More naval vessels were sent. At the same time the United States offered to assist the President of Haiti to put down certain threatened revolutionary disturbances. Certain con-

ditions were attached to this assistance, and it was refused. In November and December modifications of previous treaty drafts were again submitted. They proposed the control and administration of the Haitian customs by the United States, and were again refused.

On December 13, 1914, without warning to the Haitian government, American marines landed in the Haitian capital from the *U.S.S. Machias.* They went to the vaults of the National Bank of Haiti and carried away $500,000 in gold, the property of the Haitian national government, on deposit in the bank for the redemption of paper money. This procedure had been arranged between the Secretary of State and the American director of the National Bank of Haiti, who had been in charge since the control was secured by the National City Bank of New York in 1911. The reason assigned for the removal of the gold was that the bank feared revolutionary activities. The Haitian government protested to Washington against this violation of its sovereignty, but no explanation was ever given.

Landing of Marines

Subsequent negotiations brought about successive modifications, in Haiti's favor, of the proposed convention. The Haitians indicated willingness to secure American financial aid and friendly cooperation, but would not consent to any abdication of their sovereign rights, and so all negotiations came to naught. On July 1, 1915, the *U. S. S. Washington,* with Rear Admiral Caperton on board, arrived at Cape Haitien, on the north of the island. He established a field radio station ashore on July 3, and on the 9th landed marines from the *Washington* and bluejackets from the *Eagle.* On the 27th a revolution broke out in the capital. The president, Vilbrun Guillaume, seized some two hundred Haitians of the better class and threw them into prison. During the night, either at his order or that of the military commander of

the capital, General Oscar, these political prisoners were massacred. The next morning a mob of friends and relatives of the victims marched to the presidential palace. The president fled to the French legation. The mob pursued him there, dragged him and General Oscar out and cut them to pieces. Quiet was immediately restored. There was no looting and no other violence. A committee of safety took charge.

The same day, July 28, a regiment of marines was landed south of the capital. They took possession of all strategic points and disarmed the inhabitants. There was virtually no resistance. On August 10 Admiral Caperton issued the following proclamation:

> I am directed by the United States government to assure the Haitian people that the United States has no object in view except to insure, establish and help maintain Haitian independence and the establishment of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people. Every assistance will be given to the Haitian people in their attempt to secure these ends. *It is the intention to retain United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for this purpose.*

Meantime the election of the president by the legislative chambers was twice delayed at the request of Admiral Caperton, who was acting under orders from the State Department. Secretary Lansing's orders to the American minister were, in part, as follows:

> In order that no misunderstanding can possibly occur after election, it should be made perfectly clear to candidates, as soon as possible, and in advance of election, that the United States expects to be entrusted with the practical control of the customs and such financial control over the affairs of the Republic of Haiti as the United States may deem necessary for efficient administration.
>
> *The Government of the United States considers it a duty to support a constitutional government. It has no design upon the political and territorial integrity of Haiti.*

Forcible Intervention

In the interval granted, American naval officers in the capital sought a candidate who would agree in advance to sign and support any treaty which the United States

would submit. Several thus approached refused. Among them was the Hon. J. N. Léger, for many years Haitian minister at Washington, characterized by Lord Pauncefote as "the ablest diplomat I have ever known." He could not agree to such conditions, he said; he was "for Haiti, not for the United States." Finally, Philip Sudre Dartiguenave, president of the Senate, appeared as a candidate and offered, if elected, to accede to any terms the United States desired, including customs control and cession of Mole St. Nicholas. Upon being apprised of this fact, the Navy Department notified Admiral Caperton that it preferred the election of Dartiguenave. Under American supervision, he was elected on August 12.

Two days later, August 14, a draft of a treaty was presented. It contained all the clauses which the Haitians had rejected in previous peaceful negotiations—and further conditions. The American legation was instructed to advise the Haitian president that "the Haitian Congress will be pleased to pass forthwith a resolution authorizing the president-elect to conclude, *without modification,* the treaty submitted by you." The legation transmitted the message. Negotiations for the acceptance of the treaty were thenceforth carried on by Admiral Caperton and his naval officers, acting jointly with the legation. On August 19 Secretary Daniels ordered the seizure of the Haitian customhouses, adding: "Confer for purpose of having Dartiguenave solicit above action. Whether President requests or not, proceed." By September 2 the ten principal customhouses had been taken over. The Haitian government protested in the strongest terms in a series of notes, but in vain. Meanwhile strong opposition was evidenced in the Haitian cabinet and Congress against ratifying the treaty. On September 3 Admiral Caperton proclaimed martial law in the capital, and on September 8 sent the following message to Captain Durell, commanding the *Connecticut* at Cape Haitien:

Successful negotiation of treaty is predominant part of present mission. After encountering many difficulties, treaty situation at present looks more favorable than usual. This has been effected by the exercising of military pressure at propitious moment in negotiations. Yesterday two members of Cabinet who had blocked negotiations resigned. President himself believed to be anxious to conclude treaty. At present am holding up offensive operations and allowing President time to complete Cabinet and try again. Am therefore not yet ready to begin offensive operations at Cape Haitien, but will hold them in abeyance as additional pressure.

Meanwhile the customs receipts, virtually the sole revenue of the republic, were held up by Admiral Caperton, so that there were no funds for the payment of government salaries and other current expenses. On October 2 Admiral Caperton informed the President that "funds will be immediately available upon ratification of the treaty." The President replied that if funds were further withheld he could not face the growing opposition of the Senate, especially in view of the steadily increasing subjugation of the country by American naval forces, but would have to resign. Upon transmission of these facts to the Navy Department, the latter authorized the allowance of a certain weekly amount to the Haitian government to meet current expenses, saying also: "The question of payment of back salary will be settled by the department immediately after the ratification of the treaty." The Haitian cabinet had ratified on September 16. The Chamber of Deputies followed suit on October 6. During these weeks several messages from the Navy Department demanded to know the cause of the delay in securing ratification. On November 3 Admiral Caperton, in a statement to the President, said in part:

I have given Captain Edward L. Beach, who is my senior Captain, orders to do everything in his power to get the treaty ratified. Accordingly, he has repeatedly seen different members of the Senate treaty committee, as well as other prominent and influential Haitians, and has earnestly and forcefully presented to these members my reasons why the Senate committee should reconsider the report it has determined upon, and should recommend immediate ratification by the Senate of the treaty as it has

passed the House. Captain Beach will continue to work for this ratification. . . The only objections are unimportant technical points and abstract principles. These and other details can be arranged later.

On November 5 the Senate presented its objections to the treaty and demanded certain modifications. On November 7, following the election—to fill a vacancy—of a new Senator known to be favorable to the treaty, Admiral Caperton sent the *U.S.S. Hector* to transport him from Cape Haitien to Port-au-Prince. On November 10 Secretary Daniels sent the following message to Admiral Caperton:

. . . Arrange with President Dartiguenave that he call a cabinet meeting before the session of Senate which will pass upon ratification of treaty and request that you be permitted to appear before that meeting to make a statement to the President and to members of the cabinet. On your own authority state the following before these officers: "I have the honor to inform the President of Haiti and the members of his cabinet that I am personally gratified that public sentiment continues favorable to the treaty; that there is a strong demand from all classes for immediate ratification, and that the treaty will be ratified Thursday. I am sure that you gentlemen will understand my sentiment in this matter, and *I am confident if the treaty fails of ratification that my Government has intention to retain control in Haiti until the desired end is accomplished,* and that it will forthwith proceed to the complete pacification of Haiti so as to insure internal tranquillity necessary to such development of country and its industry as will afford relief to the starving populace now unemployed. . .

The message ended with the confidential memorandum, "It is expected that you will be able to make this sufficiently clear to remove all opposition and to secure immediate ratification."

The admiral carried out these instructions and the next day, November 11, the treaty was ratified by the Haitian Senate. It was ratified by the Senate of the United States the following May (1916).

Forced Labor Instituted

Since that episode, the history of Haiti under the American occupation has been, in the words of Admiral

Caperton, written at that time, "purely one of military control." Operations were conducted into the hills, particularly against all who offended against the existing régime. The military operations were, however, of minor consequence. The Haitians had no modern weapons. The annual report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1920 gives the Haitian killed for the ensuing years as follows:

1915	212	1918	35
1916	50	1919	1,861
1917	2	1920	90

During the same period one marine officer and twelve enlisted men were killed in action or died of wounds.

The tremendous rise in Haitian casualties in 1919 was due to the folowing conditions:

While determined opposition existed against the coming of the Americans, the Haitians are a naturally peaceful people. Almost without exception, they expected the American military occupation to be of short duration. (The categorical promises in the American proclamation confirmed that belief.) There had been little resistance. In 1917 the country was absolutely at peace. In 1918, however, the American military forces resurrected the old Haitian law of corvée. This law required Haitians to work a few days each year on the roads in their immediate community to keep the highways in repair. The occupation determined to build a military highway running from north to south through the island, and other roads, by forced labor. Even the moderate Haitian law had been in disuse for a long time. Testimony varies as to the extent of the abuses committed under the corvée, but it seems to be clearly proved that Haitians were (a) siezed wherever they could be found; (b) transported to other parts of the island; (c) compelled to work under guard, often for weeks; (d) placed under guard at night to prevent their escape; (e) subjected to physical violence if they resisted; (f) shot if they attempted to escape. Navy Department testimony admits that at least

a hundred were thus killed. Haitian figures are very much higher. It is also proved that the corvée continued in certain sections after it had been ordered discontinued by brigade headquarters.

In consequence of these repressive measures, a widespread revolt broke out against the American military forces. This was headed by Charlemagne Peralte, a formerly wealthy landowner of the town of Hinche and a former *chef d'arrondissement.* He was arrested, charged with revolutionary activities and sentenced by court-martial to a long term of imprisonment. He was subjected to ill treatment and forced to labor on the public streets in prison garb. He escaped and became the leader of the rapidly growing revolutionary forces. For many months he defied all efforts of the American troops, until finally he was captured and killed with the aid of treacherous natives and his body exposed in the market place at Cape Haitien. His followers were then rapidly exterminated.

The New Constitution

In the Spring of 1917 the draft of a new constitution was submitted to the Haitian Congress by the American officials. The chief provision of the new constitution was that it permitted foreigners to acquire land. Haitians had always considered that their greatest safety lay in their constitutional provision which had hitherto forbidden this. The new constitution centred unheard-of powers in the executive, enabling him, at his pleasure, to hold or postpone elections! Moreover, this Haitian constitution contained clauses ratifying all acts of the occupation, providing that no Haitian could be prosecuted either civilly or criminally for any act exectued by order of the occupation, and that the courts-martial of the occupation were the supreme law of the land. The Legislative Assembly refused to ratify. It proposed instead to pass the constitution without the most objectionable provisions. On June 17 General Eli K. Cole, U. S. M. C., chief of the

occupation, sent the following message to the Secretary of the Navy:

Antagonism National Assembly to foreign ownership land such that no endeavor short of dissolution will prevent passage constitution along lines reported my 13107. Have discussed matters fully with minister and General Butler. Suggest minister notify Haitian government that, in opinion our government, constitution prepared assembly will make impossible to bring about results contemplated articles 1 and 14 of treaty, and consequently our government cannot accept such constitution. If assembly refuses heed such warning, it will be necessary to dissolve assembly to prevent such passage. The number marines in Haiti should be increased by at least eight full companies to prevent disorders that may follow dissolution assembly.

On June 18 General Cole notified Washington, "unless contrary instructions received, if necessary to prevent passage proposed constitution, I intend dissolve National Assembly, through president, if possible, otherwise direct." In reply the Navy Department vested General Cole "with full discretionary power." The next day General Butler, acting under instructions from General Cole, dissolved the Assembly. The Haitian newspapers were ordered by General Cole to omit all comment on this action.

So universally hostile was public sentiment to the proposed constitution that it was evident that no Haitian Legislature could be elected that would vote for it. No authority existed in consequence to pass such a constitution. But in the course of the following twelve months the occupation decided to arrange a plebiscite for that purpose. For such a plebiscite neither precedent nor authority existed in Haiti. The following is a specimen order indicating the manner in which this plebiscite was conducted:

Republic of Haiti,
Port-de-Paix, June 11, 1918.

In accordance with the decree of his excellency the president of the republic, published in *The Monitor* of May 8 last, all the citizens of this commune of Port-de-Paix are asked to be present tomorrow at the Hotel Communal to vote on the new constitu-

tion, published in *The Monitor* of the same date. Any abstention from such a solemn occasion will be considered an unpatriotic—that is, an anti-American occupation—act. Maintenance of order will be assured by the gendarmerie [under chief, General Williams, American marine officer], and the ballots will be distributed by a member of the administration of finances [an American marine officer] opposite the voting offices, &c.

The voting is described by a Baptist missionary, the Rev. L. Ton Evans. (Page 191 *et seq.*, Official Record, Senate Resolution 112, Inquiry Into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo.) He states that "the natives were terror-stricken." Further, all the pink slips marked *non* (no) were tied up and only the white slips with *oui* (yes) were handled on the table before which the so-called voters were driven in.

The following passages are taken from the record:

Senator POMERENE—What was the vote at St. Marc? What was the result there?

Mr. EVANS—There was no means of knowing. The natives felt no interest whatever, as it was known from announcement by the occupation (through Dartiguenave), that whatever the American marines did no one dared to oppose or even question. All slips were taken to Port-au-Prince and published there. It was looked upon as a mere farce, and lowered the prestige of the United States among Haitians who seriously think, and even Europeans, and, indeed, Americans, who felt that the American occupation had gone the limit, and made itself a laughing stock and looked contemptible. No votes were reckoned to my knowledge at either town, but all taken in charge of American marines to Port-au-Prince.

Senator POMERENE—No, no; when the votes were counted, what was the result of the election at that place?

Mr. EVANS—All were taken to Port-au-Prince and published there, but whether they gave numbers supposed to be cast at each town, I know not, and, like others, cared little, as I became disgusted and felt disgraced that such was possible in the name of the United States and by any one who called himself an American!

Senator KING—Sixty-three thousand for, and two or three hundred against in all the island.[3]

Mr. EVANS—You mean the republic, Senator. They might have published the vote as 1,000,000, or as 63,000; there is no one to contradict or to explain, for the American marines managed the whole business. I do not believe that any slips were put in

[3] The official figures as published at the beginning of the new constitution are 98,294, yes; 769, no.

by Haitians, and that out of shame certain marines cast in a couple of hundreds. This is the belief in Haiti. I denounced it then, and denounce it more still today, as the greatest mockery I ever saw in my life, and never thought we had Americans and marine officers that could sink so low before these gendarmes and poor Haitians, whose respect, implicit confidence and highest admiration should be the aim of every military officer and true American, who despises anything like hypocrisy and scorns deceit and fraud.

Senator POMERENE—What part did these educated Haitians take in the election?

Mr. EVANS—The great majority—apart from those who happened, as stated, to be officially and financially connected with the occupation, so-called Haitian government, sugar and castor-oil corporations, schools, courts, prisons, customs, railroads, &c.—abstained and kept clear of the voting places, though in so doing they ran the risk of being blacklisted, run into prison on slightest suspicion or provocation, &c.

Had they gone they would have asked for the pink slip with *non,* which would have decided their lot with the occupation. It was a hard and trying situation, but many were heroic enough to stand the test, whatever have been the consequences since.

This testimony has remained uncontradicted, although virtually every high marine officer who served in Haiti testified subsequently, viz., General Butler, General Waller, General Cole, General Catlin, Colonel Williams (the General Williams of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti mentioned in the above plebiscite order), as well as Admiral Caperton and General Barnett, who was Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1914 to 1920.

THE HAITIAN MEMORIAL

Today Haiti remains under martial law, but recently the situation there began to attract attention in the United States and elsewhere. In the summer of 1920, following the publication of articles in *The Nation,* President Harding made of the Haitian and Dominican situations a campaign issue. Secretary Daniels denied the accusation of wrongdoing by the Democratic administration, but sent a naval commission to investigate. This commission found nothing materially discreditable to report. On October 2, 1920, Major Gen. Barnett, commandant of

the Marine Corps, expressed himself as shocked by "the indiscriminate killings in Haiti." Another naval commission was sent to investigate, and it reported approximately as had the first. Shortly afterward a delegation of representative Haitian citizens came to the United States, representing the Haitian people, and particularly the popular organization known as the Union Patriotique d'Haiti. These delegates, refused an audience by the State Department, composed a detailed memorial—with documents—which was sent to the Secretary of State and to the Chairman of the Committees on Foreign Relations of the Senate and House. It was also read into the official record last August of the Senatorial Commission of Inquiry, of which Senator Medill McCormick was chairman. This memorial makes charges of administrative incompetence and malfeasance by the civilian officials. It lists twenty-five specimen atrocities which, it charges, were committed by the American military and were vainly called to the attention of the naval commission of inquiry headed by Admiral Mayo. The memorial makes the following conclusion (p. 32 and 33 of the record of the Senatorial Commission of Inquiry):

> The Haitian republic was the second nation of the New World—second only to the United States—to conquer its national independence. We have our own history, our own traditions, customs and national spirit, our own institutions, laws and social and political organization, our own culture, our own literature (French language), and our own religion. For 111 years the little Haitian nation has managed its own affairs; for 111 years it has made the necessary effort for its material, intellectual and moral development as well as any other nation—better than any other nation, because it has been from the start absolutely alone in its difficult task, without any aid from the outside bearing with it along the harsh road of civilization the glorious misery of its beginning. And then, one fine day, under the merest pretext, without any possible explanation or justification on the grounds of violation of any American right or interest, American forces landed on our national territory and actually abolished the sovereignty and independence of the Haitian republic.
>
> We have just given an account of the chief aspects of the American military occupation in our country since July 28, 1915.

It is the most terrible régime of military autocracy which has ever been carried on in the name of the great American democracy.

The Haitian people, during these last five years, have passed through such sacrifices, tortures, destructions, humiliations and misery as have never before been known in the course of their unhappy history.

The American government, in spite of the attitude of wisdom, moderation, and even submission, which it has always found in dealing with the Haitian government, has never lived up to any of the agreements which it solemnly entered into with regard to the Haitian people.

The Haitian people are entitled to reparations for the wrongs and injuries committed against them.

The great American people can only honor themselves and rise in universal esteem by hastening the restoration of justice—of all the justice due a weak and friendly nation which the agents of its government have systematically abused.

Reparations are due for the human lives that have been taken and for the property that has been destroyed or abstracted. An impartial investigation will provide the necessary statements and supply the basis for the estimates to be determined.

The present political aspirations of the Haitian nation have been formulated by the Union Patriotique, a comprehensive national association which, through its numerous branches throughout the country and in all levels of society, includes virtually all the Haitian people. The undersigned have been sent to the United States by this association to make the will of the country clearly known.

The Haitian people are filled with peaceful sentiments, but there is no doubt that they intend to recover definitely the administration of their own affairs and to resume under their own responsibility the entire life of the country, with full sovereignty and independence. They will never rest until they have obtained them.

The salient aspirations of the Haitian people are summarized as follows:

1. Immediate abolition of martial law and courts-martial.
2. Immediate reorganization of the Haitian police and military forces, and withdrawal within a short period of the United States military occupation.
3. Abrogation of the convention of 1915.
4. Convocation, within a short period, of a constituent assembly, with all the guarantees of electoral liberty.

But the Haitian people desire too strongly the friendship of the great American people, and are too anxious for their own material, intellectual and moral development, not to wish and bespeak for themselves the impartial and altruistic aid of the United States government. They have urgent needs, vital to the development of the natural resources of the country and essential

to the full expansion of its agricultural, industrial and commercial activity. The satisfying of these needs is absolutely necessary for the continued progress of the Haitian community.

Nothing would serve better to bring about the speedy reestablishment of normal relations between the two countries than the friendly aid of the United States government in the economic prosperity and social progress of the Haitian republic.

Situation in Santo Domingo

The Dominican situation may be said to have begun on November 19, 1915. On that date, one week after the final ratification by Haiti of the treaty giving the United States military and financial control, a virtually similar draft was presented to President Jimenez of the Dominican Republic. It was promptly and emphatically rejected. The following April, after a disagreement between President Jimenez and his Minister of War, Desiderio Arias, impeachment proceedings were entered upon against the president in the Dominican Congress. On May 4, 1916, during some revolutionary disturbance, and without warning to the Dominican government, American marines were landed near Santo Domingo. The American minister at that time gave assurance to the Dominican government that these forces were solely for the purpose of protecting the American legation. On May 7 these forces had increased so greatly that it appeared evident to President Jimenez that they were there for another purpose, and he resigned in protest against this violation of Dominican sovereignty.

The next day, General Arias, the Minister of War, was invited and escorted personally by the American minister to the American legation, where he was induced to enter a conference with Federico Velasquez. It was proposed to Arias that, in return for certain favors and remunerations, he would use his influence and the military under his command to aid the election of Velasquez. Arias refused, declining to abet the scheme to foist illegally and by force majeure an undesired candidate on the Dominican people. On May 11 Federico En-

riquez y Carvajal was nominated for president of the republic in the Chamber of Deputies and confirmed by the Senate on May 23. On May 13 the American minister formally notified the Dominican government of the intention of the United States government to land a large armed force and to occupy the capital, and threatening bombardment of the city and unrestricted firing upon the natives if in any way they interfered with the landing of the American forces. The next day, May 18, the American minister notified the Dominican Congress that Federico Enriquez y Carvajal was not acceptable to the United States as president.

On June 5 the American minister gave formal notice to the Dominican government that the receiver general of customs would take charge of all the finances and funds of the government. Under the treaty of 1907 with the United States, an American appointed by the United States government was in charge of the collection of customs of the Dominican Republic. It was his duty under this treaty to turn in all but the sum of $100,000 monthly to the Dominican government. All above this $100,000 was to go, one half to the Dominican government for its own uses, the other half to the sinking fund of the loan contracted under the treaty. The Dominican government instantly and vigorously protested against this procedure. On June 11 Federico Enriquez y Carvajal, bowing to the expressed opposition of the United States, declined election to the presidency. His resignation was accepted by the Dominican Congress, which then decided to elect as president a man who had had no affiliations with any of the existing political parties, namely, Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, who had been practicing medicine in Santiago de Cuba for the previous twelve years. On June 16, following orders from Washington, the receiver general of customs took charge of all revenues—internal, as well as the customs revenues which alone were stipulated in the treaty of 1907—and set himself

up as disbursing agent of the republic. Dominicans made vigorous protest, pointing out that this action was in violation of the treaty of 1907.

The receiver general admitted his inability to conform to the wishes of the Dominican government, stating that his orders were received directly from the State Department of the United States, and that he had but to obey. On July 31 Dr. Henriquez was inaugurated as president. No objection was raised by the United States to his election. On August 18 notice was sent to the Dominican government by the American authorities that no money coming into the hands of the receiver general would be paid to the Dominican government. On August 23 the American minister presented a note demanding the acquiescence of the Dominican government to the conditions rejected November 19 of the preceding year by President Jimenez—virtually the same treaty then in effect in Haiti. The Dominican government refused. On October 17, following instructions from Washington, the receiver general formally refused recognition to the Dominican budget to pay the salaries of its officials and employes and the pensions of its widows and orphans. On November 29, 1916, a "proclamation of occupation" was made by the United States. It was issued over the signature of Captain H. S. Knapp, U. S. N., who subsequently declared himself to be "supreme legislator, supreme judge, supreme executor."

Held in Iron Bondage

For five years Americans held Santo Domingo in the iron bondage of martial law. Public meetings were forbidden, the press censored, protestors court-martialed. Every governmental function was taken over by American marines. During this period, also, the occupation built excellent highways, cleaned up towns, and greatly improved the school system, using Dominican funds for these ends. Many Dominicans were also killed in action.

The occupation holds all Dominicans killed in action to be bandits; the Dominicans consider them patriots. The Dominicans have never ceased to protest before the world against the occupation of their country. The sentence of imprisonment and fine of the poet, Fabio Fiallo, because of his article of protest against the invasion of his country, attracted wide attention in Latin America.

A plan for withdrawal was proposed by the Wilson administration in December, 1920. A similar plan was proposed by the Harding administration through the proclamation issued by the military governor on June 14, 1921. The plan set a date eight months ahead for the withdrawal of the American forces and the restoration of the national Dominican government. It constituted the military governor the provisional Dominican executive, gave him the power to promulgate an electoral law and to convene the people to the elections. It also gave him the power to name the Dominicans who, together with representatives of the American government, would agree: (1) to ratify all acts of the military government; (2) to entrust the command and organization of the Dominican forces to American officials.

This plan aroused the unanimous resentment of the Dominican people. They protested solemnly that they desired their freedom without qualifications. They refused to ratify the acts of the military government, which included a loan that carried interest varying from 9 to 19 per cent. As the cooperation of the Dominicans was necessary, the plan went by the board.

That is the status of the Dominican Republic to date. It asks its unconditional sovereignty as an absolute right. It desires that the Americans retire and leave them in peace.

The contentions of the American government, justifying its occupation of the Dominican Republic, are vigorously denied by the Dominicans. They assert, first, that they have not violated the treaty of 1907 by increasing

the public debt, and that the indebtedness to the United States has been paid far in excess of requirements (they present the official figures to prove these assertions); second, that the revolutionary disturbances were of a purely political and minor character, which in no sense affected American lives or property, or the execution of the treaty of 1907; third, that granting a difference of interpretation of these two preceding issues, nothing in law or morality justified the aggression and conquest practiced by the United States.

Summary and Indictment

To sum up: The cases of Haiti and Santo Domingo are closely analogous. In both instances the United States clearly desired to gain control of these republics. In both instances, when attempts to secure this by peaceable means failed, advantage was taken of internal disorder to land forces. Then what could not be obtained by peaceable means was sought by military pressure. In Haiti the United States was able to force through a treaty, and today this treaty is held up as the sanction for all America's acts in that republic since. In Santo Domingo the treaty could not be forced through, and a ruthless destruction of all forms of Dominican self-government followed. These acts are indisputably proved by the record. They comprise the gravest breach of fundamental American traditions in our history. They violate international law. They violate the Constitution of the United States. They violate every treaty involved. They constitute essentially the same kind of aggression as that which Germany practiced against Belgium in 1914—and without even the invalid excuse of "military necessity." While we were preparing to enter the struggle against Germany to oppose ruthless military conquest we were secretly practicing it.

The activities in Haiti and Santo Domingo were guarded by a rigid military censorship and were prac-

tically unknown in the United States until 1920. They are not widely known today.

The people of both these countries are clamoring for their independence. The Haitians demand the abrogation of the convention of 1915, imposed upon them by force, and the withdrawal of the occupation. In the next few weeks the Senate of the United States will have the opportunity to decide whether or not the nation will adhere to the traditions in which it was conceived and grew to greatness. The issue is far larger than Haiti and Santo Domingo. Shall the United States follow the course of Japan in Korea, of England in Egypt, of Germany in Belgium? Or shall it follow the path of honor, justice, fair dealing and common decency to weak and friendly neighbor states? We are at the parting of the ways. Haiti and Santo Domingo are the acid test.

OUR ENCROACHMENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1898-1927[4]

A glance at the table following, showing American activities in the Caribbean region, provides some interesting facts. In about thirty years we have created two new republics—Cuba and Panama; converted both of them and three other Latin-American countries—the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti—into virtual protectorates; intervened by force at least thirty times in the internal affairs of nine supposedly sovereign and independent nations; made the period of intervention last anywhere from a few days to a dozen years; enlarged our investments from a paltry two or three hundred millions of dollars to the tidy sum of upwards of three billions, and installed in four states our own collectors of customs to insure payment. Incidentally, we have annexed Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands, built a canal, secured an option to construct another and gathered in several naval stations.

[4] By William R. Shepherd. *New Republic.* 49:266-9. January 26, 1927.

The causes for our entry into so close a relationship with the five little republics may easily be recalled. In 1898 the United States declared war on Spain for the liberation of Cuba from what we regarded as Spanish misrule. The immediate motive, beyond doubt, was one of good will toward a people suffering from oppression in an island that lay very near our own shores.

Meanwhile Americans had long been cherishing the idea of constructing a canal somewhere in the nether portion of the North American continent. Whether it should be run through the Colombian province of Panama or through the Republic of Nicaragua was the question until 1903, when a timely revolution in the province solved the difficulty in favor of the Panama route. Thereafter it became a foregone conclusion that the second new nation which we have godfathered within five years would grant to the United States all the rights and privileges which the building and control of a canal might warrant.

Hardly had the construction of the new waterway begun, when the financial distress of another small state, the Dominican Republic, awoke fears on the part of the American government lest the situation prompt European creditors to take measures for a collection of their debts, likely to impinge upon some one of our numerous interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. Hence, in order to forestall that possibility, in 1905 the United States assumed financial guardianship itself.

From the Dominican Republic the next step was directed, in 1912, to Nicaragua. Here two motives came into operation. One was the determination of the United States not to allow an option to be acquired by some foreign power for the construction of a canal that would not only compete with the Panama waterway, but would also be a potential menace to our control of the latter. The other motive was, to quiet political disturbances that threatened injury to Americans and foreigners and their

respective property. The fact that the gentleman who in 1927 claims to be president of Nicaragua happens to be the same aspirant whom we installed in office fifteen years ago lends enchantment to the present tangle there.

In 1915 the Colossus of the North again stepped back on to the island for the eastern end of which he had already assumed the financial management. At the western end lay a Negro republic called Haiti, squirming under a series of despotic presidencies tempered by frequent assassination. Here an unusually horrible slaughter of political prisoners and the violation of a foreign legation compelled the United States to intervene, for fear the European nation concerned might do something detrimental, again, to the Monroe Doctrine. Although the protection of foreign and American lives and property was involved, the basic motive for the landing of marines in Haiti, as in the case of Cuba, was humanitarian.

Whatever the direct motives for these several courses of action, through them all has run the advancement of our own economic, as well as political, welfare. This country of ours has become powerful in proportion as its southern neighbors have remained weak. We have known how to utilize our resources; they have not. Because they have not and we want what lies in their soil and under it, our captains of industry, aided by the government of the United States, have put themselves increasingly into the position of showing them how the things nature has provided should be turned to account.

In our virtual protectorates we have followed two quite distinct procedures: one toward Cuba, Panama and Nicaragua; the other toward the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Both of them have the same aims: to encourage American economic enterprise and to promote the material benefit of the peoples concerned. Neither course of action has been motivated so much by a determination to exact reparation for injury committed, as by a desire to prevent such injury. Lest Americans and their property,

as well as foreigners and theirs, should suffer damage and the Monroe Doctrine be exposed to infringement, the plan has been to avert the possibility of either. Commonly, the intervention has been asked by interested parties, native, American or European, with or without sufficient reason. Whether the inhabitants of the countries affected relish it or not, is something not taken into account.

So far as Cuba, Panama and Nicaragua are concerned, the United States has aided the local authorities to maintain order and adopt other salutary measures for the general objects in view. Since 1909 Cuba has remained under its own rulers. The same has always been true of Panama and Nicaragua, even if the personnel of the functionaries has sometimes been determined by the United States.

Toward the Dominican Republic and Haiti, on the other hand, the action taken has been quite ruthless. Because of political commotions and a disposition to incur indebtedness beyond what the American guardian thought proper, in 1916 the Dominican government was practically abolished. In its place an American military régime was set up, which stayed on until 1924. Haiti, a year earlier, had undergone a similar fate, except that the native administration still continues under the military supervision of an American officer, now styled a "high commissioner."

From the standpoint of the rights presumed to attach to states which are reputed to be "sovereign and independent," certainly the plight of the Dominican Republic and Haiti is much less enviable than that of their three fellows. To be sure, the American military rulers have built roads and railways, improved ports, bettered sanitary conditions and enlarged educational facilities, but their action has been accompanied at times by harshness and cruelty to individual natives, especially in the Negro republic. Both of the little states, also, have been compelled to assent to treaties providing for huge loans.

These advances from American financiers will contribute, no doubt, to the material welfare of the countries concerned; so they will to our own. Doubtless, too, the opposition to American influence there and in all of the republics under our tutelage where similar loans have been the order of the day, is political, rather than the result of actual wrongs inflicted. But is political opposition on the part of reluctant wards toward their self-appointed mentor nothing of any moment?

A much more intriguing question now presents itself. Is there a possible ratio between the extent of American governmental control and the manner of its exercise, on the one side, and the increase in American investments, on the other? Has there been any apparent connection between the growth of American financial interests and a tendency of our Department of State to practice, through diplomatic pressure, with marines posted in the background, political interference in the internal affairs of the republics? Let us cite the case of Cuba.

In the joint resolution of April, 1898, which brought on the war with Spain, Congress declared that the United States disclaimed any intention to exercise control over Cuba except for its pacification, and would leave the government and control of the island to its own people. Events, however, soon indicated that the government was indeed to be left, but not the control. Three years later, the so-called "Platt amendment," which the Cubans were obliged to incorporate into their constitution, provided among other things that the United States was to possess the right to intervene in the republic for the preservation of its independence and the maintenance of a government capable of protecting life, property and individual liberty, and that Cuba should contract no excessive indebtedness. The former of these stipulations the United States has enforced on several occasions. The application of the latter appears to stand in quite a different category,

although in essence the ultimate means employed have been the same.

In 1904 the first loan contract made with Cuba by an American banking house provided for no financial administration by Americans, and contained no allusions to the government of the United States as a party to the agreement. From that time onward, moreover, such contracts regularly have stipulated that the amount loaned constitutes a lien upon the customs revenue, or even on all sources of public income, of the country concerned, as security for the interest on, and amortization of, the bonds as issued. These in turn, as to both principal and interest, are exempt from domestic taxation.

Beginning in 1905, sometimes by "executive agreement" between the President of the United States and the appropriate authorities in a given republic when the Senate would not assent, sometimes by formal treaty, no fewer than five methods have been devised for insuring payment. As the table shows, in Cuba the customs revenues are administered by Cuban officials; in the Dominican Republic, by an American general receiver, named by the President of the United States; in Nicaragua by an American collector, acting under the orders of a high commission, one of whose three members is chosen by our Department of State and one by American bondholders. In Haiti, the entire revenue system of the country is in the hands of an American general receiver and an American financial advisor, appointed by the president of the republic on the nomination of the President of the United States, who also appoints the high commissioner over all. The case of El Salvador, not one of the virtual protectorates, and yet illustrative of the fifth method, is even more significant. For the service of a loan, contracted in 1922, the collection of 70 per cent, and, if necessary, all, of its customs revenues is attended to by an American official chosen by an American corporation with the approval of our Department of State. Nor are

Size and Population of Country	*Political Relation to United States*	*Military Intervention*	*American Investments, estimated in millions of dollars*[5]	*Forms of American control to insure payment*
Cuba. Pennsylvania. 3,400,000	Virtual Protectorate, 1901—	1898-1902, 1906-1909, 1912, 1917	1899 Total, 50 1909 " 141 1916 " 400 1920 " 525 1925 " 1,360	
Panama South Carolina and Delaware. 440,000	Virtual Protectorate, 1903—	1908, 1912, 1917, 1918, 1921	1925 government loans, 6 Other holdings, 16 Total, 22	
Dominican Republic. Vermont, N. H. and R. I. 890,000	Virtual Protectorate, 1905—	1903, 1904, 1913, 1914, 1916-1924	1925 government loans, 15	General receiver of customs, appointed by the President of U. S.
Nicaragua. Larger than North Carolina. 630,000	Virtual Protectorate, 1912—	1899, 1907, 1910, 1912-1925, 1926, 1927—	1925 government loans, 3 Other holdings, 13 Total, 16	High Commission of three representing Department of State, American bondholders and Nicaragua, with American collector of customs.
Haiti. Vermont and Rhode Island. 2,040,000	Virtual Protectorate, 1915—	1915—	1925 government loans, 17 Other holdings, 6 Total, 23	American Military High Commissioner, American general receiver of customs and American financial adviser.
El Salvador. Smaller than New Jersey. 1,600,000	Independent		1925 government loans, 6 Other holdings, 11 Total, 17	American collector of customs, appointed with approval of Department of State.
Mexico. Ohio, Ind., Ill., Wis., Mich., Minn., Ia., Mo., N. D., S. D., Neb., Kan., Vt., and Conn. 14,200,000	Independent	1914, 1916	1899 Total, 185 1912 " 700 1925 " 1,318	
Guatemala. New York. 2,100,000	Independent		1925 Total, 50	
Honduras. New York. 770,000	Independent	1907, 1910, 1911, 1919, 1924, 1925	1920 Total, 18 1925 " 40	
Costa Rica. Vermont, N. H. and Conn. 500,000	Independent	1919	1925 government loans, 2 Total, 20-30	
Colombia Original Thirteen States, plus Florida. 6,600,000	Independent	1903	1912 Total, 2 1920 " 30 1925 " 87	
Venezuela Texas, Kentucky and Tenn. 3,000,000	Independent		1912 Total, 3 1920 " 40 1925 " 75	

[5] Figures taken chiefly from Robert W. Dunn, *American Foreign Investments* (New York, 1926).

extensive loans likely to be made anywhere in Latin America without seeking in advance the approval of that branch of our national administration.

Considering the financial relationship of Cuba to the United States, reference to the appropriate column in the table reveals that between 1899 and 1916 the estimated amount of American investments in the island increased from $50,000,000 to $400,000,000; whereas between 1916 and 1925 it rose to $1,360,000,000. But it was precisely during these nine years that the influence of our government over Cuban political and financial affairs became altogether marked. After 1918, and acting in compliance with a series of memoranda from an army officer of high rank, sent as personal representative of the President of the United States and later appointed American ambassador to the republic, the Cuban congress passed a large number of enactments aimed at improving political and economic conditions. They included: new electoral laws; suspension of certain provisions of the civil service law, so as to permit the president of Cuba to shift the personnel of administrative departments: facilitation of the removal of judges; revision of the tariff; changes in the budget; reorganization of the system of accounting; the clearing up of indebtedness, and the floating of an American loan of $50,000,000, placed as a lien upon the entire national revenue and under the virtual guarantee of the government of the United States. All of this might argue that the jurisdiction of the United States over the financial concerns of Cuba has made some progress since 1901, when the republic was obligated only to contract no excessive indebtedness!

In handling the affairs of our neighbors in and around the Caribbean, with or without their cooperation, four general policies have been brought into play. They may be designated by as many words: *regulation, annexation, neutralization* and *abstention.* Certain islands have been annexed; a Central American country (Honduras) has

been neutralized and, where the political and economic interests of the United States have seemed to permit it, abstention from interference in internal situations or international relations among the several republics has been practiced. But the general policy most in vogue has been that of regulation, whereby whatever those neighbors do is subject in greater or less degree to American control. For its exercise, four methods of action have been followed: (1) recognition of a particular government; (2) the severance of diplomatic relations—which means the same thing as the newly coined and misleading expression, "withdrawal of recognition"; (3) the levying or the lifting of an embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions, and (4) military intervention.

Phases of this policy of regulation are visible just now in our dealings with little Nicaragua and Panama and with bigger Mexico. The legitimate successor to an erstwhile president in Nicaragua, not recognized by the United States, is forcibly prevented from taking his official seat, because our government regards another person as better suited to our interests, political and economic. The allegation that the installation of the personage who is not our candidate might imperil the canal which we have not begun to construct is—amusing. The supposition that, in collaboration with Mexico, he and his band of partisans might conjure up the "spectre of a Mexican-fostered Bolshevist hegemony intervening between the United States and the Panama Canal" is—terrifying, indeed, to the richest and most powerful nation on earth! If the United States recognizes one "president" in Nicaragua, Mexico mustn't recognize another; if, for the benefit of its protégé, the United States lifts an embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions, Mexico has no business to allow Mexican armaments and soldiers of fortune to be used for the advantage of its own alleged disciple. As to Panama, that small state has been induced to enter into a treaty of alliance with this country,

whereby it stands pledged to cooperate in the military defense of the canal, despite its solemn obligations as a member of the League of Nations.

The nigger in the Nicaraguan wood pile is evidently the issue—on quite different grounds—between the United States and its neighbor immediately to the south of the Rio Grande. In order to enforce our will, we appear to menace Mexico with the threat of severing diplomatic relations and lifting the embargo on arms and munitions, which would result, probably, in putting the country anew into the throes of civil war. Yet the problem need not be solved in this fashion. With all due respect for "national honor and vital interests," the matters in dispute might be adjusted by a resort to the Permanent Court of International Arbitration at The Hague, of which the United States is a sponsor.

Our country may not "covet an inch of our neighbors' territory"; yet somehow it seems to have been exemplifying on this side of the Atlantic what John Galsworthy described as a characteristic of the motherland on the other—"the possessive instinct of the nation on the move." Of the measures we have taken in the Caribbean, the eventual outcome is painfully clear. If we go on as we have begun, the American empire must ultimately bestride the entire area. Politically, the republics within it may remain "sovereign and independent"—in the language of diplomacy. Economically, they would become a happy hunting ground for American capitalists, upheld and protected by their government. The Monroe Doctrine then will deserve the definition given in the covenant of the League of Nations: a "regional understanding" about a sphere of influence for a great power.

Of this broadening out of the United States over its huge preserve, bounded by the wall of the Monroe Doctrine, the nations of Europe doubtless would disapprove. Even though we are only emulating their own example elsewhere in the world, they are likely to object to such

behavior on our part, just as the Latin-American republics still outside the sphere will cherish resentment. Both will vent their feelings in hard words, if nothing worse. But what does that matter? Business is business. And southward the course of empire takes its way.

FROM STATE DEPARTMENT RECORDS[6]

1907

Central American Court of Justice created under joint auspices of United States and Mexico.

1909

October 7. American consul at Bluefields, Nicaragua, wires State Department that "a revolution will start in Bluefields on the 8th," that the revolutionaries "propose to protect the property of foreigners," and that General Emiliano Chamorro (who, with J. J. Estrada and Adolfo Diaz, secretary—at $1,000 per year—of an American mining company, was to lead the revolution) has just landed secretly from Costa Rica.

October 12. Consul wires State Department that revolution occurred on 10th; that "foreign business interests are enthusiastic," that "immediate reduction of tariff is assured; also the annulment of all concessions not owned by foreigners."

December 1. Secretary Knox withdraws recognition of Nicaraguan government, stating that "the government of the United States is convinced that the revolution represents the ideals and the will of a majority of the Nicaraguan people more faithfully than does the government of President Zelaya."

December 16. Zelaya resigns, naming Madriz, also of Liberal party, to succeed him.

[6] By Lewis S. Gannett. *Nation.* 124:89-91. January 26, 1927.

1910

May 16. Madriz forces, having swept all Nicaragua, call upon Estrada to surrender his last stronghold at Bluefields.

May 16. *U.S.S. Paducah* declares Bluefields a netural zone.

May 31. United States prohibits interference with American ships carrying arms to Estrada in Bluefields; insists that customs duties be paid to Estrada faction, not to Madriz.

August 20. Madriz resigns; Estrada enters capital and declares himself president; his first official act is to telegraph Secretary Knox that the victorious party "entertains warm regard for American people."

September 12. Estrada promises to ask for American loan.

October 11. Department of State offers aid in securing loan from American bankers, suggests foreign control of customs, and offers service of "confidential financial expert."

October 18. Thomas C. Dawson arrives as special agent of the United States.

October 27. "Dawson Pact" signed on board United States battleship by Nicaraguan leaders, promising loan, American customs control, and a claims commission—one member to be appointed by Nicaragua, two by United States—to settle American claims against Nicaragua; and agreeing upon election of Estrada and Diaz as president and vice-president.

December 31. General election; Estrada and Diaz *unanimously* elected.

1911

March 27. American minister cables "President Estrada is being sustained solely by the moral effect of our support and the belief that he would unquestionably have that support in case of trouble."

March 29.—Estrada by presidential decree ratifies Dawson plan for claims commission.

April 4. President Estrada dissolves assembly; revolution threatens.

Late April. New assembly, subordinate to Estrada, elected.

May 6. New assembly authorizes president to negotiate loan with American bankers.

May 9. Estrada resigns in favor of Diaz.

May 14. Department of State approves recognition of Diaz; revolution still threatens.

June 5. American minister reports informing Diaz that "I had communicated to my government his pledge not to resign and that I was instructed to say that my government considered the pledge as given to it through me and appreciated it very much."

June 6. Knox-Castrillo treaty signed, United States offering to aid Nicaragua to get $15,000,000 loan from American bankers, customs to be put under American control as security. (This treaty was never ratified, either by the American Senate or the Nicaraguan Assembly.)

July 30. American minister reports that Diaz is a mere figurehead, but has "repeated his promise not to resign until the loan matter had been settled."

September 1. Brown Brothers and Company, and J. and W. Seligman and Company, New York bankers, sign contract for $15,000,000 loan if and when treaty is ratified; meanwhile lend Diaz government $1,500,000, also guaranteed on customs, which they are to control; bankers also take option for 51 per cent of stock of National Bank of Nicaragua, and railway rights.

November 20. State Department wires to hold assembly in session until American fiscal experts arrive, as supplementary legislation may be needed.

December 2. Diaz orders assembly held in session.

December 21. Diaz confidentially suggests treaty "per-

mitting the United States to intervene in our internal affairs."

December 23. Secretary Knox expresses "intense gratification."

1912

March 26. Same bankers give Nicaragua further loan of $500,000 taking lien on government steamship and railway lines.

July 29. Anti-Diaz revolution breaks out; Diaz appoints Chamorro his general-in-chief.

August 3. Revolution spreading; Diaz asks "that the government of the United States guarantee with its forces security for the property of American citizens in Nicaragua and that it extend its protection to all the inhabitants of the republic."

August 4. 100 men from *U. S. S. Annapolis* arrive in Nicaraguan capital. United States minister orders revolutionaries to return engine and two box cars to American corporation operating railroad.

August 11-15. Nicaraguan capital bombarded by revolutionaries.

August 12. American manager of Bank of Nicaragua wires James Brown of Brown Brothers for protection. Brown consults State Department.

August 15. Major Smedley D. Butler with 350 United States marines arrives in capital.

August 20 (about). American minister declares capital a neutral zone.

September 4. State Department announces its policy is "to take the necessary measures for an adequate legation guard at Managua, to keep open communications, and to protect American life and property." Also states that "the American bankers who have made investments . . . have applied for protection."

September 5. Admiral Southerland arrives with reinforcements.

September 15. Expeditionary force under Butler starts north.

October 6. Marines complete campaign by the capture of Leon, last revolutionary stronghold; 4 marines, 3,000 (estimated) Nicaraguans killed in course of campaign.

November 2. With American marines guarding the polls, Diaz is unanimously reelected for four-year term.

November 4. New $500,000 loan by bankers, secured by American collection of tobacco and liquor taxes, and option for purchase by bankers of remaining 49 per cent of railroad stock.

November 14. Admiral Southerland, Major Butler, and bulk of United States expeditionary force leave Nicaragua.

December 13. All marines except 100 men at capital and a ship at Corinto recommended withdrawn.

1913

October 8. Bankers buy majority stock of railroad for $1,000,000 and of bank for $153,000 and make $1,000,000 loan; of this $2,153,000 all but $772,000 is held to repay previous loans.

November. Chamorro is *unanimously* elected to succeed Diaz.

1916

February 18. Bryan-Chamorro treaty signed; United States pays $3,000,000 for right to build canal across Nicaragua, and for 99-year lease of naval bases on Nicaraguan territory. Money is used to repay American creditors of Nicaragua. (Costa Rica and Salvador protested that this treaty violated their treaty rights, and appealed to the Central American Court of Justice, which ruled that the treaty was invalid. Nicaragua encouraged by United States, refused to accept the verdict; and in 1918, accordingly, the court dissolved.)

1924

July 12. Nicaragua pays off last of her debts to Brown Brothers and J. and W. Seligman and Company. Railway and National Bank are returned to Nicaragua, although Americans are retained as members of directorates.

October. First free elections in Nicaragua history held under new election law. Carlos Solorzano, Liberal, defeats Emiliano Chamorro two to one for presidency; Juan Sacasa is elected vice-president.

1925

August 3. American marines are withdrawn from Nicaragua, leaving native constabulary in charge of American officer.

October 25. Chamorro and Diaz seize power by coup d'etat.

1926

January 16. Chamorro, after expelling opposition members of assembly, has assembly elect him president. Solorzano is forced to resign, Sacasa to flee.

January 22. State Department refuses to recognize Chamorro because he gained office by use of force.

Early May. Liberal revolution to reinstate constitutional régime begins.

October 30. Chamorro, discouraged by State Department hostility, resigns.

November 10. Adolfo Diaz elected president by Chamorro's assembly.

November 15. Diaz asks for American aid and support.

November 17. State Department recognizes Diaz.

November 18. New loan agreement negotiated by Diaz with New York bankers.

December 7. Mexico recognizes Sacasa as constitutional president of Nicaragua.

December 24. Admiral Latimer lands troops at Bluefields.

December 25. Sacasa is ordered to disarm or get out.

ABANDON ARMED INTERVENTION[7]

The use of armed force by governments to protect the lives and property of their citizens in other lands has been a frequent source of hostility and war. It is a favorite device of imperialistic nations. Again and again the great powers have prolonged for decades or made permanent what purported to be a temporary occupation. Many of the most bitter quarrels of the past half century centered in questions of this character.

What is the present policy of the United States with regard to safeguarding the interests of our citizens in other lands? The answer is found in several recent addresses by President Coolidge. In his message to Congress on January 10th, the President said: "It has always been and remains the policy of the United States in such circumstances to take the steps that may be necessary for the preservation and protection of *the lives, the property, and the interests* of its citizens and of this government itself. In this respect I propose to follow the path of my predecessors. Consequently I have deemed it my duty to use the powers committed to me to insure the adequate protection of all American interests in Nicaragua, whether they be endangered by *internal strife* or by *outside interference* in the affairs of the republic." In an address on April 25th, 1927, the President said: "The person and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the nation, *even when abroad.*" Recently Secretary Wilbur said: "To defend America we must be prepared to defend its interests and our flag in every corner of the globe. . . An American child crying on the banks of the Yangtse a thousand miles from the coast can summon the ships of the American

[7] By Kirby Page. *Dollars and World Peace.* p. 53-9.

navy up that river to protect it from unjust assault."[8] On another occasion the Secretary of the Navy said: "Our trade routes as well as our international trade, are essential parts of our national life. We are committed to the protection of this traffic upon the high seas."[9]

According to our present policy, our responsibilities are even more extensive. The prevailing interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine places upon us the obligation to safeguard the lives and property of Europeans in Latin America. Since we will not allow European powers to use armed force in those countries, we must ourselves give them protection, so runs the argument. "Toward the governments of countries which we have recognized this side of the Panama Canal," says President Coolidge, "we feel a moral responsibility that does not attach to other nations."

It is highly important that we recognize the drastic change in meaning which has been given to the Monroe Doctrine in recent years. The phrase is now used with extreme looseness. Our participation in the World war was justified in an official document of the government on the ground that "a new Monroe Doctrine must be defended on the pathways of the seas and in the fields of Flanders if the western world is to be preserved as the citadel of a free-developing, forward-looking democracy."

In its original form it laid down two principles: The American continents "are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers"; and, second, we will regard any attempt to establish the monarchial system of government on "this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere." These are the words of President Monroe. No further

[8] Before Connecticut Chamber of Commerce, May 7, 1925.
[9] In Thomaston, Maine, July 25, 1927.

colonization and no monarchies, this was the original meaning of the famous doctrine.

No objection was raised to temporary intervention in Latin America by European powers to safeguard their interests. On June 21st, 1862, Secretary Seward said: "France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have a right and interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and anti-American government." [10]

In an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895, Secretary Olney said: "It does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American states. It does not relieve any American state from its obligation as fixed by international law, nor prevent any European power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American state or in the relations between it and other American states. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of government or to prevent the people of such state from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure. The rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is that no European power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies." [11]

During the Venezuelan crisis, President Roosevelt said: "We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power. . . No independent nation in America need have the slightest fear of aggression from

[10] J. H. Latané. *American Foreign Policy.* p. 404.
[11] J. H. Latané. *American Foreign Policy.* p. 482.

the United States."[12] In 1916 President Wilson said: "But the Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European governments should not attempt to extend their political systems to this side of the Atlantic."[13]

As a result of the theory that our government must protect the lives and property of our citizens in other lands and of the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, we have intervened frequently in the affairs of other countries. Professor Wm. R. Shepherd, of Columbia University, recently summarized our activities in the Caribbean as follows:[14] "In about thirty years we have created two new republics—Cuba and Panama; converted both of them and three other Latin-American countries—the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti —into virtual protectorates; intervened by force *at least thirty times* in the internal affairs of nine supposedly sovereign and independent nations; made the period of intervention last anywhere from a few days to a dozen years; enlarged our investments from a paltry two or three hundred millions of dollars to the tidy sum of upwards of *three billions,* and installed in four states our own collectors of customs to insure payment. Incidentally, we have annexed Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands, built a canal, secured an option to construct another and gathered in several naval stations."

At a luncheon of the Chamber of Commerce in Helena, Montana, General Smedley Butler, for many years in charge of our marines in the Caribbean, made the following boast: *"I and the marines have conducted five successful presidential elections in Central America."*

If our government continues to follow the announced policy of defending with armed force the lives, property and interests of our citizens in other lands whenever they are jeopardized by internal dissension or outside interference, we shall find ourselves in endless controversies

[12] H. C. Hill. *Roosevelt and the Caribbean.* p. 140.
[13] Latané. p. 664.
[14] *The New Republic.* January 26, 1927. p. 266-9.

and hostilities with other nations. Keep in mind the essential facts. International trade is becoming increasingly vital to all nations. Exports and imports are matters of life and death to many countries. Through foreign investments we are becoming more and more deeply enmeshed in the affairs of other peoples. The economic and financial struggle between nations is assuming greater intensity and bitterness. If each of the great powers continues the policy of armed interference in the affairs of backward countries and of armed preparedness against its rivals, another great war is inevitable.

It is undeniable that imperialistic rivalry has been responsible for most of the wars of the past century and constitutes one of the greatest perils now confronting the world. The attitude of the United States toward imperialism is, therefore, of supreme importance. Our present policy inhibits us from any effective protest against the aggression of the other great powers. The Paris correspondent of *The New York Times* recently wrote as follows concerning our intervention in Nicaragua: "Why should Chamberlain, Briand, Stresemann and Mussolini find only sly pleasure in this performance? The answer is that they think the United States has put herself on record in a fashion which will bind her to silence when the occasion presents itself for European powers to take analagous steps where their interests are at stake."

The Financial Chronicle recently said editorially: "From whatever angle it may be regarded, intervention is a perilous course. The internal quarrels which it settles rarely remain settled for long, the very presence of foreign troops is an incitement to revolt, and the spectre of occupation haunts the trail of the armed peacemaker, however high his motives. Whether it be the League of Nations intervening in the affairs of the small states of Eastern Europe, or Italy or France intervening in Albania or Syria, or the United States intervening in Cen-

tral or South America, the story is the same; intervention breeds intervention, and what is begun has to be continued."

It seems imperative, therefore, that all nations, including our own, abandon the policy of armed intervention, and rely upon other means of securing protection for their citizens abroad. This latter problem is not as difficult as it may appear. Most frequently the menace to the lives and property of aliens occurs in the weaker, more backward countries. It is precisely with these nations that non-violent sanctions are most effective. The hope of the future lies in international cooperation. Cooperative action on the part of our government and the governments of Mexico, Argentine, Brazil and Chile would be far more effective in Nicaragua, for example, than armed intervention on our part. The threat to sever diplomatic and economic relations with any Nicaraguan government that cannot maintain law and order would compel the observance of its obligations. Cooperative action in restoring the financial and economic stability of Austria and of Hungary was far more effective than armed intervention by the British or French would have been. Moreover, cooperative action of this sort acts as a check to the conscious or unconscious aggression of a single power. Behind armed intervention there is usually the desire not merely for protection, but for special privilege. That the United States needs such a check is indicated by the facts. Our armed forces have already been in Haiti for twelve years. We stayed in Santo Domingo for eight years. We were in control of Nicaragua from 1912 to 1925, and now our marines are in charge for another indefinite period.

The current interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is unwarranted and constitutes a grave peril to our southern neighbors. Instead of being a real defender of these countries, we have become the chief menace to their liberties. The original purpose of the Monroe Doctrine—

the prevention of further European colonization and of the establishment of monarchies—can be accomplished by cooperative action on the part of the United States and the Latin-American powers, with less risk of aggression on our part.

The peril of intervention is greatly intensified by reason of the fact that the constitutional provision that Congress alone can declare war is now being evaded. During recent years we have waged war on several foreign powers by executive order of the President without authorization from Congress. In referring to the policy of one of his successors, Theodore Roosevelt said: "When our armed forces attack the chief seaport city of a foreign country, as we did in the case both of Mexico and Haiti; and take it by violence, after conflicts in which scores of our own men and either scores or hundreds of our opponents are killed and wounded, the act is one of war . . . and each was waged without any Congressional action whatever." [15]

Professor Albert H. Putney has recently published an exhaustive survey of executive precedents and judicial decisions bearing on this point. [16] His conclusion is stated as follows: "Against the recent claim of the Executive Department are arrayed the plain and express wording of the Constitution of the United States, the debates in the Federal Constitutional Convention, the explanation of the Constitution contained in *The Federalist,* various decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the attitude and conduct of both legislative and executive departments of the government down to November, 1903. These precedents would seem to indicate that under the Constitution of the United States the power to declare war, including the power to authorize the use of offensive force abroad, is vested exclusively in the Congress of the United States." [17]

[15] *Fear God and Take Your Own Part.* p. 30-1.
[16] The Executive Assumption of the War Making Power. *National University Law Review.* Washington, May, 1927, p. 1-41.
[17] *Ibid.* p. 41.

The present policy leaves the citizens of this country with no effective voice in deciding whether or not war is to be waged on the people of another country. The President should not only be prevented from intervening with armed force in other nations, the practice should be completely abandoned.

COSTLY INTERVENTION[18]

Is this business of holding Adolfo Diaz glued in the Nicaraguan presidential chair worth the sacrifice of so many American lives? The majority of Nicaraguans appear not to wish Diaz for president; the great majority of Americans do not care a whoop who is president. The government at Washington is determined to keep Diaz in power, notwithstanding the questionable validity of his claim to the office. There may be a hidden reason for this; the only obvious reason is that Diaz ever since he was thrust into politics after an apprenticeship as a clerk in a United States exporting concern has been a super-serviceable friend of American interests.

Five American marines have been killed and many wounded in a battle with the forces of General Sandino, a Nicaraguan who stubbornly declines to recognize the right of the United States to rule Nicaragua or to dictate Nicaraguan policies. The Government dispatches describe Sandino as a "rebel," also as an outlaw and a brigand. In his own eyes, of course, Sandino is no rebel. He is opposing what he considers an extraconstitutional régime which would not last ten days without United States support.

It is scarcely likely that the sacrifice of American lives in carrying out the Coolidge-Kellogg policy of coercion will meet approbation in this country. The American people, or that very large part of the American people which has no capital invested in Nicaragua, does not care a hurrah about Diaz, Sandino or any other Nica-

[18] Editorial. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*. January 3, 1928.

raguan. If there is any sympathy one way or the other it is not unlikely to be with those who are feebly crying, "Nicaragua for the Nicaraguans" and against Diaz, whose political career has been consistently based on "Nicaragua for the United States investors."

President Coolidge deeply regrets that his aggressions in Nicaragua have had the effect of alienating the friendship and stirring the suspicion of Latin-American peoples. To remedy this he is personally going to Havana to attend the Pan-American conference. To help matters he has sent Lindbergh as ambassador of good will to the Central American states. And then, just at the very worst possible time, five more Americans are killed in battle and the losses of the Nicaraguans are reported to be "severe."

It is quite evident that the best policy to follow now is the policy which will render the American occupation as inconspicuous as possible. It is probably impossible to withdraw. In lieu of withdrawing the American forces should confine their energies largely to protecting the capital and the American tool who is serving as president and should desist from looking for trouble or pursuing earnest and fanatical "rebels" into the mountains or jungles. Not only in Latin America but also in the United States there is no pleasure in reading of battles in which American lives are lost and in which the slaughter of Nicaraguans is "severe."

IMPERIALISTIC AMERICA[19]

It is difficult to follow the expansion of America in the Caribbean without feeling that it will go farther. Utter recklessness and incompetency have characterized the management of every one of these pseudo-states which the preoccupations of the real nations have temporarily abandoned to independence. It was a matter of chance which one of the dancers should first pay the piper, but all have danced and all must pay. To the independence party Central America is its own little world. To the imperialistic party it is but a pawn on the mighty chessboard of world

[19] By Samuel G. Inman. *Atlantic Monthly.* 134: 107-16. July, 1924.

empire. The United States plays the vaster game, must play it and play it well, for the stake is its existence. We have learned subtler ways of winning, more varied ways of ruling. Never was our frontier more alive than it is today. Not one American in a hundred realizes that we have a protectorate over Haiti and that our control is creeping out through all these southern seas. If he knew, his only reaction would probably be a slightly increased complacency. The door is thus opened wide for a government, embarrassed by the mischievous irresponsibility of these petty make-believe states, to take refuge in an ever-broadening imperialism.—*H. H. Powers, in America Among the Nations.*

This bold statement of North America's imperialism in the Caribbean may shock some readers, but the fact of its rapid development cannot be denied. It is the outstanding development in the international policy of the United States, as interpreted by its government and its financial interests. After watching it rather closely for several years, the author believes that it bodes more evil than any other tendency on the American continent today.

In these smaller countries of the south, controlled by our soldiers, our bankers, and our oil kings, we are developing our Irelands, our Egypts, and our Indias. So far they are weak and we have been able to hide them from others. But at the rate the world is moving they can hardly be expected to remain always powerless and isolated. Our North American Christian civilization will find its final test in the way we treat our next-door neighbors. We are piling up hatreds, suspicions, records for exploitation and destruction of sovereignty in Latin America, such as have never failed in all history to react in war, suffering, and defeat of high moral and spiritual ideals. How can the United States expect to be the one exception to the rule?

Run your eyes rapidly down the map and note the countries where the United States is now in practical control. And remember that this control always brings resentment and enmity among the people, though their officials may approve it. Here is the list:

Cuba, where the United States has a navy base, with

marines often found in the interior of the country, with the threat of intervention always held over the Cuban government, which can make no loan nor dispose of any territory without the consent of the United States, whose representative at Havana largely controls the political and financial policies of a land whose economic life is determined by absentee landlords and bankers living in the United States.

Haiti, where two thousand United States marines direct and "protect" the Haitian government, elected under their supervision; where an American financial adviser exercises absolute control over finances, collecting customs and making loans which the United States government guarantees, thus assuring its continued occupancy of Haiti, and where, moreover, the nation's constitution was rewritten to permit the acquisition of land by United States' companies.

Santo Domingo, where for the first time in the history of republics, one republic, without declaring war on another, landed an army, dismissed the president and congress, and for seven years ruled entirely, without even a semblance of national government, by military decrees enforced by a foreign military governor, backed by 2500 marines. Recent promises to retire the military governor are conditioned on the Dominicans' ratification of all the acts of the military government and agreement to allow the United States to continue to collect the customs and administer the finances of the country.

Panama, where, as President Roosevelt said, "I took Panama," since which time it has been under control of the United States, with an "agreement" providing for the disbanding of the Panamanian army, the taking over at any time of further Panamanian territory considered necessary for protection of the canal, and carrying out any other measures which might be covered under the general formula of "maintaining the independence of the Republic of Panama."

Nicaragua, where we have maintained one hundred marines since 1912, keeping in control a government which—according to the United States admiral in charge —is opposed by eighty per cent of the Nicaraguans, but which is favorable to American bankers, who, with the approval of the State Department, collect the customs and own the national bank and the railroad—such a complete control that the country is known throughout Latin America by the name of the bankers who hold these privileges.

Honduras, where the American minister and two American corporations have long been the controlling powers, and where recently marines have been landed for "protection of American life and property"—the same formula under which they have entered and remained in the other countries mentioned.

Here then are six republics where the United States' economic control is backed by military forces on the ground.

Next we come to the countries were North American financial advisers directing the fiscal policy of the governments have not yet brought military forces, but following precedent in the above named republics, they may at any time bring those forces which are always handy on the battle cruisers that continuously patrol the Caribbean. These countries are as follows:

Salvador, where a loan at eight per cent —plus extra charges—has been recently made by New York bankers, which loan is guaranteed by seventy per cent of the customs receipts, collected by the bankers, with the agreement made by the Secretary of State of the United States that if any differences arise between Salvador and the bankers, he—the Secretary of State—will refer the question to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, whose word shall be final.

Colombia, where an American financial mission has just outlined a reorganization of the fiscal system of the

republic, especially advising as to the expenditure of the $25,000,000 the United States is now paying to Colombia —officially because of the Panama Canal Zone, but, according to the explanation of Messrs. Lodge and Fall in arguing for the treaty which they had before so bitterly condemned, because we needed Colombia's friendship in order to favor American petroleum companies and secure other concessions.

Ecuador, where the government has recently engaged an American financial adviser, where an American president of the principal railroad owns most of the stock, and where American interests recently blocked an English loan.

Peru, where an American financial adviser directs the fiscal policies of the government, and a loan is pending by American bankers which would be guaranteed by the customs, collected by Americans.

Bolivia, where the hardest bargain of all has been driven, with a loan of $24,000,000 floated, which is guaranteed by the country's customs, by the stock in the government bank, by a government railroad, and finally by all the internal revenues of the country, which may be augmented at any time to suit the commission of the American bankers—which commission now assumes complete control of Bolivia's finances including practically the power to dictate what Bolivia's tariffs and taxes shall be.

Here are five more countries where Americans have been called to direct the fiscal policy of the governments, making a total of eleven. But this is only official direction.

We must now retrace our steps on the map and look at the third class of countries. These are the ones dominated by North American capitalists, though not having Americans officially appointed to direct their fiscal program.

They number three as follows:

Guatemala, where American bankers control the busi-

ness, American money is the medium of circulation, and the United Fruit Company and other American financial interests have secured control of the railroads, which now become a part of the International Railways of Central America—the largest American-owned railway enterprise outside of the United States.

Costa Rica, where, after thirty years' peace, American oil and banana interests recently fomented a revolution against a reform government and at present largely control the economic life of the country and often act as brokers for the government.

Mexico, where Americans own one-third of the $2,500,000,000 of the nation's wealth, with seventy-three per cent of the oil lands and much the largest part of the 54,874,557 acres of land owned by foreigners (an area equal to France, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland), and where American financial representatives are the most important plenipotentiaries received by the Mexican government.

To recapitulate: Out of the twenty Latin-American republics, eleven of them now have their financial policies directed by North Americans officially appointed. Six of these ten have the financial agents backed by American military forces on the ground. (This includes Cuba, which has no official financial adviser; but General Crowder has so acted during recent financial readjustments.) Four of the remaining half of these southern countries have their economic and fiscal life closely tied to the United States through large loans and concessions, giving special advantages to American capitalists.

This leaves the six countries of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela as the only ones outside the circle of North American financial control. While Americans have recently made large loans or secured extensive concessions from these last-named countries they have, so far as the author knows, not yet acquired such a preponderant influence as to dictate their

fiscal policies. But these six countries are trembling in their boots, wondering how long before the inevitable must arrive!

Along with this economic and military dominance goes a dominance in the internal affairs of Latin America. In the Caribbean countries especially, the word of the American minister is the most important factor for any government to consider. It is impossible for anyone who has not come into close contacts with these countries to realize how completely their governments are held in the hollow of the hand of the State Department at Washington. In fact the government officials of these countries are so far accustomed to doing Washington's will that the State Department frequently finds it necessary to refuse to do things related to internal order that native officials, often indebted to their Big Brother for their position, request it to do. This creates a strong inconsistency in the policy of the State Department from time to time. What one official refused to do as interference with internal order, another will do, and even the same official will judge differently at different times. At one time we allow a revolution, at another we forbid it. So it happens that, as with a fond parent, who at one time will insist on making all decisions for his son, at another will throw him entirely on his own resources, at one time will pay the forged check, at another will let him go to jail, so it is with these little countries—pawns on the international chessboard as Mr. Powers says—who never know what is to happen to them. Usually the State Department seems hesitant about making suggestions to one of these smaller governments concerning improvement in a national educational program, lest this be considered as interference in internal affairs. But it is always sure of the right to do anything that comes under the formula: "protection of American lives and property." Since American lives seldom are in danger, American property naturally gets first place. In fact it is only in countries

where American property interests are paramount that this tutelage is employed.

This recent economic dominance in Latin America is directly connected with the recent resurgent policy of isolation from Europe. We stay out of Europe; we go into Latin America. The corollary—Europe must stay out of Latin America; Latin America must stay out of Europe. "Business first." "Why take a mandate for Armenia," asked one of our senators, "since there are no oil fields there?" The greatest oil deposits in the world are in Latin America, so we'll take our mandates there, and we will write our own terms. To be sure that these terms are to our liking, we are recently giving the Monroe Doctrine a new application, isolating Europe from Latin America.

As President Lowell says: "Some Americans, while professing a faith in the right of all peoples to independence and self-government, are really imperialists at heart. They believe in the right and manifest destiny of the United States to expand by overrunning its weaker neighbors. They appeal to a spirit of patriotism that sees no object, holds no ideals, and acknowledges no rights or duties but the national welfare and aggrandizement. In the name of that principle Germany sinned and fell. The ideas of these American imperialists are less grandiose, but at bottom they differ little from hers. According to that view Central and South America are a game preserve, from which poachers are excluded but where the proprietor may hunt as he pleases. Naturally the proprietor is anxious not only to keep away the poachers but to oppose game laws that would interfere with his own sport."

During the last few years the United States has pursued a steady policy of eliminating European poachers. The first way is by American government and American banks "funding," that is, combining together all the various international obligations of a nation, after which one

big loan to care for it all is floated in the United States. The foreign creditors are then paid off and eliminated. Then the United States Government, in seeing that such a loan is paid, is protecting only its own citizens. This funding process was first carried out in Santo Domingo in 1905. It has been extended now to about half the Latin-American states. As the Department of Commerce has recently stated: "Our great interest in Latin America is largely a growth of the last ten years. Yet our investments now include $610,000,000 in public securities and $3,150,000,000 in industries."

The next step in this elimination of Europe is in the matter of arbitrations. The president of Switzerland, the king of England, the king of Spain, the president of France, and other distinguished Europeans have in the past been selected by Latin America as arbitrators in the many cases Latin America has settled by arbitration. But the United States government is now using its great power to eliminate all this. At the Santiago conference there was a steady drive by the North-American delegation to eliminate all European participation in arbitrations and all other American matters.

One of the first acts of Mr. Hughes as Secretary of State was to settle a dispute between Panama and Costa Rica, sending military forces to emphasize his settlement. Both these nations were members of the League of Nations, whose covenant required that it extend its good offices to any members in controversy. But the League was not allowed to use its good offices. In the same way the Tacna and Arica dispute between Peru and Chile was first brought before the League of Nations for settlement. But the Monroe Doctrine did not allow the League to touch it, and it is now before the President of the United States.

The third way in which we are eliminating Europe from America is seen in the naval mission to Brazil. The principal reason for sending that mission was the

one which is given for every imperialistic act from Santo Domingo to Honduras: "If we don't, Europe will." For a century England, France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy have sent military or naval missions to Latin America. But that policy must be stopped. So when England was about to send a naval mission to Brazil, we substituted our own. If the government that called the disarmament conference in Washington had sought, when this matter of a mission came up, an agreement among all interested parties that no more missions should be requested or sent; and if it had then lent its good offices in the Santiago conference to bring about an agreement on disarmament instead of standing off, as a disinterested spectator, the terrible race for armament, now beginning in South America, could have been avoided. But to Argentina's appeal against the mission, as a movement that would generate suspicions and augment naval expenditures, the State Department replies: "We play no favorites, we are ready to send you a mission also." In fact, we have another mission in Peru.

In one of the recent proposals made by the State Department to Santo Domingo it put as one of the conditions of withdrawing the marines that we be requested to send them a military mission. In the last few years our government has sold arms to different Latin-American countries. Of course, our arms manufacturers are continually in the business, one recent order being for ten submarines made for Brazil, another the reconditioning of the two dreadnoughts owned by Argentina. We have just established a further military precedent, which is likely to have a far-reaching influence, by our government selling arms to the Mexican government to suppress an armed revolution against it.

We have invited a number of Latin-American countries, as a special work of friendship, to send their officers to West Point for further training. Our government has never sent an educational mission to Latin America, nor

offered scholarships in her scientific or cultural institutions to Latin Americans. Where unofficial educational missions—like the one recently going to Peru—and official educational advisers, like the one that went to Nicaragua—have met with difficulties, it has let them go down in defeat and withdraw in ignominy. To do otherwise would have been "interfering with the internal affairs of a sister nation!"

Will not someone kindly explain why, when we are arranging to direct the financial and military affairs of these nations, we should not with equal propriety arrange to direct their educational systems? At least it might have the advantage of economy. For what the United States government paid for the Pershing expedition into Mexico it could have built and equipped in every town of Mexico, of over four thousand population, a high school, a hospital, and a social centre, and in addition presented each one of these towns with an endowment of $700,000 with which to conduct these institutions. Yet a proposal for the establishment of a North American college in Mexico City, advocated by the most distinguished educators of the United States and Mexico for the last ten years, has languished because a beginning cannot be made on furnishing the five million dollars finally needed.

Here we have then, briefly stated, the program of economic imperialism and isolation from Europe which the United States is fostering today in Latin America.

What does the rest of the world think about this program?

In no country has the military occupation of Santo Domingo and Haiti been more discussed than in Japan, where the government has formed now its own Monroe Doctrine of the Orient, by which it justified its recent twenty-one demands on China, and its imperialism in Korea.

The press of France is filled with comment on the matter, running from sarcastic slurs on the United States

as the good Samaritan of the New World to the defense of France's policy in financing the Little Entente, in buying arms, and in the occupation of the Ruhr for the alleged collection of debts.

The *Manchester Guardian,* in an article recently reprinted in more than a dozen different countries, has clearly told the story. The press of Spain, of course, finds here its favorite theme. Italy, Egypt, India, Ireland, and Russia find here proof texts, alike for preachments favoring radicalism and reaction.

As for Latin America, the situation is tragic. Since the Santiago conference a resurgence of opposition against the United States has made the old campaigns of Ugarte and Blanco Fombona seem as nothing. During the last year at least two papers have been founded in Argentina and one in Honduras, backed by some of the most distinguished men of Latin America, whose whole purpose is opposition to the United States. In practically every one of the prominent Spanish-American magazines it is now the custom to carry in each issue one or more articles against the United States. Formerly friends of the United States in those countries combated such attacks. But scarcely ever do we find defenders now. Old friends have either changed or they do not care to oppose the tide. Latin-American government officials, of course, are still outwardly friendly. They have to be. This is probably why our State Department has recently expressed its opinion that never before have our relations with Latin America been so cordial. But if the department thinks that, it is living in a fool's paradise.

La Prensa of Buenos Aires sharply challenged the optimistic report made to the Secretary of State by the United States delegation to the Santiago conference, saying:

> What occurred in Santiago, and the inexact, the incomplete, exaggeratedly optimistic report made to the government of the United States, demand a rectification in the interest of Pan-Americanism which today is facing a profound crisis. . . The

conference has perturbed the tranquillity of the situation in general and especially among certain groups like the Rio de la Plata group (Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil). In the question of disarmament the part of the United States was scarcely welcome, since they, being the initiators of the movement for universal disarmament, and authors of that subject on the program of the Santiago conference, then abandoned this attitude at Santiago. . . Do the good people of the United States know these things, which so profoundly affect their interests? . . . The United States has a great mission in favor of Pan-American friendship, but they must reorganize their work on another basis, taking into account the discontent which exists in the greater part of the Latin-American countries. The lack of diplomacy, of exact information, and of coordination among the various officials of the United States government, in regard to Pan-Americanism, is blocking its development.

No one who visits these countries, mixes on equality with the people in general, reads their literature and attends their theatres and lecture halls, can fail to realize the truth of the following, written by an Argentina professor—a friend who laments the fact he describes as much as does any American:

As is well known, up until the present, whenever reference is made to closer relations between the two Americas the intensification of economic relations between them is the usual method advocated. This attitude, in which many eminent personalities have taken part, has not been able to accomplish the desired results. It is certainly true that in Latin America the conviction seems to have grown largely that the egotistic motive is the one that guides the United States in its relations with these countries and the materialistic conception of the North-American civilization has been more largely confirmed in recent time. The current of sympathy toward his country which Wilson succeeded in arousing during the war, and which caused Ricardo Rojas to say that the legend of a ruddy and cannibalistic Yankee had disappeared and that the United States was displaying a magnificent spirit, has gradually disappeared. For people in general once again the North-American civilization is considered as barbaric, and automatically moved only by a utilitarian objective.

We would even venture to say, at least in reference to Argentina, that she finds herself further removed from the United States today than she was in the sixth and seventh decade of the past century. At that time, at least, our people were influenced by the fervid enthusiasm for North-American democracy, felt by Sarmiento and Alberdi. Certainly with France and England the United States had captured our sympathy. Today this has all been modified. While France continues captivating us by the

excellencies of her literature, and Great Britain continues attracting our thinkers as the country of free institutions and good political sense, the United States presents herself to us as principally concerned in the conquest of our markets.

Only in the United States do the press and the people ignore how our economic imperialism is eliminating friendships and fostering suspicions. With our accustomed optimism and assurance of our altruistic motives we continue as the trombonist, who claimed he was the greatest trombone player in the world. When someone told him he would have to prove it, he replied, "I don't have to prove it, I admit it." And, should all the world challenge our idealism in relation to Latin America, we might go on serenely; for this is the greatest nation on the face of the earth, owning one-third of the wealth of the world and possesing the largest force of efficient man power humanity has ever seen. To quote Secretary Olney, "It's fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

But can we be sure that always we shall be strong enough to ignore the feeling of Latin America and all other potential enemies seeking their alliance? Already there are three combinations forming which may some day become strong enough to challenge effectually this ever increasing dominance. These combinations are The League of Nations, the proposed Latin-American League and the Pan-Latin movement.

Suppose the League of Nations, already comprising three-fourths of the population of the world should some day feel itself strong enough to accept the request of one or more of its Latin-American members and mediate between them, as its covenant provides that it shall. Can we look forward with complacency to the question of deciding as to whether we shall flatly oppose the moral consciousness of the world or whether we shall back down under pressure? Suppose that some day in the future we repeat in some Latin-American country, member of the League, a landing of marines and seizing of the

sovereignty of the country as we did in Santo Domingo and Haiti, and the League feels itself strong enough to protest—as it did in the case of Italy and Corfu? Can we look forward with pleasure to such a challenge?

Certainly we cannot be entirely sure that the league will not grow more powerful, and more disposed to carry out its agreements with its American members.

One of the outstanding opponents of the World Court in the United States Senate recently said to a friend that one strong reason for his opposition to our entering the court was that some of the Caribbean countries now under our control might then challenge this occupancy before the World Court.

Colonel Roosevelt even before the formation of a League of Nations said of the proposed treaty with Colombia:

> If succeeding administrations can act as Wilson's is now acting in reference to mine, then unquestionably there is far heavier claims for reparation against the United States . . . by Santo Domingo and Haiti for her invasion and overthrow of their government by armed forces without declaration of war, while Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Guatemala all have similar grievances and in the case of one (I think Costa Rica) the International Court of the Isthmus has actually decided we are to blame.

Certainly, so far as a combined Latin America is concerned, no one will question the fact that these nations are growing stronger every day, and at the end of this century will have come to be foes worthy of consideration. Our recent restrictive immigration law will be a considerable factor in the growth of these southern lands.

With the present policy continued, then we shall find ourselves more isolated than the fondest nationalist ever dared desire. Then we shall find that the profits on oil and bananas and sugar, which went into the pockets of a few, were not worth the price of enmities developed in our southern neighbors against our whole nation.

This isolation forced on Latin America is already bringing its counter movements. While we are talking

of how we are protecting Latin America from Europe, the Latin Americans are betaking themselves as fast as they can to Europe for protection against us. In the League of Nations they have found exactly the kind of international understanding they have advocated for years. And the Europeans have not hesitated to give Latin America the leading honors in the League. Two of the four presidents of the annual assemblies of the League have been Latin Americans. Two of the six elected members of the council are Latin Americans. Two out of the eleven judges of the World Court, elected from all nations of the world, are Latin Americans. Some of the most important heads of committees come from Latin America, and the Latin-American section of the League at Geneva is a section of great influence.

While the Latin Americans are becoming more engrossed in the League, they are becoming more indifferent to the Pan-American Union. At the last Pan-American conference at Santiago the United States told Latin America that the Monroe Doctrine was none of its affair; that we are interested in commercial agreements, but that we should have nothing to do with an American League of Nations where all American countries could sit at a Round Table to discuss their problems; and that we were opposed to a reorganization of the Pan-American Union, so that the dominance of the United States should be less apparent—a dominance so marked at Santiago that even the director of the union figured as a member of the United States delegation. While the conference did some useful things, the United States delegation pushed nothing but commercial and health questions, and fought every move which would put Latin America on an equal basis with the United States in determining inter-American questions. As a promoter of good feeling between the Americas, the conference was a distinct disappointment.

On the adjournment of the conference without ef-

fecting any agreement on disarmament, the Brazilian delegation announced that the question would be referred to the Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations, which could no doubt work out a satisfactory solution. The league has since been working on an agreement between the ABC countries, to stop the armament race and ugly feeling started at the Santiago meeting.

Following the Santiago conference, a movement has been launched in Buenos Aires, by influential university professors and students and other prominent men, for the establishment of a Latin-American League. They are publishing a paper and pushing their organization with all enthusiasm.

The old idea of a Pan-Latin League has also been revived, taking advantage of the growing distrust of the United States. While King Alfonso was visiting the Pope recently, Mussolini and Primo de Rivera were planning a new entente between these two Latin countries and Spanish America. Portugal also has been drawn into the movement and the proposed visit of King Alfonso to South America is expected to contribute largely to it. France, always recognized as the inspiration of the spiritual life of Latin America, is more active than ever in its promotion.

Altogether, this is a dark picture. It is a severe indictment of our imperialism—an imperialism which the author believes has not been developed deliberately, but has stolen over us as a part of the materialistic spirit of the times. It is a departure from the ideals of our fathers. The North American visitor in the Caribbean these days, sensitive to those ideals, often blushes with shame and suffers the deepest humiliation on beholding sights enacted in the name of our fair America—acts which his fellow citizens at home would deem impossible. So one who has seen much of these things and has become alarmed at their rapid spread is constrained to risk all the penalties of plain speaking in order to challenge this

un-American movement—un-American although some of the finest men one can meet have been caught up in its onrush. These men have often built good roads, established sanitary codes, and enforced peace. But these are not worth the surrender of American principles, the bowing before materialistic gods, the hatreds and the sacrifice of the spiritual, which the program involves. Even if such a program should help Latin America, the people of the United States cannot go on destroying with impunity the sovereignty of other peoples, however weak, cutting across the principles for which our fathers fought, without the reaction being shown throughout our whole body politic.

Some day we shall realize that the whole rotten mess of investigation now being played with at Washington runs directly back to the mental attitudes and the combinations involved in the policy of "cleaning up" our next-door neighbors—a phrase which may seem to have moral significance to the average innocent citizen and official, but which, for the privileged few, takes on the more modern significance of "cleaning out." No one objects to legitimate business with our neighbors. On the contrary, it is vital to all concerned. But the continuance of this dollar diplomacy, with its combination of bonds and battleships, means the destruction of our nation just as surely as it meant the destruction of Egypt and Rome and Spain and Germany and all the other nations who came to measure their greatness by their material possessions rather than by their passion for justice and by the number of their friendly neighbors.

ABANDON THE MONROE DOCTRINE[20]

Many of the events of the past quarter century have amply justified our southern neighbors in feeling that the Monroe Doctrine, under which term they include our

[20] By Hiram Bingham. *The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth.* p. 40-55. This was written in 1913. Since then Senator Bingham has changed his views on this subject.

general foreign policy in the western hemisphere, means interference and intervention. A recent American minister to Honduras, in a carefully prepared paper before the American Political Science Association, was obliged to admit that, "Historically, the Spanish-Americans have cherished in their hearts a marked adversion for the Yankee. The taking of California from Mexico, the occupation of Porto Rico, the protectorate over Cuba, the receivership in Santo Domingo, the coup d'etat in Panama, are all held to be palpable evidence of a lust for territory and warnings of the ultimate fate awaiting other countries on this continent. Every intervention of the United States, while approved by the faction immediately favored, is viewed with apprehension by all other Spanish-Americans."

The menace of intervention, armed intervention, the threatened presence of machine guns and American marines, have repeatedly been used by Latin-American politicians themselves in their endeavors to keep the peace in their own countries. And we have done enough of that sort of thing to make it evident to disinterested observers that the new Monroe Doctrine, our present policy, is to act as international policeman for the Latin part of the western hemisphere.

By letting it be known in Europe that we shall not tolerate any European intervention or the landing of European troops on the sacred soil of the American republics, we assume very grave responsibilities. As the *Spectator* recently pointed out, if France or Germany or Great Britain is offended by some act of a South American state, the Monroe Doctrine offers a way out of these difficulties. "It constitutes the United States a kind of buffer between the contending parties; it provides a means of reconciling our interests and theirs without demanding an unconditional surrender on either side. But it does not do this without laying a very real burden on the United States." In other words, the Monroe

Doctrine makes the United States a medium between the powers of Europe and South America.

We have even gone further than this, we have declared in the words of Secretary Olney, that the United States is "practically sovereign on this continent, and that its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition." Therefore, European countries have the right to look to us to do that which we prevent them from doing. A curious result of this is that some of the American republics float loans in Europe, believing that the United States will not allow the government of their European creditors forcibly to collect these loans.

Personally, I believe that it ought to be an adopted principle of international law that armed intervention of creditor nations to collect bad debts on behalf of their bankers and bondholders is forbidden. If this principle were clearly understood and accepted, these bankers and underwriters would be far more particular to whom they loaned any great amount of money, and under what conditions. They would not be willing to take the risks which they now take, and many unfortunate financial tangles would never have a beginning. It is natural for a republic which has great undeveloped resources, much optimism, and a disregard of existing human handicaps, to desire to borrow large amounts of money in order to build expensive railroads and carry out desirable public improvements. It is equally natural that capitalists seeking good interest rates and secure investments should depend on the fact that if the debtor country attempts to default on its national loans, the government of the creditors will intervene with a strong arm. It is natural that the money should be forthcoming, even though a thorough, business-like, and scientific investigation of the possessions and resources of the borrowing nation might show that the chances of her being able to pay interest, and eventually to return the capital, were highly problematical, and to be reckoned as very high risks.

Millions of dollars of such loans have been made in the past. It is perfectly evident that many of these loans cannot be repaid; that the time is coming when the creditor nations will look to us as the policeman, or "elder brother," of the western hemisphere, to see to it that the little boys pay for the candy and sweetmeats they have eaten.

The recent report of the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, which looks after the interests of foreign capitalists, shows that Ecuador and Nicaragua are on the boundary line. Guatemala and Honduras are way over on the wrong side of the fence. In the words of the report: "Another year of total default on its external debt has been carried to the discredit of the Guatemalan government. The act of spoliation, by which the bondholders were arbitrarily robbed of the revenues specially assigned to them in consideration of the sacrifices to which they were forced to submit, continues to stand as a shame and disgrace to the republic. The council have requested His Majesty's government to take such steps as they may deem fit to demand the restitution to the bondholders of the security of which they have been deprived. . . Honduras has succeeded in delaying the meeting of its foreign obligations for nearly forty years, and there are no indications at present that the government has become convinced of the necessity of putting an end to its long continued default, either by accepting the cooperation of American bankers in putting its finances in order, or by any other method."

It is currently reported that the British foreign office recently made urgent demands on Guatemala to take steps toward settling its constantly increasing national debt. It was reported in the English papers that Guatemala had appealed to Washington and the Monroe Doctrine. It appears to be impossible to find out exactly what happened. The worst of it is, the situation is bound to recur. Mexico has a large debt, and, as is well known,

local conditions have been growing steadily worse for the past two or three years. It is conceivable that the day may come when Mexico will default the interest on her bonds. The money is mostly owed abroad. Is it the duty of the United States to decide what the foreign bondholders may or may not do?

One cannot dodge the truth that the continuation of our support of this doctrine implies that we will undertake to be responsible for the good behavior of all of the American nations. The nature of this responsibility was more fully realized and more frankly expressed by President Roosevelt than by any of his predecessors. In a message to Congress in 1904, he said, "It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards other nations of the western hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may, in America as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized nations they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and help-

ful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations."

Again, in the following year, President Roosevelt endeavored to show his sense of our responsibility. In a message to Congress he said: "One of the most effective instruments for peace is the Monroe Doctrine as it has been and is being gradually developed by this nation and accepted by other nations. No other policy could have been as efficient in promoting peace in the western hemisphere and in giving to each nation thereon the chance to develop along its own lines. If we had refused to apply the doctrine to changing conditions it would now be completely outworn, would not meet any of the needs of the present day, and indeed would probably by this time have sunk into complete oblivion. It is useful at home, and is meeting recognition abroad, because we have adapted our application of it to meet the growing and changing needs of the hemisphere. When we announce a policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy, and those consequences from time to time alter. It is out of the question to claim a right to shirk the responsibility for its existence. Not only we, but all American republics who are benefited by the existence of the doctrine, must recognize the obligations each nation is under as regards foreign peoples no less than its duty to insist upon its own rights."

At the same time, fearing the results of thus publicly acknowledging our responsibility under the Monroe Doctrine, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to issue the following warning: "Moreover, we must make it evident that we do not intend to permit the Monroe Doctrine to be used by any nation on this continent as

a shield to protect it from the consequences of its own misdeeds against foreign nations. If a republic to the south of us commits a tort against a foreign nation, such as an outrage against a citizen of that nation, then the Monroe Doctrine does not force us to interfere to prevent punishment of the tort, save to see that the punishment does not assume the form of territorial occupation in any shape. The case is more difficult when it refers to a contractual obligation. Our own government has always refused to enforce contractual obligations on behalf of its citizens by an appeal to arms. It is much to be wished that all foreign governments would take the same view. But they do not; and in consequence we are liable at any time to be brought face to face with disagreeable alternatives. On the one hand, this country would certainly decline to go to war to prevent a foreign government from collecting a just debt; on the other hand, it is very inadvisable to permit any foreign power to take possession, even temporarily, of the customhouses of an American republic in order to enforce the payment of its obligations; for such temporary occupation might turn into a permanent occupation. The only escape from these alternatives may at any time be that we must ourselves undertake to bring about some arrangement by which so much as possible of a just obligation shall be paid. It is far better that this country should put through such an arrangement, rather than allow any foreign country to undertake it."

There is no doubt that these statements were logical and represent our justifiable responsibility so long as we maintain the Monroe Doctrine. It is true they caused great alarm in South America, and in the following year President Roosevelt found it necessary to say: "In many parts of South America there has been much misunderstanding of the attitude and purposes of the United States toward the other American republics. An idea had become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doc-

trine implied or carried with it an assumption of superiority, and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that doctrine applies. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Yet that impression continued to be a serious barrier to good understanding, to friendly intercourse, to the introduction of American capital and the extension of American trade. The impression was so widespread that apparently it could not be reached by any ordinary means."

To disperse this impression was part of Secretary Root's mission on his journey through South America, and he was partially successful, but the logic of the situation still remains. If we are the big-brother-with-the-club who will not permit any outsider to spank our irritating or troublesome younger brothers, we must accept the natural corollary of keeping them in order ourselves, for we cannot allow the American family to become a nuisance. And some members of it have a decided tendency in that direction. Is this task worth while? Is there not a better way out of the difficulty? Furthermore, Europe knows that in order to continue to execute our self-imposed and responsible mission we must run counter to the most approved principles of the law of nations. The right of independence is so fundamental and so well established a principle of international law, and respect for it is so essential to the existence of national self-restraint, that armed intervention, or any other action or policy tending to place that right in a subordinate position, is properly looked upon with disfavor, not only in Latin America, but by all the family of civilized nations.

The grounds upon which intervention is permitted in international law differ according to the authority one consults. But in general they are limited to the right of self-preservation, to averting danger to the intervening state, and to the duty of fulfilling engagements.

When, however, the danger against which intervention is directed is the consequence of the prevalence of ideas which are opposed to views held by the intervening state, most authorities believe that intervention ceases to be legitimate. To say that we have the right to intervene in order to modify another state's attitude toward revolutions is to ignore the fundamental principle that the right of every state to live its life in a given way is precisely equal to that of another state to live its life in another way.

In the last analysis, no intervention is legal except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of international law has taken place, or unless the family of civilized nations concurs in authorizing it.

If, then, our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine means, practically, disregard of the principles of the accepted law of nations, is it worth while to continue? Why should the United States not abandon the Monroe Doctrine and publicly disclaim any desire to interfere in the domestic quarrels of the American republics? Why should our government not publicly state to Europe that this nation will not intervene except at the request of a Pan-American Congress, and then only in case we are one of the members which such a congress selects for the specific purpose of quieting a certain troublesome neighbor?

NICARAGUA'S BLOODY "PEACE" [21]

President Coolidge will face a tremendous task at the Pan-American Congress on January 16, predicts the Camden *Post,* if he should try to reconcile the peaceful hum of Colonel Lindbergh's "good-will" airplane engine with the vindictive sputter of American machine-guns in Nicaragua. In fact, since January 1, when our marines suffered a loss of five men killed and twenty-three

[21] *Literary Digest.* 96: 8. Jauary 14, 1928.

wounded in "the biggest battle in which our troops have fought since the World War," the President's lot has not been a happy one. Senators to right of him, Congressmen to left of him have volleyed and thundered. Resolutions looking toward inquiries into Nicaraguan affairs have been introduced in both Houses, and editorial writers have had many a scathing word to say of our policy—or lack of one—in the republic. The Boston *Globe* finds that approximately fifty engagements have taken place in Nicaragua between American marines and native forces "since active intervention by the United States began last March." And this daily expresses the gist of many another editorial when it says:

> What is all this fighting about? Why are these young men in marine uniforms being killed?
>
> Two things are known. One is that the United States is not officially at war with Nicaragua. Congress alone has the power to declare war, and Congress has done no such thing. The other known fact is that clashes have been frequent. But why our men should be there at all has not been explained.

In the opinion of the Washington *News* and other Scripps-Howard papers, "the American public has been shamelessly deceived by its officials as to the real state of affairs in Nicaragua." Continues this paper:

> To sum it up in a few lines, a Liberal revolution was in full blast last year and was on the point of overthrowing our man, President Diaz, a Conservative, when President Coolidge sent Col. Henry L. Stimson down there to see what could be done to stop the bloodshed and at the same time keep Diaz in power.
>
> Colonel Stimson found a way. In an interview with General Moncada, the revolutionary commander-in-chief, he made it plain to the general that it was either a case of surrender or fight the United States. Moncada yielded, and our forces then in Nicaragua began disarming. But one of Moncada's ablest lieutenants, General Sandino, refused to surrender. He and his command kept to the field. Sandino, Colonel Stimson reported, had only "about 150 followers"—men whom Washington officials ever since have referred to as "bandits."
>
> Against these "150 followers" of Sandino, then, some 1,400 American marines, along with a couple of thousand or so native troops, have been fighting ever since. But, lest you should get the idea that our marines have lost some of their punch, let it be recorded here and now that the story of General Sandino and his

"150 followers" was sheerest nonsense. Tabulation of casualties shows that approximately 670 "bandits" have been killed since Colonel Stimson reported. And since at least twice that number have been wounded in those same engagements, Sandino's total casualties during the period under discussion must have been around 2,000. Yet, on December 30, this extraordinary general seems to have had with him 500 followers.

It is perfectly patent, therefore, that the American public has been disgracefully spoofed. Not only has General Sandino's strength been grossly underestimated, but the inspiration to make it appear that he and his followers are mere bandits was equally ridiculous. Any further attempt to keep up this fiction becomes an insult to the American public.

We should at least be honest with ourselves. For the time being, at any rate, Nicaragua has become an American protectorate, and what we are doing down there is not fighting bandits, but Nicaraguans in revolt against our rule.

Admittedly we have certain well-defined rights in Nicaragua —our canal rights, for example. But unless we wish to spoil our chances for real understanding with the rest of Latin America, we must find a better procedure than killing off vast numbers of native rebels on the pretext that they are bandits.

"We are not at war with these people, and they have in no way injured us," points out the Baltimore *Sun*. "We have blundered into this thing," explains the New York *World*, "and are now trying, with the help of God and a few marines, to fight our way out of it." These might also be said to summarize the editorial sentiments of such papers as the Providence *News*, Troy *Record*, Brooklyn *Eagle*, and Cleveland *Plain Dealer*.

Such administration supporters as the Washington *Post*, New York *Herald Tribune*, and Philadelphia *Inquirer*, however, maintain that we are fully justified in sending marines to Nicaragua, and that we ought to stay on the job until the rebel leader, Sandino, is captured or his followers dispersed. "Nicaragua needs an era of peace and constructive effort," declares the Philadelphia paper. "That is why our marines are campaigning there." Heretofore, asserts the Syracuse *Post-Standard*, "our fault has been, not too much interference, but too little," and the Springfield *Union* is convinced that—

In carrying on a relentless campaign against General Sandino, the United States is engaged in no imperialistic undertaking

threatening the political sovereignty of Nicaragua. The marines are in Nicaragua at the invitation of the Nicaraguan government, and General Sandino is a recognized outlaw, disowned by the Liberal party who employed his services in last winter's civil war. His capture would be a cause for congratulation in Nicaragua, as well as in the United States.

The United States government, points out the Washington *Post,* "sent its forces into Nicaragua to protect American life and property. It recognized the constitutional government of the republic, and has been cooperating with it against bandits who pretend to be fighting for 'liberty.'" To quote the New York *Herald Tribune:*

It is the onerous task of the marines to aid Nicaragua to maintain order and to tranquilize the country in preparation for the 1928 election. They deserve all possible support in this work of pacification. Sandino is no Nicaraguan politician; no irreconcilable patriot. He is only a type of desperado.

BRIEF EXCERPTS

Let no American think that the banana belt [Central America] likes what it has to abide by.—*Carroll Binder. New Republic.* 50:90. *March* 16, 1927.

Too frequently the State Department has used military intervention in Caribbean countries for the profit of private business interests.—*Parker T. Moon. Survey.* 58:24. *April* 1, 1927.

It is now generally recognized that there exists an obligation of non-intervention, as correlative of the right of independence.—*George G. Wilson. Cyclopedia of American Government. v. 2, p.* 234.

Prima facie intervention is a hostile act, because it constitutes an attack upon the independence of the state subjected to it.—*William E. Hall. A Treatise on International Law (eighth edition,* 1924). *p.* 337.

God forbid that we should ever be twenty years without a rebellion. The tree of liberty must be refreshed

from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. —*Thomas Jefferson. Works. v.* 4, *p.* 467.

We have just confiscated foreign property by the millions by passing the Prohibition amendment, yet no one would think that that gave a foreign government the right to intervene in our affairs.—*Samuel G. Inman. Intervention in Mexico. p.* 28.

With the right of independence goes the correlative obligation of non-intervention, i.e., of refraining from all acts that would forcibly limit the freedom of another state.—*George G. Wilson. International Law (eighth edition). p.* 87.

Intervention on the ground of financial transactions is not now sanctioned [by international law]. A state may make any injustice done its subjects by a foreign state a matter of diplomatic negotiations.—*George G. Wilson. International Law. p.* 94.

Our relations with Latin America are poisoned by the feelings roused by several instances of this imperialistic tendency on the part of the United States, and of all these instances our actions in Haiti are perhaps the most flagrant.—*Emily G. Balch. Occupied Haiti. p.* 149-50.

Harding said he would not "empower an assistant secretary of the navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the point of bayonets borne by United States marines."—New York *Times. August* 29, 1920. *p.* 1, col. 5.

Senator Harding attacked the (Wilson) administration's course toward the smaller republics of the western hemisphere, asserting that we were at war now with "our neighbors to the south" through the usurpation by the executive of powers "scrupulously withheld by the con-

stitution."—New York *Times. September* 18, 1920. *p.* 14, *col.* 2.

Our course in Nicaragua is an utter perversion of the Monroe Doctrine. It is an assumption of a right to do ourselves what we deny to European nations. We have not left Nicaragua to herself. We have virtually taken her over.—*Kenneth McKellar. Congressional Record.* 68:2225. *January* 25, 1927.

One who will check up the number of rumors printed each week by the American press concerning dire happenings in Mexico, which a short lapse of time proves to be untrue, will be ready to question seriously what influence is directing our press.—*Samuel G. Inman. Intervention in Mexico. p.* 14.

The necessity for putting an end to the constant disorders in Central America and thereby removing the liability of European interference in those republics has been generally recognized.—*George T. Weitzel. Former United States minister to Nicaragua. Senate Document no.* 334. 64th *Congress,* 1st *session.* 1916.

On February 6, 1921, a group of 22 marines and 1 hospital, first class, while on authorized liberty in Managua, broke down the doors of the printing shop of La Tribuna and entering caused some damage and considerable confusion to the property inside.—*Charles E. Hughes. Letter to the President. January* 9, 1924.

Latin-American students in Paris on February 1, 1927, called upon all Latin-Americans, in protest against the policy of the United States in Central America, to adopt as their motto: "Boycott Yankee capital and products."—*Charles W. Hackett. Current History.* 26:106. *April,* 1927.

The principles which gave to our early statesmen the inspiration of domestic policy soon found expression in

our foreign relations. The most fundamental one was that of non-intervention.—*Charles E. Martin. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law.* 93:293. 1921.

As we reread the story of the five weeks' revolution in Nicaragua, we can see what substantial foundations there are for the charge that this government went into Nicaragua, or was fooled into going into Nicaragua, in behalf of self-seeking American interests.—*Nation.* 95:226. *September* 12, 1912.

Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.—*United States Supreme Court.* 168 *U. S.* 252. 1897.

As far as any comment I have heard, or as far as my information goes, I have yet to learn of the first American who has been injured in Nicaragua, and I have yet to learn of a single dollar's worth of property being destroyed.—*Milton A. Romjue. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.* 69*th Congress,* 2d *session, on conditions in Nicaragua and Mexico. p.* 15.

No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone.—*United States Supreme Court. Decision written by Chief Justice John Marshall.* 10 *Wheaton* 122. 1825.

Editorial comment in the foreign press, both European and Latin-American, has been critical of the course being pursued by the United States [in Nicaragua]. Charges of imperialism were frequently made, particularly in the Latin-American press, during the course of events in January. American intervention has been denounced in virtually all of the South American capitals.—*Foreign Policy Association Information Service.* 2:302. *February* 2, 1927.

Turning for aid to the United States, the Haitian government floated a loan in New York [in 1902] at twelve per cent and invested large sums in ammunition at two or three times the usual price. Unabashed by these commitments, American munition makers showed an equal interest in the revolutionary forces fighting for "liberty" and sold them instruments of destruction, also on profitable terms.—*Charles and Mary Beard. The Rise of American Civilization. v. 2, p.* 505.

The forcible collection of public debts: This subject as embodied in the program "that the Second Peace Conference at The Hague be requested to consider whether, and if at all, to what extent, the use of force for the collection of public debt is admissible," overshadowed in interest all other topics before the conference.—*Report of the delegates of the United States to the Third International Conference of the American States held at Rio de Janeiro,* 1906. *p.* 12. *Printed as Senate Document no.* 365. 59th *Congress,* 2d *session.* 1907.

The citizens of one country in case of a civil disturbance in another are entitled to no greater protection than the citizens of that country. Of course, in Nicaragua, if any faction should turn out against American citizens and attack them as Americans, we would be justified in forceful intervention, but the mere fact that fighting is going on and Americans are incidentally injured

does not afford ground for intervention in time of civil strife.—*John H. Latané. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January* 12, 1927. *p.* 32.

It was found neecssary to use force in holding natives at the task of roadbuilding. Moreover, local orators and editors, according to American reports, conducted such an "agitation against the United States officials who are aiding and supporting the constitutional government of Haiti," that vigilance dictated the suppression of newspapers and public meetings and the institution of trial by court-martial.—*Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. The Rise of American Civilization. v.* 2, *p.* 509.

It is unfortunate that publicists have not laid down broadly and unanimously that no intervention is legal, except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless the whole body of civilized states have [sic] concurred in authorizing it. . . Evil-doing would have been at least sometimes compelled to show itself in its true colors. It would have found more difficulty in clothing itself in a generous disguise.—*William E. Hall. A Treatise on International Law. (Eighth edition.) p.* 343-4.

Armed intervention should not be used for the purpose of conquest, whether the conquest is hidden behind subtleties or not. If the marines are used to coerce weak countries like Haiti and Nicaragua into signing away their independence, even though the process be ingeniously contrived by installing puppet governments, we cannot disclaim imperialism and military imperialism at that. Fortunately the Senate has more than once served as a check on efforts of the department to carry out veiled protectorate projects.—*Parker T. Moon. Survey.* 58:24. *April* 1, 1927.

In years past vast quantities [of American private capital] have been sunk or lost in countries such as Mexico and various of the South American states and in other undeveloped parts of the world. Nevertheless, hostility to the United States exists in many of those countries which have received the most generous treatment at the hands of our capitalists and investors; and some of our most serious foreign problems have grown out of the desire of those, who have made past advances, to get a moderate amount of governmental protection.—*Literary Digest.* 62:137. *September* 6, 1919.

Intervention, such as that of England and Germany in Venezuela, coming in the midst of civil insurrection, endangers the very existence of the state; and the right to a continued existence is the most sacred of all sovereign rights. It is not always possible for a state to pay its debts, and of that fact the state itself is the sole judge; for if this question is to be settled by foreign states, the very existence of that state is at the mercy of its creditors. The most that a foreigner has the right to expect is that his claims shall receive the same consideration as those of subjects.—*John H. Latané. America as a World Power. p.* 277.

It would make for the peace of the world, and we think also for justice and fair dealing, if The Hague conference would enunciate these two principles: (1) That any citizen doing business in any civilized country must depend on the courts of that country for the protection of his business interests. (2) That any nation having a financial claim, either on its own account or as a representative of its citizens, against any other nation, must present the claim before The Hague Tribunal; it must not constitute itself judge, jury, and sheriff, and proceed itself to collect the debt by force of arms.—*Editorial. Outlook.* 83:355. *June* 16, 1906.

I utterly disclaim, as unwarranted, the observations which occasionally have been made implying a claim on our part to superintend the affairs of our sister republics, to assert an overlordship, to consider the spread of our authority beyond our own domain as the aim of our policy, and to make our power the test of right in this hemisphere. I oppose all such misconceived and unsound assertions or intimations. They do not express our national purpose; they are false to the fundamental principles of our institutions; and they find no sanction whatever in the Monroe Doctrine.—*Charles Evans Hughes. Review of Reviews.* 77:39-40. *January,* 1928.

Unquestionably the chief obstacle to a happy cooperation between Latin and English America is just this question of our relations with the Caribbean republics. The less friendly South American newspapers watch our movements with the intensest [sic] jealousy. The protectorate over Cuba, benevolent though it may be, and our policing of the more erratic republics of Central America, expose us to endless criticism. The interventions of American marines and diplomatic agents in Nicaragua and Honduras are pictured as the cause rather than the consequence of the political inquietude.—*Clarence H. Haring. Foreign Affairs.* 5:373-4. *April,* 1927.

Our policy should not rest solely upon mahogany and oil, or depend for its execution upon warships and marines. People who acquire property in foreign lands should at all times be willing to submit their property rights, if brought in question, either to the laws and courts of the country in which their property is situated or at most to arbitration. It ought to be regarded as a crime to defend by force and with American marines a title or a claim that cannot stand the inspection of an arbitrator. The American taxpayer should not be called upon to protect property or titles which claimants are un-

willing to have adjudicated.—*William E. Borah. Current History.* 26:106. *April,* 1927.

The situation which exists in Nicaragua today [1918] is inherently and fundamentally wrong, and it cannot form a basis for a permanent settlement satisfactory either to that country or to the United States. Our government cannot continue to uphold by force a minority administration and to support that administration in a financial policy which is opposed by the great majority of the Nicaraguan people, if it wishes to eradicate the suspicion in Central America, and in fact throughout Latin America, that its ultimate intention is to deprive Nicaragua, and eventually her neighbors, of their position as independent nations.—*Dana G. Munro. The Five Republics of Central America. p.* 264.

No right to place armed forces within the territory of a friendly nation is conceded under any circumstances by international law. It rests not in a principle of law, it is merely a practice of nations, and I may say that nations practice it only in cases where they are dealing with those of inferior strength to themselves. A riot in New York endangering foreign property, or machine-gun battles between gangsters on the streets of Chicago, would not be considered to afford to any of the great nations the slightest reason why they should send their armed forces there. Sometimes the practice is tolerated, usually because those on whom it is practiced are not able to resist. *George Huddleston. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January* 13, 1927. *p.* 36.

In 1866 Spain was engaged in hostilities with the republics of Ecuador, Peru and Chile. Respecting this conflict Secretary Seward wrote our minister in Chile: "The Government of the United States will maintain and insist, with all the decision and energy which are compatible with our existing neutrality, that the republican

system which is accepted by any one of those states shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers"; but, he added, the United States will not "consider itself bound to take part in wars in which a South American republic may enter with a European sovereign, when the object of the latter is not the establishment, in place of a subverted republic, of a monarchy under a European prince."—*John W. Foster. A Century of American Diplomacy. p.* 461.

To take up the question from the point of view of international law— it is a rather dubious question as to how far a state may go in landing armed forces. Of course, it is said that in the Nicaragua case it was done at the request of one side, but I think you will all admit that there is a big difference between landing armed forces for the protection of the lives and property of people, say in Nicaragua or in Mexico, and landing armed forces for the protection of the property of American citizens who are not in Nicaragua but who may be in Wall Street, or somewhere else, and I think that is a very important distinction to bear in mind. You are only justified in landing troops when there is immediate danger to the lives and property of your citizens at the point where those troops are landed.—*John H. Latané. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January* 12, 1927. *p.* 20.

We have imposed our force upon weak, hopeless, and defenseless countries, and slaughtered thousands of their citizens. We have attacked them when they expected we would defend them. We have used the Monroe Doctrine to prevent sympathetic European nations going to their rescue when we abused them. In each case of intervention we have been guilty of violating the sovereign rights of neighbors and of proceeding contrary to the universally recognized principles of international law. Instead

of sending them teachers, instructors, and helpers, we have sent them concession-hunters, conscienceless and usurious bankers, avaricious financiers, bribers, commercial tricksters, murderers, soldiers, degenerates, and carriers of infectious diseases. Instead of trying to elevate and make their people better and more patriotic, we have made crooks and traitors of many of them, in order that our unscrupulous bankers, capitalists, and Washington can control the government and affairs of their countries. —*Horace G. Knowles. Literary Digest.* 94:13. *September* 17, 1927.

President Roosevelt's policy undoubtedly warded off serious difficulty in the case of Santo Domingo, but the ultimate effects of that policy are not yet evident; for, if it be taken as a precedent that the United States will in every case assume responsibility for the payment of the debts of American states, the bankers of Europe will find it profitable to buy up all doubtful claims against American states and urge their governments to press for payment. Our navy would thus be converted into a debt-collecting agency for the powers of Europe, and the only escape from such a predicament would be the establishment of a protectorate over the weaker Latin-American states, and the imposition upon them of a provision like the Platt amendment, by which Cuba has bound herself not to contract any foreign debt without the consent of the United States "the payment of which cannot be provided for by the ordinary revenues of the island."—*John H. Latané. America as a World Power. p.* 281-2.

A powerful neighbor which is really interested in their welfare will recognize that the Mexicans of today are the victims of a tragic past, the consequences of which must be slowly and patiently neutralized. If it wishes to play the part of a friend and to help them to become as desirable neighbors as the Canadians, it should look out for and encourage any trustworthy indications

on their part of increasing collective self-control and self-confidence. A snobbish attitude of superiority is now preventing the United States from doing this very thing. The most offensive recent official expression of it was the magisterial impertinence with which our State Department informed President Calles that his government was on trial.—*New Republic.* 49:316. *February* 9, 1927.

Our concern for the independence and prosperity of the states of Central and South America is not altered. We retain unabated the spirit that has inspired us throughout the whole life of our government and which was so frankly put into words by President Monroe. We still mean always to make a common cause of national independence and of political liberty in America. But that purpose is now better understood so far as it concerns ourselves. It is known not to be a selfish purpose. It is known to have in it no thought of taking advantage of any government in this hemisphere or playing its political fortunes for our own benefit. All the governments of America stand, so far as we are concerned, upon a footing of genuine equality and unquestioned independence. We have been put to the test in the case of Mexico, and we have stood the test. Whether we have benefited Mexico by the course we have pursued remains to be seen. Her fortunes are in her own hands. But we have at least proved that we will not take advantage of her in her distress and undertake to impose upon her an order and government of our own choosing. *Woodrow Wilson. Address to Congress. December 7,* 1915. *p.* 4.

The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in

no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World power at the expense of any other. We do not ask under this doctrine for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American state. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power. Our attitude in Cuba is a sufficient guaranty of our own good faith. We have not the slightest desire to secure any territory at the expense of any of our neighbors.—*Theodore Roosevelt. Message to Congress. December* 3, 1901. *p.* 28-9.

Whatever the merits of our stand in Mexican and Nicaraguan questions, it is an unmistakable fact that our policy in these matters has at once roused protest and denunciation from one end of South America to the other, and in the same fashion provoked European criticisms and played Europe's game. We have not at the moment a friendly public opinion in any Latin-American country. All the influential press has recently been united in denouncing American imperialism. All of this denunciation finds ready echo in Europe and is the basis for an ever-growing solidarity between European and South American sympathies. There is thus raised the very simple question as to whether any country can afford the collective hatred of most of the rest of the world. On the Japanese side our immigration policy has roused enduring Japanese resentment. In Latin America our various attempts to protect American rights have ended by creating a solidarity of distrust which begins at the Rio Grande and extends to Cape Horn. In Europe our debt policy has united all our debtors and is rapidly bringing together the nations which suffer as a consequence of the delay in recovery which our policy imposes.—*Frank H. Simonds. Review of Reviews.* 75:276. *March,* 1927.

The president's message [of January 10, 1927] is not a satisfactory explanation to me. In the first place, there is great emphasis placed on the canal treaty, and the fact that we have a right of way for a canal through Nicaragua. We know perfectly well that that treaty was signed as a part of a definite policy on the part of the United States to secure control of all available canal routes because we did not want to be embarrassed by some foreign country undertaking to secure rights-of-way for a canal connecting the two oceans. So, here is an available canal route. We have acquired control of that—not that we want to build a canal immediately, but at some time in the future it may be necessary to supplement the Panama Canal. But the main reason was to prevent anybody else from building a canal there. To say that we have to land a large force of marines in Nicaragua to protect this canal route seems to me an absurdity, and when a man gives a reason of that kind as an excuse for his action, it always raises in my mind a suspicion that there is some real reason for the action which he does not care to express, because that is not a reason, and nobody is threatening to take away from us the right to build a canal at some time in the future. That treaty would enable us to protest instantly in case any party in Nicaragua should grant a concession to some foreign power to build a canal. Of course, we would step in under our treaty rights and say "no." But is there any possible danger of anyone going in there at the present time?—*John H. Latané. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January* 12, 1927. *p.* 20-1.

Nicaraguan opposition may be expected to increase as the occupation is prolonged, but as yet it is less manifest than is the hostility in other parts of Central America. The Central American press, very often inspired from Mexico, so one is assured, is loud in its condemnation of Yankee imperialism and officiousness. Students and trade

unionists parade the streets of Guatemala and Salvador with anti-American banners, and hold mass meetings pledging their undying resistance to the extension of Yankee domination, and their sympathy with Nicaragua, Haiti, and Panama. American business men whom I encountered in four of the Central American republics were a unit in reporting that the opposition to American activity in Nicaragua was expressed by refusal to buy from or sell to American traders, whenever some other foreigner could be favored. I have seen the books of one of the largest companies doing business in Central America. They bore eloquent testimony to this discrimination. The irony of the situation is that the favored non-American foreigners, with the exception of the Germans, have been more vociferous than the American traders in clamoring for firm action on the part of Washington. But the United States is alone held responsible for the course pursued in Nicaragua. Your Latin-conscious Central American will sell his coffee to a German or an English buyer if the price is anywhere near being equal, and he will buy a German sewing machine in preference to one coming from the country which he thinks is oppressing Nicaragua and may shortly intervene in his country. One hears no mighty cry for intervention from these American business men.—*Carroll Binder. New Republic.* 50:90. *March* 16, 1927.

There is one peculiarity about the history of the Latin-American states which I am sure they are keenly aware of. You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege, and states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the

main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions, are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination which has been inevitable to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate. The dignity, the courage, the self-possession, the respect of the Latin-American states, their achievments in the face of all these adverse circumstances, deserve nothing but the admiration and applause of the world. They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater, and the securities were taken that destroyed the risks. An admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms. I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation.—*Woodrow Wilson. Address to the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile. October 27,* 1913.

The administration first said, with reference to Nicaragua, that we were neutral, that we were simply going there to protect American lives and property. We have now changed that position. We admit that they are there for other purposes. I call your particular attention to the statements carried by the President's message [of January 10, 1927]. He said (p. 8):

> The total public debt of Nicaragua has been reduced from about $22,000,000 in 1917 to $6,625,203 at the beginning of 1926. Furthermore, the country in time of peace has ample revenues for its ordinary budget expenses and a surplus which has been used in extensive public improvements.

On page 9—I read only the germane parts:

> There is no question that if the revolution continues American investments and business interests in Nicaragua will be very seriously affected, if not destroyed.
>
> American as well as foreign bondholders will undoubtedly look to the United States for the protection of their interests.

What are the interests there? First, the interests of American property owners and the American owners of Nicaraguan bonds. Second, the interests of foreign bond holders. Those are the two interests of private individuals. Third is the cession to us of a right to construct a canal across Nicaragua. Those are the three interests that we have there. The President says they will be jeopardized by revolutionary movements and that he is determined to protect them. That means—I do not see how it can be interpreted to mean anything else, and it necessarily does mean something—that the president has intervened in Nicaragua to suppress the revolution, for the purpose of establishing Diaz who can be relied upon to do those things, as president, he wants done in there.—*George Huddleston. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January* 13, 1927. *p.* 40.

The policy of the United States, in regard to the several Spanish-American states, is, or ought to be, well known now, after the exposition it has received during the last five years. We maintain and insist, with all the decision and energy which is compatible with our existing neutrality, that the republican system which is accepted by the people in any one of those states shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers. We concede to every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes other than political or ambitious as it thinks right and wise. In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with ourselves, if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political

point before mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain neutral, conceding nothing to one belligerent that we do not concede to the other, and allowing to one belligerent what we allow to the other. We certainly thought that it was an act of friendship on our part that we obtained assurances from Spain, at the beginning and at other stages of the present war, that, in any event, her hostilities against Chile should not be prosecuted beyond the limits which I have before described. We understand ourselves now and henceforth ready to hold Spain to this agreement, if, contrary to our present expectations, it should be found necessary. Those who think that the United States could enter as an ally into every war in which a friendly republican state on this continent becomes involved, forget that peace is the constant interest and the unwavering policy of the United States. They forget the frequency and variety of wars in which our friends in this hemisphere engage themselves entirely independent of all control or counsel of the United States. If there is any one characteristic of the United States which is more marked than any other, it is that they have from the time of Washington adhered to the principle of non-intervention, and have perseveringly declined to seek or contract entangling alliances, even with the most friendly states.—*William H. Seward. Letter to Judson Kilpatrick. United States minister to Chile. June* 2, 1866. *Executive Documents* 1866-67. *v.* 1, *p.* 413-14.

The American Federation of Labor has taken a strong and most advanced position upon some of the most momentous subjects appearing on the agenda of the Havana conference. In the diplomatic controversies which arise between the Government of the United States and the Republic of Mexico, we favored international arbitration as a means of bringing an honorable and just settlement of any dispute which could not be settled through the ordinary channels by direct negotiations. Furthermore,

organized labor of the United States has expressed itself as being irrevocably opposed to every form of unauthorized intervention in the domestic or political affairs of other nations. The most recent convention of the American Federation of Labor, held in Los Angeles, Cal., beginning October 3, 1927, unanimously expressed the hope that "the United States will again adopt the policy which in the main it adhered to during the first century of our national life, a policy based upon the proposition that Americans and so-called American interests in foreign countries must abide by and accept the consequences of the laws of such countries, just as foreigners and foreign interests within our borders must abide by and accept the consequences of American law."

Labor's international principles as well as labor's principles of self-government are comparable with those of most all other groups of people within the United States and the Pan-American countries. The peoples of the New World are committed to the principle of self-determination of government. This is no new policy. It is traditional Americanism. It is a policy supported by the overwhelming sentiment of the American people. Only selfish interests within the United States and abroad, which are influenced by greed and a desire for exploitation, oppose it. The working people of the United States are firmly convinced that cordial and friendly relations can only be established and maintained between all countries represented in the Pan-American Union through the development of a perfect understanding that the Government of the United States will not, at any time, interfere in the affairs of any Latin-American nation and will not, either directly or indirectly, encroach upon their sovereign or territorial rights. Such a guarantee should be absolute, without reservation.—*Pres. William Green of the Am. Fed. of Labor, in a letter to Charles Evans Hughes, chairman of U.S. delegation to Pan-American conference in session at Havana. N. Y. Times. January* 27, 1927.



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